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This Working Paper forms part of a series of five volumes 
dealing with the "Europeanisation" of product safety law. They 
are the result of a study carried out on behalf of the Commission 
of the EC which has so far been published only in German*. The 
publication of this English version has been made possible by a 
grant from Directorate General XI.
The five volumes of this series of Working Papers should 
thus be read in context. Volume 1 (Chapter I) aims to show why 
product safety law has given rise to extremely diverse regulation 
patterns and to provide an overview of the most important 
instruments for action.
Volumes 2 and 3 (Chapter II) are concerned with recent 
developments in the relevant legislation of the economically most 
important Community Member States and of the United States. 
Volume 2 (Chapter II, Parts 1 and 2) contains reports on France 
and the United Kingdom, Volume 3 (Chapter II parts 3 and 4) 
deals with the Federal Republic of Germany and the US 
Consumer Product Safety Act 1972, which is of crucial 
importance in the international debate.
Volume 4 (Chapters III and IV) analyses the development of 
the "traditional" policy of approximation of law and of efforts at a 
"horizontal" European product safety policy. In both policy areas 
it proved impossible to realise the Community's programmatic
Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-W. Micklitz, Die Sicherheit von 





























































































goals. As far as policy on achieving the internal market is 
concerned, the Commission itself has pointed out the reasons and 
called for, and implemented, a fundamental revision of traditional 
legal approximation policy. This reorientation of Community 
policy is dealt with in Chapters IV; it describes the most 
important precursors of the new internal market policy, namely 
ECJ case law on Articles 30 and 36 EEC since the Cassis de 
Dijon judgment, and regulatory technique for the Low Voltage 
Directive and then analyses the new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards, whereby the Community will 
restrict itself in its directives to setting "essential safety 
requirements", leaving it to European and national 
standardisation bodies to convert these safety requirements into 
technical specifications.
Volume 5 (Chapters V and VI) evaluates the effects of the 
Community's new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards on product safety policy. Chapter V diagnoses a new 
need for action in the area of product safety policy, including in 
particular the internal organisation of the standardisation process, 
and participation by consumer associations in European 
standardisation. Chapter VI continues a comprehensive 
discussion of alternatives open for co-ordinating internal market 
and product safety policy. It argues that a policy of 
"deregulating" Member States' product safety legislation would 
not be feasible, and opts for a "positive" supplementation of the 
new approach by a horizontal Community product safety policy. 
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The "traditional" harmonisation policy approaches to re­
m oving technical barriers to trade and efforts at a 
"horizontal" European product safety policy
The process of European integration affects the laws of 
product safety in many ways. Every law approximation policy 
measure, whereby the Community harmonises its legal and ad­
ministrative provisions in the interest of the "functioning of the 
Common Market" (Art. 100 EEC, 1st paragraph), that also relates 
to the conditions for marketing products, necessarily contains 
substantive provisions that may in Member States act to promote 
or else to place restraints on product safety policy. These re­
straints may be preempted decisions at the choice of regulatory 
instruments and substantive definitions of the safety level to be 
aimed at. As well as law approximation policy, primary Commu­
nity law restricts the Member States' field of action. While ECJ 
case law on Arts. 30 and 36 EEC has confirmed Member States' 
responsibility for product safety, it also subjects this responsibil­
ity to checks against principles of Community law. Finally, the 
Community has, following adoption of its Consumer Policy Pro­
grammes, developed approaches towards a "horizontal" European 
product safety policy of its own.
It nevertheless remains difficult to specify the nature of the 
Community's influence on product safety law more exactly, to 
recognise the consequences of the integration process for law in 
Member States and to find answers to the questions of what 
product safety policy tasks the Community should be responsible 
for and which instruments it ought to employ in so doing. Jurists 
are accustomed to approaching such questions by seeking to 




























































































Member States. However apparent and inevitable this delineation 
of competencies may be, it rapidly emerges that the legal frame­
work set by the EEC Treaty leaves the Community with enor­
mous latitude, and can hardly define the priorities of Community 
policy (1.1 infra). Since Community law determines the process 
of Europeanisation of product safety policy only to a very limited 
extent, it is tempting to fall back on economic and politi- 
calscience theories in explaining the actual course of this process. 
But attempts to date to reconstruct the process of European inte­
gration using economic models or political structural analyses 
have scarcely gone beyond the development of relatively abstract 
hypotheses on the effects of the general European policy frame­
work conditions (1.2 infra). In view of this ambiguity not only in 
the law but also in sociological integration research, it is presum­
ably justified in analysing Community practice to begin with 
long-term political programmes that the Community has taken as 
a guide in influencing product safety law: the 1969 General Pro­
gramme on removing technical barriers to trade, and the pro­
grammes to protect and inform consumers (2 and 3 infra). It is 
the fate of political programmes, and not only where the Com­
munity is concerned, to never fully realise their original objec­
tives. But the Community's responses to discrepancies between 
its original programmatic conceptions and the actual course of 
the integration process will be further analyzed in Chapters III 
and IV.
1. Framework conditions for the Europeanisation o f  
product safety policy
The Community's competencies are by no means compre­
hensive. Its legislative acts in principle operate indirectly in 




























































































powers in only a few policy areas. All this influences both the 
orientation and the implementation of Community policy. All the 
same, these general framework conditions do not constitute insu­
perable legal barriers to the Community's possibilities of influ­
encing product safety law.
1.1 The openness of the legal framework
A first indirect possibility for the Community to intervene in 
Member States' product safety law is offered by Art. 30 EEC. Al- 
hough the ban on discriminatory import restrictions and all mea­
sures having an equivalent effect is by Art. 36 EEC for measures 
which, among other things, serve "the protection of health and 
life of humans", this has not prevented the ECJ from subjecting 
non-discriminatory marketing regulations to substantive verifica­
tion1. Hopes or fears that the ECJ would use this supervisory pos­
sibility in order to "deregulate" product safety law in Member 
States have however not been realised2.
Accordingly, the provisions of Arts. 100 et seq. EEC on ap­
proximation of laws remain the most important basis for Com­
munity policy. Art. 101 EEC even provides the possibility of 
adopting directives by qualified majority where legal differences 
are "distorting the conditions of competition in the Common 
Market". Significantly, the Community has refrained from at­
tempting to clarify the conditions for applying this provision, 
which are controversial in the literature3, thereby circumventing 
the difficulties of reaching consensus on law approximation mea-
1 Cf. esp. ECJ Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979] 
649 — Cassis de Dijon; see Chapter IV, 1.1.





























































































sures under Art. 100 EEC. This cautiousness is hardly surprising. 
It is one of the indications that the limits to Community action in 
fact cannot be determined purely "legally"4.
The Community's powers to take measures to approximate 
laws on product safety under Art. 100 EEC cannot de facto be 
limited by binding the Commission to particular integration pol­
icy objectives. There have of course been repeated attempts to 
derive the limits to Community competence specifically in areas 
of "social regulation" (chiefly health, consumer protection and 
the environment) from the requirement in Art. 100 EEC, stating 
that law approximation measures should have to do with the mar­
ket5. But it cannot be denied that differences in product safety 
law constitute non-tariff barriers to trade and therefore "directly 
affect the establishment or functioning of the Common Market". 
This realisation leads directly to the position that in order to avert 
emergent regulatory differences the Community can exert a 
shaping influence "even in anticipation of the development of 
new legal areas"6. If as is the prevailing view today, the law­
making competencies of Art. 100 EEC are taken in connection 
with the preamble and Art. 2 EEC7, and further bearing in mind 
that in drafting directives the Community can lay claim to very 
wide discretion8, then it is hard to identify any definitive legal 
bounds to product safety policy harmonisation at all. Moreover,
3 Cf. Rohling, 1972, 95 et seq., and more recently Collins/Hutchings, 
1986, 197 et seq.
4 Cf. also the reports on the Commission's present consideration of acti­
vation of Arts. 101 et seq. EEC, in Collins/Hutchings, 1986, 198 et 
seq.; Pipkorn, Art. 101, No. 24.
5 From the German literature, see e.g. Kaiser, 1980, 102 et seq.; Börner, 
1981.
6 Taschner, Art. 100, No. 23.
7 Cf. Close, 1978; Krämer, 1985, Nos. 6 et seq., 15 et seq., and for the 
analogous case of environmental policy Rehbinder/Stewart, 1985, 21 et 
seq., with other references.




























































































in addition to the instrument of the directive, the Community has 
by Art. 235 EEC a second and likewise very far-reaching power 
to act. This provision may, as the ECJ has confirmed9, be taken 
advantage of where directives do not offer an "adequately effec­
tive means" to attain treaty objectives.
The demonstration that no clear limits to the Europeanisa­
tion of product safety law can be derived from the new Art. 100 
a, Arts. 100 and 235 EEC does not explicitly respond to the 
questions of "dynamic" interpretation of these provisions. It may 
be very hard to derive clear criteria for the delimitation and con­
trol of European law-making activity from differences between 
the Community legal system and Member States' constitutions. 
But one indirect consequence, which is hard to grasp in formal 
legal terms, is definitely irrefutable: entry by the Community into 
areas of social regulation will lead to a conflict of objectives be­
tween a law approximation policy oriented merely towards mar­
ket integration as such and a legislative policy oriented towards 
the substantive quality of regulations10.
The Community's powers under Arts. 100, 100 a and 235 
EEC compensate for the absence of genuine powers of direct ac­
tion and administration by the Community. The most obvious 
way to reach uniform administrative practice is to harmonise the 
conditions for recognising national administrative acts11. The 
objective connection between approximation of laws and har­
monisation of administrative practice is undeniable, particularly 
in the area of product safety law. Admittedly, such co-ordination 
is enormously complicated in practice, especially since, as M.
9 ECJ Case 8/73, Judgment of 12 July 1973, ECR [1973] 897 (907) — 
Massey-Ferguson.
10 Cf. Everling 1976, 170 et seq.; Langeheine, Art. 100, No. 54; Seidel, 
Kiinftige Regelungsprobleme, 1985, 170 et seq.; Bruha/Kindermann, 




























































































Seidel rightly stresses12, it affects the political "quality" of the 
integration process: it means an "approfondissement" of the inte­
gration process, legal reservations against which are not justified, 
but can at the same time be perceived by Member States as a 
threat to their sovereignty, and by national administrations as a 
restriction on their powers.
1.1 Excursus into integration theory
In practice, the potentially enormously broad legal frame­
work for Community policy in product safety law could be used 
only extremely selectively and incompletely. The discrepancy 
between what is legally possible and what is politically feasible is 
a central theme of sociological integration research, which not 
only explains the difficulties of the integration process but looks 
to guide the choice of integration policy strategies. Recently in 
this area, the American economic theory of federalism has been 
taken up, and efforts at a political interpretation of the Commu­
nity's legal order have been renewed.
1.2.1 The economic theory o f federalism and conflicting eco­
nomic interests in connection with the Europeanisation 
o f product safety law
The economic theory of federalism seeks, in its normative 
part, to answer the question of what regulatory tasks can more 
rationally be handled ("economically") at a central level, and 
which better at a decentralised level. "Positive" federalism theory 
then tries to identify the factors that actually determine the ac-




























































































tions of those involved in politics, and bases recommendations 
for political strategies on this positive analysis13. Normative ar­
guments for centralisation (fédéralisation) of regulatory activities 
apply where the costs and advantages of a measure cannot be 
confined to a particular jurisdiction ("externalities"), where reg­
ulatory differences can be strategically exploited by economic 
actors, starting off a regulatory "race to the bottom" ("prisoner's 
dilemma”), where duplication of administrative tasks (e.g. in the 
area of research) causes superfluous costs ("diseconomies of 
scale"), where the scale advantages of uniform regulation out­
weigh the chances of innovative product design and where fédér­
alisation weakens the influence of interest groups14. While such 
normative considerations can, cum grano salis, be transferred to 
the European situation notwithstanding the institutional differ­
ences between the Community and the US, this is much less true 
of the positive analysis. The current federalism debate presup­
poses an already economically integrated market, a parliamentary 
democratic constitution for the "central government" and the ex­
istence of a federal administration with a wide range of tasks and 
powers. It is on this institutional framework that the assumptions 
about interests and about the behaviour of industry, unions, con­
sumers, and State and federal political actors are based, which in 
turn underlie hypotheses about the chances for a federal take-over 
of regulatory tasks from individual States or about the — at pre­
sent more topical15 — efforts at decentralisation. The Community 
situation differs from that of the US in several respects. This is 
primarily true as regards the process of political opinion-forming 
and decision-making. Political actors, who are according to the 
assumptions of economic theory oriented either to the expecta-
12 Seidel, Kiinftige Regelungsprobleme, 1985.
13 From the extensive literature, see Rose-Ackerman, 1981; Noam, 1982;
Mashaw/Rose-Ackerman, 1984; Fix, 1984.





























































































dons of a particular clientele ("constituency politics"), or to more 
general regulatory attitudes and programmes ("electoral politics") 
lose part of their possibilities of self-presentation and influence, 
which are guaranteed only nationally, if they involve themselves 
in dealing with regulatory task at the European level16. European 
business maintains different interests and possibilités of influence 
. It has a degree of integration comparable with the US in only a 
few areas and therefore finds it enormously hard to develop a 
consistent position on uniformisation of product safety require­
ments. The two aspects mentioned are also connected with the 
different underlying assumptions of American federalism and of 
European integration. Explanations for the emergence of Ameri­
can federalism largely relate to situations concerning the intro­
duction of new regulations or their generalisation, whereas the 
Community as a rule finds itself facing firmly established regula­
tions that tend to differ in nature and intensity17.
The differences between the American and European situa­
tions mentioned make it hard to transfer "positive" theorems of 
federalism theory. They do not, however, a priori preclude their 
adaptation to the specific conditions of European integration. For 
the area of environmental policy, which is related to the issue of 
Europeanising product safety law, E. Rehbinder and R. Stewart18 
have tried just that. In their modelling of the integration process, 
they conceive the Nation States as the sole political actors. For
16 For more details see Pelkmans, 1982, 116 et seq.; idem, 1984, 173 et 
seq. This fits the thesis developed by Schatpf in 1985 that willingness 
to convey powers of action to the Community was opposed by Member 
States' governments "own institutional interests".
17 Cf. Heller/Pelkmans, 1986, 245 et seq., esp. 397 et seq.; also Slot, 
1975, 153. Scharpf, 1985, 34 et seq. calls the Community relationships 
with Member States a case of "policy overlap" that is closer to German 
federalism than to the American model.
18 Rehbinder/Stewart, 1985, 9 et seq.; Rehbinder/Stewart also apply their 
model as a starting point for analyzing the US federal system; how­



























































































the integration policy behaviour of the States they assume on the 
one hand identification with the interests of the domestic econ­
omy, and on the other a loyalty towards protective standards 
valid in their own legal system. This hypothesis states that faced 
with a Europeanisation of legal standards the States will weigh up 
its advantages and drawbacks for the competitive position of their 
own industries, but that they cannot simply offer domestic com­
prises between economic and social interests. For so-called prod­
uct regulation19, the interest position for "protection States" and 
"risk States"20 appears as such: as long as the protection States 
can exclude imports from risk States using Art. 36 EEC, the 
chances for harmonisation are good. The protection States will 
support it if the production costs caused by their domestic stan­
dards are higher, if setting up different production lines would 
not be economically sound and if foreign market opportunities 
are foreseen; the risk States will agree to the tightening up of 
standards where they expect advantages from access to markets 
in the protection States; finally, for pure "import States" the deci­
sion depends only on their own political calculations of the costs 
and benefits of a raised level of protection. Admittedly, the initial 
position changes where and to the extent that the restrictions of 
Art. 36 EEC have been lifted in favour of the principle of free 
market access in the protection State and/or products from the 
risk State merely need to be specifically marked. On such condi-
theory, and in the revisions of the model this necessitates (op. cit., 177 
et seq., 277 et seq.).
19 Rehbinder/Stewart, as in American literature on the whole (cf. only 
Mashaw/Rose-Ackerman, 1984, 129 et seq.), distinguish between 
product regulations and process regulations (the third usual category of 
industrial safety regulations can be left out in considering environ­
mental protection). For Rehbinder/Stewart, product regulation involves 
only the product requirements necessitated on grounds of environ­
mental protection; but regulations motivated by consumer policy 
grounds also belong to this category. By "process regulations" one 
means environmental provisions relating to production processes; they 




























































































tions, a risk State has in principle no longer any reason to agree to 
the tightening up of product regulations.
E. Rehbinder and R. Stewart themselves stress the limits to 
the explanatory capacity of their model21. These limits arise from 
the complexity of the economic interest situation, and are as a 
rule, not even homogeneous within the economy of a single 
Member State. The effects of harmonisation measure on firms in­
volved in each case depend on the internationalisation of the 
economy, the size of the domestic market, their own competitive 
position, the costs involved in changing their output and expecta­
tions of the economic prospects — and it may, as the car industry 
shows, even pay to exploit different product standards in order to 
seal off regional sub-markets, and set up a sectorially differenti­
ated price policy22. But not only the complexity of economic in­
terests but also the "intrinsic logic" of political opinion-forming 
processes makes it hard to develop general hypotheses. In their 
negotiations at a European level, States need not concentrate on a 
particular product regulation, but can try to purchase gains in one 
sector through concessions in another. Political objectives within 
a government are just as unhomogeneous as business interests. 
The conduct of negotiations often depends on what department is 
responsible, how "high" the political value of the subject in­
volved is rated and what influences the negotiators are exposed 
to. Awareness that a new regulation can, in any case, not be 
strictly monitored may facilitate acceptance. And last but not 
least, in agreements on product regulations, the object is often a 
uniformisation of regulatory methods, and therefore wishes for
20 Since they are dealing with environmental protection, Re- 
hbinder/Stewart talk about "environmental States1' and "polluter 
States”.
21 Rehbinder/Stewart, 1985, 9, 322 et seq.





























































































change have to deal with administrative inertia even apart from 
their political and ideological content.
Up to now, integration of these viewpoints referred into a 
more differentiated economic model23. But this finding is not a 
merely negative statement. Bearing in mind the economic interest 
situation and political opinion forming processes in the Commu­
nity it means that uniform behaviour patterns cannot be expected 
and the chances of carrying through broadly based integration 
strategies are slight. As regards the economic and political start­
ing conditions, adapted fragmentary advance and pragmatism in 
negotiation, are to be expected. The difficult conditions of inte­
gration policy encourage an incrementalism which has a tendency 
to obstruct the development of a coherent European safety law24.
1.2.2 Legal structures and political decision-making pro­
cesses
Political research into integration has an ambitious past to 
consider. Looking back it is evident that the expectation of func­
tionalism (and of neo-functionalism, too), i.e. that the political 
integration process would involve objective, functional interde­
pendences and gradually extend to increasingly wider sectors, 
underestimated the contingencies of political developments25. 
The centre of interest in political research on Europe therefore 
shifted to the Community's decision-making structures26 and
23 This is Rehbinder/Stewart's very surprising conclusion, given the na­
ture of their presentation of the economic integration model as the 
starting point for their considerations: 1985, 315.
24 For the — relative — success of traditional harmonisation policy and 
on the heterogeneity of "vertical" and unsuccessfulness of "horizontal" 




























































































analyses of individual policy areas27. A repeatedly confirmed 
finding of political analysis is, as Joseph Weiler has shown28, in 
striking contrast with the developments of the Community’s legal 
structure: whereas in political decision-making processes a re­
placement of supranational elements by intergovernmental bar­
gaining processes is inevitable, the supranational legal structures 
have developed into a European constitution which finds its ex­
pression specifically in the doctrines of direct effect, primacy and 
prior effect of European directives. The originality of Weiler's 
analysis is that he sees the presumed contradictions between the 
patterns of political decision-making and the legal structures as 
two characteristics of the European integration process that mu­
tually determine each other. The discrepancies between the po­
litical and legal structures have not acted centrifugally, but rather 
as a balancing force that maintains the Community29.
Weiler's theses are of equal importance for an understanding 
of the Community's legal structure and for advancing its policy 
programmes. They state that in order to stabilise and extend
25 See the literature survey in Behrens, 1981 and the references in Re- 
hbinder/Stewart, 1985, 316 et seq. and Krislov/Ehlermann/ Weiler, 
1986, 6 et seq.
26 As an example, see Bulmer, 1983.
27 Specifically on the programme for eliminating technical barriers to 
trade, see Dashwood, 1983, and on environmental policy the references 
in Rehbinder/Stewart, 1985, 265 et seq.
28 Weiler, 1981; idem, Community, Member States and European Inte­
gration, 1982; idem, Supranational Law and the Supranational System, 
1982.
29 Scharpfs 1985 characterisation of the relationship between the Com­
munity and the Member States as a case of "policy overlap" very 
largely coincides with Weiler's analysis. Like Weiler, Scharpf, too, ex­
plains the unanimity rule on the basis of Member States' situations (and 
their governments "own institutional interests", see note 16 supra). 
However, Scharpf is interested only in the political conditions, which, 
despite the unanimity rule, impose constraints towards consensus for­
mation at the European level (he specially mentions the density of reg­
ulation already attained, which excludes exit options and continually 




























































































supranational legal structures, involvement of national political 
actors in the Community's political decision-making process is 
always necessary : the Community's precarious dual structure 
would be endangered by either neglecting Member States' politi­
cal interests in making Community law or by neglecting princi­
ples of Community law in the Member States. These warnings 
coincide with the reservations against a purely formal legal 
treatment of the Community's powers under Arts. 100, 100 a or 
235 EEC30. They have considerable practical implications for the 
connection between internal market policy and product safety 
policy that is of interest here. For if it is true that the adoption and 
implementation of Community legal acts must not, at any rate de 
facto, neglect to include political actors from the Member States, 
then a harmonisation policy oriented towards the objectives of 
realising the internal market must also bear in mind the effects of 
its measures in other policy areas, and cannot overextend the po­
litical consensus that underpins it. We shall return in more detail 
below to the consequences of these theses for the relationship 
between internal market policy and product safety policy in gen­
eral, and to the legal significance of the "internal market to tech­
nical harmonisation and standards" in particular31.
2. Traditional policy o f  approximating laws in order 
to break down technical barriers to trade
The manifestations and consequences of technical barriers 
to trade will be discussed in (2.1), the general programme for 
their removal in (2.2) and the methods of harmonisation it pro­
analysis centres around the relationship between the conditions for po­
litical agreement and the Community's legal structures.
30 Note 10 in 1.1 supra.




























































































vides in (2.3). Analysis of selected directives and proposals for 
directives shows that while this programme is primarily aimed at 
removing obstacles on the path to a common internal market, by 
way of negative integration, it also partly contains detailed regu­
lations on product safety (2.4). Safeguard clauses are responses to 
reservations by Member States (2.5). With the proposal for a di­
rective on construction products, the attempt to delegate powers 
to the Commission failed (2.6). Criticism of the production of di­
rectives overloaded with technical details (2.7) and the consider­
able difficulties in converting them into law in Member States 
(2.8) prepared the ground for a reorientation of integration policy; 
a policy that seeks in other ways to pursue the goals of free 
movement of goods on the one hand, and safety and health for 
the consumer along with industrial safety and environmental 






























































































2.1 Manifestations of technical barriers to trade and their
consequences
Following the abolition of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions between Member States, technical barriers to trade32 
attracted public attention. The General Programme to remove 
technical barriers to trade in goods was aimed at removing obsta­
cles arising from differences in legal and administrative provi­
sions in Member States relevant to product quality.
For many goods, special requirements on production, im­
port, marketing or use exist that may, because of different na­
tional characteristics, hamper free movement of goods. Among 
these are all administrative measures by Member State authorities 
that ensure compliance with these regulations. Of particular im­
portance economically are the numerous, often very detailed, in­
tercompany technical standards, aimed at both raising the safety 
level of technical products, and especially at rationalising busi­
ness processes and increasing productivity through mass produc­
tion. Technical legal regulations are often based on decades of 
tradition; it is often not easy to separate the objective of protect­
ing particular legal values on grounds of public safety and order 
from attempts to fence off markets. This is, however, not the 
place to examine attempts by particular industries to take advan­
tage of industrial property rights and technical standards thereby 
avoiding price and quality competition33.
Technical standards and trade regulations for a product that 
differ from one country to another may also unintentionally ham-
32 In general on technical barriers to trade see esp. Nunnenkamp, 1983; 
Page, 1981 and Slot, 1975. See also OECD, Consumer Policy and In­
ternational Trade, 1986.
33 Cf. Pelkmans, 1984, 175-8. For the pharmaceutical industry see 





























































































per trade. These standards and regulations may have been delib­
erately created for protectionist reasons, but rather otit of a desire 
to create uniformity, raise the safety of appliances or protect con­
sumers, the environment or workers. Those particularly affected 
are foreign suppliers without enough economic strength to pro­
duce separate product lines to meet each set of national require­
ments. They are alleged to have their international competitivity 
notably cramped, in particular through insufficient possibility of 
exploiting the advantages of larger-scale mass production. Addi­
tionally, the price effects of non-tariff barriers and therefore the 
degree of protection for domestic suppliers are allegedly harder 
to estimate than for customs duties. The impenetrability and 
complexity of technical barriers to trade and the possibility of 
changing them rapidly are said to create considerable information 
costs and to hinder planning of production and investment. Do­
mestic industrial firms are said to unavoidably have considerable 
influence on the shaping of technical standards.
A number of additional factors influence the extent to which 
differing technical standards and trade regulations lead to eco­
nomic problems34. Flexibility in adaptation is greater in expand­
ing markets and also in the early stages of a product cycle. Dif­
ferences in standards hit harder as modificaton costs increase. 
Suppliers with the highest turnover on given markets play more 
or less the role of "standards leaders".
The economic effects of protectionist measures in general, 
including duties, levies, quotas and technical or administrative 
barriers to trades35 havefrequently been discussed36. Among 
those repeatedly mentioned are higher prices for consumers, re-
34 Cf. Groner, 1981, 153-155.
35 On 6 November 1978, in a letter to Member State governments, the 
Commission complained of the rising protectionism within the Com­




























































































striction of quality competition, loss of economic adaptability and 
medium- to long-term risks for jobs safeguarded in the short-term 
by protectionist measures.
2.2 The General Programme for the elimination of technical
barriers to trade: a survey
The General Programme of 28 May 1969 for the elimination 
of technical barriers to trade resulting from disparities between 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative ac­
tion in Member States37 aims at harmonising national regulations 
regarding marketing and the use of particular important selected 
products, through directives under Art. 100 EEC. The mutual 
recognition of national regulations was out of the question as a 
procedure in principle, since it can be considered only for cases 
where regulations are more or less equivalent, particularly as re­
gards objects of legal protection and production costs38. The pro­
gramme consists of four Resolutions and a gentlemen's agree­
ment. Two Council Resolutions contain a timetable for elimi-
sures that led principally to complaints about restrictions on free
movement of goods:
—  Documents on which imports or exports are dependent;
—  Frontier checking procedures;
—  Setting up minimum or maximum prices;
—  Payments o f equivalent effects for duties and inspection fees;
—  Preference regulations in favour of national industry in the area of public supply 
contracts;
—  National regulations laying down technical or quality conditions for marketing, 
e.g. technical standards.
Cf. EC Bulletin 10-1978, 24 et seq.
36 More recently, see OECD, Consumer Policy and International Trade,
1986; OECD, Costs and Benefits of Protection, 1985; Lorenz, 1985;
Schultz, 1985; Gutowski, 1984; also Hasenpflug, 1976.




























































































nating barriers to trade in the industrial sector39 and in food­
stuffs40; the latter area will not further be discussed. According to 
this very ambitious but utterly unrealistic programme, the Coun­
cil was to decide on 114 harmonisation directives for industrial 
products in three six-month periods between mid-1969 and the 
end of 197041; the decisions were each to be taken within six 
months of presentation of the draft. Regulations were planned 
above all for motor vehicles, agricultural tractors and machinery, 
measuring instruments, electrical machinery and equipment, 
pressure vessels, fertilizers, dangerous preparations, lifting 
equipment and lifts, and other miscellaneous goods.
A further resolution42 provided for the mutual recognition 
of national inspections, which are conditions for the marketing of 
many products. The principle of mutual recognition, applies, 
however, only in so far as national rules for marketing are equiv­
alent or have been rendered so by Community harmonisation 
measures.
To adapt directives to technical progress, two simplified 
procedures are provided for43: in cases of particular importance, 
the Council will decide on a Commission proposal, by qualified 
majority. Otherwise the Commission will be empowered to enact 
amending provisions, but in doing so must call in a committee on 
which Member States are represented. Should the committee 
support the Commission's proposed regulation by qualified ma-
38 For detail on law approximation as a procedure for eliminating techni­
cal barriers to trade, see Seidel, 1969; idem 1971.
39 OJ C 76, 17 June 1969, 1.
40 OJ C 76, 17 June 1969, 5.
41 In March 1968, when the Commission proposed this programme (OJ C 
48, 16 May 1968, 24), only 8 drafts of these were before the Council.
42 Council Resolution of 28 May 1969 on mutual recognition of tests, OJ 




























































































jority, then it may be enacted; otherwise the Council will decide 
by qualified majority within three-months time. Should it not do 
so, the Commission itself may decide44.
Finally, the Member State government representatives 
meeting in the Council agreed, by way of a "gentlemen's agree­
ment", on standstill arrangement^. Governments were required 
for a particular period, in principle, to refrain from taking na­
tional legal or administrative measures for products covered by 
the programme, and to supply the Commission drafts of national 
legal and administrative measures. National measures "urgently 
required on ground of safety or of health" are excluded. This 
standstill arrangement has since been replaced by the directive 
laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the 
field of technical standards and regulations46.
The Council Resolution of 21 May 197347 supplemented the 
General Programme for the elimination of technical barriers to 
trade in industrial products, because of the intensification of in­
ternal Community trade and the increasingly more pressing (or 
publicised) problems connected with environmental and health 
protection, adding such sectors as motorcycles, packaging, toys, 
equipment and machinery for building sites, petrol additives and 
fuel oil. Finally, in its Resolution of 17 December 1973 on in­
dustrial policy48, the Council presented a thoroughly revised 
timetable for the elimination of technical barriers to trade in the
43 OJ C 76, 17 June 1969, 8.
44 For details on this see Zachmann, 1977.
45 OJ C 76, 17 June 1969, 9. Cf. the Commission's recommendations of 
20 August 1965 to Member States on prior notification to the Commis­
sion of particular legal and administrative provisions at the drafting 
stage, OJ of 29 September 1976, 2611/65.
46 Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983, OJ L 109, 26 April 1983, 8. 
For details see Chapter IV, 3.1.




























































































field of industrial products. More than 100 additional directives 
were to be adopted in the four-year period which terminated at 
the end of 197749.
2.3 The methods of harmonisation provided for in the Gen­
eral Programme
In an annex to its original proposal for the General Pro­
gramme, the Commission gave some fundamental indications on 
the harmonisation solutions still useful for understanding the new 
approach today. It distinguished the following five solutions50:
a) "Complete" solution: in this procedure, also known as 
total harmonisation, national regulations are completely replaced 
by Community ones. In complete harmonisation, only products 
that fully conform with directives may be marketed in the Com­
munity. The full harmonisation approach means the biggest loss 
of sovereignty for Member States, places particular requirements 
on political consensus formation and requires comprehensive 
detailed regulations at the Community level, but in the long-run 
results in the furthest-reaching harmonisation. This approach has 
so far been chosen, apart from the foodstuffs sector, in directives
48 OJ C 117, 31 December 1973, 1, esp. Annex 2, 6-14.
49 It is noteworthy that the standstill arrangements are to apply to only 11 
out of over 100 draft directives.
50 E.P. Doc. 15/68, VI, reprinted in BT-Drs. V/2743, 22 March 1968, 13 
et seq.; for details on this see Slot, 1975, 80-89; cf. also Lauwaars, 
1986, 2 et seq. Also very instructive on total and optional harmonisa­
tion is Part B of the agreement between CEN and the Commission on 
co-operation between CEN and the Commission of the European 
Communities as regards the Commission's work in the area of har­
monisation of different technical legislation of Member States and the 





























































































on hazardous substances and preparations, cosmetics and phar­
maceuticals.
b) "Alternative solution": this procedure, better known as 
optional harmonisation51, leaves to suppliers, the freedom to 
choose between orienting their products to national law or to 
Community-law requirements. Products meeting the Community 
requirements cannot be refused access to the market in any 
Member State. This approach, the prevailing one in the area of 
industrial products, does ease political agreement, but has draw­
backs from the viewpoints of harmonisation and also of product 
safety. The number of recognised rules is increased, so that it is 
harder to compare what is offered. Where safety standards differ, 
a manufacturer that avoids higher standards which in general 
mean higher costs, can secure competitive advantages52. Optional 
harmonisation thus tends, given significant differences in safety 
and a sizeable volume of cross-border trade in the products con­
cerned, to promote a reduction in the safety level. The reasons 
adduced in favour of the Community regulation in cases of op­
tional harmonisation — longer manufacturing series, better use of 
output, greater rationalisation —- do not apply to many small- and 
medium-size firms that market their goods only domestically. In 
favour of optional harmonisation, it may be said that Member 
States have more leeway to take national peculiarities into ac­
count, and that national adaptation to technical progress is possi­
ble without amending the directive. Because the market is opened 
up for products that meet the Community standard, consumer 
choice is increased and competition among manufacturers 
stepped up.
51 On optional harmonisation see Grabitz, 1980, 44-47; 1985, Nos. 78-80; 
Seidel, 1971,742 et seq.; Eiden, 1984, 61 et seq.




























































































c) "Reference to technical s ta n d a rd sOn this method, di­
rectives refer, in order to specify safety requirements, to har­
monised technical standards worked out by standardisation bod­
ies53. This method of harmonisation has so far been applied only 
in the Low Voltage Directive54, though the European Parlia­
ment55 and the ESC56 had selected it in their opinions on the draft 
general programme as the most promising of solutions. The Eco­
nomic and Social Committee stressed that reference to technical 
standards was particularly suitable for sectors where there was 
experience in harmonising technical standards, and offered the 
greatest possibilities for elastic adaptation to the demands of 
technical progress and for the introduction of new technical ideas. 
Almost pre-empting the new approach to technical harmonisation 
and standards, the ESC states:
"It would thus be conceivable for a Community direc­
tive first to list the safety objectives to be attained and 
then to state that these will be taken as having been at­
tained where a particular standard, initially harmonised 
at Member State level, has been complied with. This 
provides an opportunity to demonstrate that the safety 
objectives can be met even without complying with the 
standard concerned"57.
The legal literature had further defined this method of har­
monisation by the early 70's, setting forth fairly clearly the out-
53 For more details on reference to technical standards see the chapter on 
Germany (Chapter II, 3), the discussion of the Low Voltage Directive 
(Chapter IV, 2) and that of the new approach (Chapter IV, 3).
54 Directive 73/23/EEC, OJ L 77, 26 March 1973, 29. The draft of the 
Low Voltage Directive was presented by the Commission on 12 June 
1968 (OJ C 91, 13 September 1968, 19), only a few weeks after the 
General Programme for eliminating technical barriers to trade, which it 
had proposed to the Council on 7 March 1968 (OJ C 48, 16 May 1968, 
24). On the Low Voltage Directive see Chapter IV, 2.
55 See point 5 of the European Parliament's Resolution, OJ C 108, 19 
October 1968, 39 et seq.





























































































line of the new approach58. While sliding reference to the succes­
sively newest version of a standard was rejected as inadmissi­
ble59, conferring law-making powers to privately organised stan­
dardisation organisations, the preferred model was, for directives, 
only to prescribe compliance with basic requirements, with tech­
nical standards merely being cited to determine these basic re­
quirements. Accordingly, manufacturers are not bound by the 
technical standards, but can show compliance with the basic re­
quirements otherwise than by meeting standards60. The directive 
should lay down the basic requirements in a general clause em­
bodying a rebuttable presumption that these requirements have 
been met by anyone who has complied with a particular technical 
standard in its latest version61. Where a manufacturer departs 
from the general clause, the onus is on him to prove that the gen­
erally formulated requirements of the general clause, which alone 
is legally binding, have nevertheless been met. Conversely, the 
authorities have the onus of showing that though technical stan­
dards referred to have been complied with, basic requirements set 
out in the general clause are not met62. In order that technical 
standards should not remain "merely a non-binding indication 
and aid to interpretation showing the specific content of the basic 
requirements in the individual case"63 thereby bringing the suc­
cess of harmonisation into question, Member States should "take 
all necessary measures to ensure that administrative authorities 
recognise goods as meeting the basic requirements if they comply
57 Op. cit. — Cf. also Seidel, 1971, 745 et seq.
58 Cf. esp. Starkowski, 1973, 104-118, 143-160. More recently, see also 
Grabitz, 1980, 82-91.
59 Starkowski, 1973, 111 et seq.; Grabitz, 1980, 72-75. Rohling, 1972, 
112-132 rejects any form of reference to technical standards as unac­
ceptable.
60 Starkowski, 1973, 115 et seq.
61 In the formulation by Grabitz, 1980, 82-91.




























































































with the standards decided on by the Commission following con­
sultation of the Standards Testing Committee"64.
While its proponents presented as an advantage that stan­
dardisation in this procedure in principle remains a matter for in­
dustry65, critics adduce constitutional reservations, complaining 
that
"in view of the existential importance of environmental 
and consumer protection for our society today, a regu­
lation can be tenable that leads to industrial organisa­
tions' wide-ranging powers of decision in determining 
the level of safety in manufacturing and utilising tech­
nical products"66.
d) "Conditional mutual recognition of tests": Where har­
monisation fails because Member States hold to their own safety 
regulations, products from one Member State should be ex­
portable to another on the following two conditions:
— that the exported product complies with manufacturing pro­
visions applying in the country of import;
— that competent authorities in the country of export carry out 
checks according to the methods applying in the country of 
import67.
e) "Mutual recognition o f tests": Here, checks carried out in 
one Member State are automatically recognised as valid by all 
Member States. This solution can be considered where in a given 
branch of industry there is very far-reaching correspondence be­
tween technical and administrative regulations in force, so that
63 Starkowski, 1973, 116.
64 Op. cit., 151.
65 Op. cit., 152.
66 Rôhling, 1972, 114.




























































































prior harmonisation of national legal provisions seems superflu­
ous68.
2.4 Conversion into national law of the General Programme 
on elimination of technical barriers to trade
2.4.1 General survey
The programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade has 
to date been converted into law in only fragmentary fashion and 
with considerable delays69. Table 1 gives a picture of the number 
of Commission proposals for directives, Council directives and 
Commission directives on adjustment to technical progress for 
the years from 1968 to 1986.
68 This solution should not be confused with the resolution on mutual 
recognition of tests (see the explanations in note 42 supra) since there 
harmonisation of legal provisions and equivalence of tests is assumed. 
Generally on the mutual recognition of certification and tests see Sei­
del, 1971, 748-750, who stresses that trust in other Member States' ad­
ministrative actions is justified only where certification and tests are 
equivalent; see also Rohling, 1972, 142-160.




























































































Table T. Programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade in industrial 
products — number of Commission proposals for directives, 
Council directives and Commission directives on adjustment to 
technical progress for the years from 1968 to 1986 (absolute and 
cumulative)(l)
Year Commission Council Difference Commission
proposals directives between adoptation
cols. 2+4 directives(2)
abs. cum. abs. cum. abs. cum.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)' (6) (V)
1968 18 18 — — 18 — ,r-r
1969 13 31 1 1 30 —
1970 5 36 9 10 26 — "i+r
1971 7 43 11 21 22 — Slpfc+
1972 12 55 3 24 31 — |  igBÿt
1973 12 67 11 35 32 1 1
1974 33 100 14 49 51 2 3
1975 15 115 12 61 54 1 4
1976 13 128 21 82 46 4 8
1977 6 134 15 97 37 1 9
1978 11 145 15 112 33 5 14
1979 8 153 11 123 30 9 23
1980 25 178 10 133 45 1 24
1981 22 200 7 140 60 5 29
1982 5 205 7 147 58 14 43
1983 6 211 8 155 56 7 50
1984 8 219 16 171 48 7 57
1985 5 224 4 175 49 12 69
1986 11 235 19 194 41 5 74
(1) Determined from data on elimination of technical barriers in Commu­
nity trade in the annual general reports, especially the tables in the an­
nexes.
(2) Including four Commission directives on methods of analysis for veri­
fying the composition of cosmetics and the Commission directives on 
sampling and analysis methods for fertilizers of 22 June 1977 (OJ L 
213, 22 August 1977, 1) and on procedures for verifying the charac­
teristics, threshold values and explosion resistance of ammonia fer­
tilizers with high nitrogen content of 8 December 1986; OJ L 38, 7 
February 1987, 1.
By the end of 1986 the Council had adopted 194 directives 
on the adaptation of Member States' legal and administrative pro­
visions on trade of industrial products. Since 1974 it has had av­
erage "arrears" of some 50 Commission proposals for directives. 
By the end of 1970 only 10 directives had been adopted. Ac­
cording to the original 1969 Programme, the figure should have




























































































dredth directive on elimination of technical barriers to trade in 
industrial products could be hailed70. The directives adopted as a 
"package" in September 198471 had been awaiting decision be­
fore the Council for nine and a half years.
Most directives contain minutely detailed technically regu­
lations72 and do not differ significantly in content from technical 
standards. This entails long preparatory periods, considerable 
possibilities of external influence by the expert industrial circles 
involved, on overloading of the high-level political decision­
making procedure in the Council with technical details and a 
pressing compulsion to adapt the directives to technical progress 
(or sometimes to advances in knowledge). By the end of 1986 the 
Commission had already adopted 74 directives on adaptation to 
technical progress73.
Table 2 gives a survey of the sectors covered by the Council 
directives and the Commission directives on adaptation to techni­
cal progress.
70 Bull. EG 6-1978, 7 et seq.
71 OJ L 300, 19 November 1984, 1-187.
72 A particularly obtuse example was the recent 80-page (!) long Com­
mission proposal for a Council directive on the harmonisation of the 
legal regulations in Member States on "steering wheels placed in front 
of the driver's seat on narrow-gauge machinery with pneumatic tyres", 
OJ C 222, 22 September 1985, 1. Directives adopted in the automotive 
sector up to 1985 total — excluding the numerous amending directives 
and directives on adaptation to technical progress — 602 pages mainly 
containing technical specifications and testing instructions.
73 Including 4 Commission directives on the testing of constituents of 
cosmetics and Commission directives on testing and analysis methods 
for fertilizers of 22 June 1977 (OJ L 213, 22 August, 1977, 1) and on 
procedures for testing the characteristics, threshold values and explo­
sion resistance of ammonia fertilizers with high nitrogen content of 8 




























































































Table 2: Programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade in industrial
products — Number of Council directives and of Commission di-
rectives on adaptation to technical 
at 31 December 1986)(1)





Chemical products(2) 33 16(3)
Measuring devices 30 10
Agricultural tractors 24 2
Construction machines and appliances 11 5
Electrical appliances 8 5
Textile products 5 1
Pressure vessels 5 0
Motorcycles 4 0




(1) Derived from data on elimination of technical barriers in Community 
trade in the annual general reports, especially the tables in the an­
nexes.
(2) Hazardous substances, lacquers and paints, pharmaceuticals, plant- 
health products, fertilizers, detergents; except for cosmetics.
(3) Including Commission directives on sampling and analysis methods 
for fertilizers of 22 June 1977 (OJ L 213, 22 August 1977, 1) and on 
procedures for verifying the characteristics, threshold values and ex­
plosion resistance of ammonia fertilizers with high nitrogen content of 
8 December 1986; OJ L 38, 7 February 1987, 1.
(4) Including four Commission directives on methods of analysis for veri­
fying the composition of cosmetics.
Of 192 directives, 145 are in the four areas of motor vehi­
cles, agricultural and forestry vehicles, measuring devices and 
chemical products. The first three sectors mentioned are particu­
larly favourable for approximation of laws. In the area of mea­
suring devices, the Community can in its harmonisation work, 
call upon far-reaching international agreement regarding weights 




























































































to technical directives from the ECE in Geneva — the Economic 
Commission for Europe, a United Nations regional organisation. 
This not only signifies a saving of time for the Commission but a 
possibility for European vehicle manufacturers to offer their 
products on extra-Community market without special costly 
adaptations75.
2 .42  Total harmonisation — directives on hazardous sub­
stances
A special place is occupied by the directives that follow the 
principle of total harmonisation, hazardous substances with re­
gard to fertilizers, and cosmetics. By contrast with most of the di­
rectives, they concern areas not normally regulated by technical 
standards. The directives in the area of classification, packaging 
and labelling of dangerous substances and preparations76 were 
based on preliminary work done by the ILO, the Council of Eu­
rope and the OECD but not yet reflected in national legislation. 
Here the Community has given Member States a lead77. This is 
true particularly of the sixth amendment to Directive 
67/548/EEC78, which is the basis for chemicals laws in the Mem­
ber States.
75 Cf. Henssler, 1975, 175 et seq.; Lukes, 1985, 196.
76 Starting with Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967 on the 
classification, packaging and marking of hazardous substances, OJ L 
196, 16 August 1967, 1. On this subject there were by the end of 1986, 
a total of 7 amending directives from the Council and 6 Commission 
directives on adjustment to technical progress. Additionally there were 
specific directives on the classification, packaging and marking of sol­
vents, pesticides and paints, lacquers, print colors, adhesives etc.
77 Cf. Braun, 179 et seq.
78 OJ L 259, 15 October 1979, 10. This directive in turn follows the US 





























































































In contrast, the regulations restricting marketing and use of 
certain dangerous substances and preparations79, much more de­
tailed in application, almost always go back to initiatives by 
Member States barring dangerous substances on grounds of 
health protection or public safety, or introducing restrictions on 
their use. Quite clearly, these are ad hoc regulations, though 
adopted with considerable delays80: The underlying Directive 
76/779 contains no criteria for including substances in the annex 
to the Directive. If hazards appear (and bans or restrictions are is­
sued in Member States), a unanimous Council resolution, based 
on a Commission proposal, and following opinions from the Eu­
ropean Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, must 
be adopted. However, speedy mandatory measures should be re­
quired to avoid severe health risks81. A ban issued by one Mem­
ber State and a Commission proposal for a ban give manufactur­
ers and traders enough time to quickly sell off the dangerous sub-
79 Starting with Council Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on re­
strictions to the marketing and use of certain hazardous substances and 
preparations, OJ L 262, 27 September 1976, 201. Here by the end of 
1986, there were a total of 7 amending directives, including those on 
PCB, PCT, Tris, PBB, particular substances in game articles, benzole 
in toys and asbestos.
80 For the seven amending directives, it took an average of 30 months 
between Commission proposal and Council Decision — quick as pro­
cedures for directives go, but far too slow considering the imminent 
risks.
81 Accordingly, the Commission undertook a new advance in 1983, in or­
der to make amendments to the annex possible using the Regulatory 
Committee Procedure, COM (83) 556 final of 26 September 1983. In 
the meantime, with strengthening of the Commission's implementing 
powers by the Single European Act (for details see Chapter IV, 4.3 in­
fra) it has proposed the even quicker and more flexible procedure of 
the Advisory Committee, which provides only for informative consul­
tation of Member States' representatives, COM (87) 39 final of 30 Jan­
uary 1987. Cf. also the corresponding proposal for a directive on the 
classification, packaging and labelling of hazardous preparations, OJ C 




























































































stances in countries that have not yet applied the protective 
clause82.
2.4.3 Optional harmonisation — Directives in the automotive 
sector
The most detailed regulations at Community level are for 
the vehicle market83, which is also of paramount economic im­
portance for internal trade84. All directives are based on the prin­
ciple of optional harmonisation. In 1982, the Commission 
checked the extent to which Member States had bindingly pre­
scribed compliance with Community standards domestically and 
to which manufacturers voluntarily followed Community provi­
sions85. The finding was that except in Italy and The Netherlands, 
where Community standards are mandatory, manufacturers still 
largely have a choice between domestic provisions and Commu­
nity directives. Manufacturers largely apply about half the direc­
tives, especially those on environmental protection and active 
safety. Otherwise, they apparently prefer national provisions. The 
Community standards have practically no effect where technical 
specifications are not legally regulated by national standards. Ac­
cordingly, manufacturers are only partly exploiting the oft- pro­
claimed advantages of longer production runs. The differing na-
82 See the EAC's opinion on the proposal for a Council directive on the 
seven amendments to Directive 76/769/EEC, OJ C 112, 3 May 1982, 
42 et seq. See also Written Question No. 650/79, OJ C 74, 24 March 
1980, 6 et seq.
83 On this see Table 3 infra and Annex 13 to the Commission's Report on 
the European automobile industry, EC Bulletin, Supplement 2/81, 71- 
76, with a survey of the directives adopted for motor vehicles.
84 Automobile exports between Member States amounted in 1980 to al­
most 2.78 million units.
85 Commission activities and Community regulations for the automobile 




























































































tional provisions are apparently advantageous for dividing up and 
separating markets and preventing parallel imports86.-'
Harmonisation directives in the vehicles sector are sum­
marised in Table 3.
Even with the revised programme, considerable delays 
clearly emerge. The large number of directives can be explained 
by the fact that directives have been issued for practically all ve­
hicle components. This concerns all the technical provisions that 
vehicles must meet, after securing EEC type approval in one 
Member State, in order to be marketed without further checks in 
other Community countries87. As Table 3 shows, since October 
1978 all that remains to be done in order for EEC type approval 
to come into force is to produce directives for windscreens, tyres 
and the weights and dimensions of particular vehicle compo­
nents.
The delays are attributed to the so-called "Third-Country" 
problem88; the fear that goods from third countries might take 
advantage of EEC-type approval to catch on easier to the Com­
mon Market. In the Council, even after adoption of 15 directives
86 In general on market delimitation in the automotive sector see Jo- 
erges/Hiller/Holzscheck/Micklitz, 1985. See also the report on behalf 
of the Committee for industry, currency and industrial policy on the 
automotive industry of the European Communities of 8 December 
1986, EP-Doc. A2-171, 86, point 7. This product differentiation de­
spite optional harmonisation should be separated from the "Third- 
Country problem" which arises particularly clearly in the automotive 
sector; on this see the references in notes 88-91 infra.
87 Directive 70/150/EEC on licences for motor vehicles and their trailers, 
OJ L 42, 23 February 1970, 1, as last amended by Council Directive of 
25 June 1987 on the harmonisation of the legal provisions in Member 
States on licences for vehicle trailers, OJ L 192, 11 July 1987, 51.
88 See Commission activities (op. cit., note 85), 21; report on the Com­
munity automotive industry (op. cit., note 86), points 10 and 18; writ­
ten questions No. 1498/81, OJ C 85, 5 April, 1982, 4; No. 1345/83, OJ 
C 52, 23 February 1984, 26; No. 1146/85, OJ C 341, 31 December 




























































































long-blocked because of this problem89, and after adoption of the 
regulation on the strengthening of the common commercial pol­
icy (in particular, on protection against prohibited commercial 
practices90), it was not possible, in the same day, to overcome 
differences of opinion in the vehicle sector as to whether third- 
country products should secure access to the Community type- 
approval systems introduced by the harmonisation directives. By 
its international undertakings, the Community is obliged where 
reciprocity is guaranteed to give imported products equally 
favourable treatment with Community products91.
While harmonisation work in the vehicle sector was initially 
and primarily aimed at the advantages of long-production runs, 
other aspects have become apparent for some time, since new 
production techniques allow flexible adaptation to different tech­
nical requirements. These aspects include noise levels, air pollu­
tion, fuel consumption and passenger safety. On 30 March 1984 
the European Parliament adopted a resolution introducing a pro­
gramme of Community measures to promote road traffic safety, 
and also called for an integrated programme including measures 
regarding vehicle construction and equipment, road construction 
and road signs, and road traffic regulations92. Among proposals 
are the obligatory equipping of all private cars with laminated 
windscreens, headrests and fog glass, anti-lock braking systems 
in all lorries and other safety devices, and the laying down of 
minimum standards on a large number of safety aspects. These
89 OJ L 300, 19 November 1984, 1-187. Cf. Bulletin EC 9-1984, points 
2.1.9 and 2.1.70.
90 OJ L 252, 20 September 1984, 1.
91 Cf. the Council Decision of 15 January 1980 on provisions for apply­
ing technical regulations and standards, OJ L 14, 19 January 1980, 36, 
following approval of the GATT agreement on technical barriers to 
trade, OJ L 71, 17 March 1980, 29.
92 OJ C 104, 16 April 1984, 38; cf. also the report by the Committee on 
transport on the introduction of a programme of Community measures 




























































































includes the quality of car tyres and rigidity of the passenger 
compartment, mandatory technical checks by independent test 
centres, and measures to remove vehicles with design faults from 
the market. It is clear that the originally largely commercially 
oriented policy to guarantee free movement of goods is gradually 
being overshadowed by an integrated policy on road traffic safety 
and aspects of environmental and consumer protection, even 
though the Council still remains closed to the idea of an inte­
grated programme to promote road traffic safety93.
Table 3: Directives on the approximation of Member States' legal provi­
sions regarding vehicles
Regulatory object Date of Adoption of directive Lag
of directive proposal(l) planned(2) /  achieved in months(3)
Type approval 7/68 1/70 2/70 1
Admissible noise 
level and exhaust 
equipment 7/68 1/70 2/70 1
Measures against 
air pollution by 
petrol engines 10/69 7/70 3/70 0
Containers for 
liquid fuel and 
its safe transport 7/68 1/70 3/70 3
Licence plate 
fixtures unpublished 1/70 3/70 3
Steering
equipment 2/69 7/70 6/70 0
Doors 12/68 7/70 7/70 1
Equipment for sound- 
level marking 8/68 1/70 7/70 7
Rear-view mirrors 8/68 1/70 3/71 14
Brakes 12/68 7/70 7/71 13
93 The Council merely took note of the Commission's plans, very modest 
by comparison with the European Parliament's ideas (OJ C 95, 6 April 
1984, 2 et seq.); presentation of a programme is no longer being in 
question (OJ C 341, 31 December 1984, 1 et seq.). According to the 
time-table in the White Paper on the Completion of the internal market 
(COM (85) 310 final of 14 June 1985, 17), only three safety-related 
































































































vehicles unpublished 1/70 6/72 29
Measures against 
the emission of 
pollutants by 
diesel engines 12/71 7/70 8/72 25
Internal equipment 12/71 7/74 (7/70) 12/73 0(42)
Security equipment 
against
unauthorised use 7/72 new 12/73
Behaviour of
steering gear 
in collisions 9/72 7/74 (7/70) 6/74 0(48)
Strength and 
anchoring of seats 5/73 1/75 7/74 0
Projecting edges 
Reverse gears and
12/73 1/75 9/74 0
speedometers 8/74 1/76(1/70) 6/75 0(66)
Licence plates 8/74 1/76 12/75 0
Safety belt 
anchorage 8/74 1/76 12/75 0
Lighting and
signalling
installations 6/74 1/75 (1/70) 7/76 19 (79)
Rear lamps 1/74 1/75 7/76 19
Contour lights, side 
lights, rear lights 
and brakelights 12/74 1/75 7/76 19
Direction
indicators 12/74 1/75 (1/70) 7/76 19 (79)
Rear-numberplate
lighting 12/74 1/75 7/76 19
Main-beam and 
dipped headlights 12/74 1/75 7/76 19
Fog lights 12/73 1/75 7/76 19
Towing equipment 12/74 1/77 (7/70) 5/77 5(83)
Rear fog lamps 12/76 1/75 6/77 30
Reversing lights 12/76 1/77 6/77 6
Parking lights 12/76 1/77 6/77 6
Safety belts and 
restraints 12/74 1/76 6/77 18
Driver view field 12/75 1/77 (1/70) 9/77 9(93)





























































































indications 11/76 1/77 12/77 12
Defrosting and 
demisting equipment 
for glass surfaces 11/76 1/77 12/77 12
Windscreen 
wipers and 
washers 11/76 1/77 (1/70) 12/77 12 (96)
Internal heating 12/76 1/77 6/78 18
Wheel covers 12/76 1/77 6/78 18
Headrests 12/74 1/76 10/78 34
Fuel consumption 1/80 new 12/80 -
Engine performance 1/80 new 12/80 -
Safety
windscreens(4) 9/71 7/74 (7/70)







Notes to Table 3:
(1) Sometimes a directive was preceded by several drafts; the date here is 
that of the last draft.
(2) Determined from the timetables in the General Programme to elimi­
nate technical obstacles to trade of 28 May 1969 (OJ L 76, 17 June 
1969, 1) and the Council Resolution of 17 December 1973 on indus­
trial policy (OJ C 117, 31 December 1973, 1). Figures in brackets are 
the earlier dates sometimes specified in the 1969 General Programme. 
In every case the implication is either 1 January or 1 July.
(3) Figures in brackets indicate the lag behind the original date in the 
1969 General Programme.
(4) Commission proposal of 20 September 1971, OJ C 119, 16 November 
1972,21.
(5) Commission proposal of 31 December 1976, OJ C 37, 14 February 
1977, 1.
(6) Commission proposal of 31 December 1976, OJ C 15, 20 January 
1977, 4. This proposal relating to private cars should not be confused 
with the directive on the weights, dimensions and certain other techni­





























































































2.5 Safeguard clauses — response to Member States reser­
vations
A number of directives contain safeguard clauses94 allowing 
Member States to intervene should, despite compliance with 
Community standards, a hazardous situation suddenly arise call­
ing for immediate action. Such safeguard clauses are essential to 
the extent that the Community provisions lay down rules for 
marketing and handling products Community-wide that take the 
right to appeal to Art. 36 EEC from Member States and adopt 
measures to protect the health and safety of persons95. The rele­
vant provision usually runs:
1. Where a Member State has good grounds for be­
lieving that an EEC product, although satisfying the 
requirements of this Directive and the relevant imple­
menting Directives, presents a hazard to safety or 
health, it may temporarily prohibit, or attach special 
conditions to, the marketing and use of that product. It 
shall immediately inform the Commission and other 
Member States thereof, giving the reasons for its deci­
sions.
2. The Commission shall consult the Member States 
concerned within six weeks, then deliver its opinion 
without delay and take appropriate measures.
3. If the Commission considers that amendments to the 
relevant implementing Directives are needed, such 
amendments shall be adopted in accordance with the 
prodecure laid down in Art. 28; in this event the Mem­
ber State which took the safeguard measures may re­
tain them until these amendments come into force.96
94 A comprehensive survey is given by Kramer, 1985, Nos. 242-246.
95 This is the ECJ's consistent case law; for more details on this see 
Chapter IV, 1.2.
96 Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relat­
ing to the construction of goods. OJ C 308, 23.12.1978, 10 et seq. 




























































































The safeguard clauses are thus designed for cases where, 
after a Community provision has been enactec}; a hitherto un­
known or unrecognised hazard appears. The Member State, as re­
sponsible for the safety and health of its citizens and for other 
objects of legal protection, is allowed to take the necessary im­
mediate action. At the same time, the notification of the Commis­
sion and other Member States and the involvement of the Com­
mittees to adapt the relevant directives to technical progress is 
aimed at securing amendment of the latter to cope with the haz­
ard situation : this is to update Community law with regard to the 
hazardous situation that has emerged, so as to avoid obstacles to 
trade. A Member State that reacts more critically than others to 
hazardous situations can thus provide an impetus for the tighten­
ing up of Community standards. However, it must supply justifi­
cation for temporary departure from Community law, and accept 
the fact that its intervention may not be lastingly confirmed by 
the Commission or in the committee procedure. Where, despite 
contrary decision by the relevant Community bodies, a Member 
State maintains its special measures, the Commission may bring 
it before the ECI for infringement of Art. 30 EEC. Those who 
doubt that exercise of national police intervention powers is ac­
cessible to subsequent co-ordination through a binding Commu­
nity procedure97 have been refuted; Member States, in agreeing
84/530/EEC (common provisions for gas installations), OJ L 300, 19 
November 1984, 95; Art. 24 of Directive 84/528/EEC (provisions for 
lifting and conveying equipment), OJ L 300, 19 November 1984, 72; 
Art. 23 of the sixth amendment to Directive 67/548/EEC on the classi­
fication, packaging and marking of hazardous substances, OJ L 259, 15 
October 1979, 10; Art. 10 of Directive 78/631/EEC (pesticides), OJ L 
206, 29 July 1978, 13; Art. 12 of Directive 75/117/EEC (electrical 
equipment for use in explosive atmospheres), OJ L 462, 30 January 
1976, 45; Art. 12 of Directive 76/768/EEC (cosmetics), OJ L 262, 27 
September 1976, 169. Member States' temporary measures are con­
fined to a maximum duration of 6 months, unless the Commission 
finds adjustment of the Directive necessary, as with Art. 9 of Directive 
73/173/EEC (solvents), OJ L 189, 11 July 1973, 7; Art. 9 of Directive 
74/150/EEC (licences for agricultural and forestry tractors), OJ L 84, 
28 March 1974, 10; Art. 9 of Directive 70/156/EEC (licences for motor 
vehicles), OJ L 42, 23 February 1970, 1. On the protection clause in 




























































































to the directive, have also agreed to verification of any further- 
reaching protective measures that may be necessary in accor­
dance with the procedure laid down in the safeguard clause, so as 
to maintain already existing Community law. There is much to 
suggest that this question of principle remains obscured and that 
the safeguard clause procedure can be used pragmatically in a 
political negotiating process to adapt Community law to new 
hazard situations.
2.6 Proposal for a directive on construction products — a 
failed attempt to delegate powers to the Commission
With its proposal for a directive on construction products98, 
the Commission embarked in 1978 on the since abandoned at­
tempt to develop an alternative to the cumbersome policy of har­
monisation through vertical, product-related Council directives99. 
A framework directive from the Council was to contain common 
definitions for all construction products and lay down general 
rules on the form of implementing directives; these implementing 
directives were, pursuant to Art. 155 EEC, fourth indent, to be 
enacted by the Commission, with feedback through a committee 
made up of Member State representatives (regulatory committee 
procedure). Implementing directives were to lay down more spe­
cific requirements for individual products or types of product,
97 Thus Seidel, 1971,754.
98 OJ C 308, 23 December 1978, 3. For details on the basic problems 
raised bv this proposal for a directive see Grabitz, 1980. See also Bub, 
1979; idem, 1982; Blachère, 1982; Lindemann/Reihlen/Seyfert, 1984. 
Borner, 1973, 245 et seq., was already proposing basic directives from 
the Council with implementing directives from the Commission as a 
transitional solution until European standardisation bodies are in a po­
sition to produce recognised European standards.
99 The 1978 proposal has since been replaced by the proposal for a direc­




























































































and guarantee that buildings produced using materials complying 
with the implementing directives would meet the generally 
recognised requirements, including safety requirements. These 
requirements relate to reliability, safety, hygiene, comfort and 
economy of buildings, and to specific properties of products100. 
Conformity of construction products with implementing direc­
tives was to be verified and established through an EEC-type ap­
proval certificate (Art. 8-12), an EEC-type examination certifi­
cate (Art. 13-17), EEC-type conformity checks (Art. 18-21) or 
through EEC self-certification (Art. 22-26); procedures were to 
be laid down in the individual implementing directives101.
The reasons for the failure of this ambitious project are not 
entirely clear. Besides Member States' reservations at such far- 
reaching transfer of powers to the Commission102 and Parlia­
ment's mistrust of the excessive influence for Government repre­
sentatives in the committee procedure103, rejection of central bu­
reaucratic detailed regulation by industrial circles involved was 
important, as well as special features of the construction industry 
which, by comparison with other technical areas, was and is rela­
tively localised and characterised by special local and regional
proach to technical harmonisation and standards, OJ C 93, 6 April 
1987, 1. On this proposal see Chapter IV, 3 infra.
100 Annex II to the 1978 proposal for a directive. Cf. the rather more de­
tailed basic requirements formulated as performance requirements in 
Art. 2 and in Annex I in the 1987 proposal for a directive, relating to 
mechanical stability, fire protection, safety in use, durability, acoustic 
protection, energy saving, hygiene, health and the environment.
101 On conformity certificates, cf. Art. 13-15 and Annex IV in the 1987 
proposal for a directive. According to this annex, the relevant standards 
or technical approvals should lay down the nature of the conformity 
certification (certification of product conformity, or quality control in 
the factory by an accepted office, manufacturer s own conformity dec­
laration based on self-initiated personal checks or initial checks by a li­
censed testing centre), preference to be given in each case to the sim­
plest procedure.




























































































traditions. As well as these political reasons, there were legal 
reservations regarding the proposed delegation arrangements, 
since all essential basic decisions were not left to the Council, but 
would be given over to the Commission without its having any 
specific, detailed framework104. It is noteworthy that the 
Commission did not seek to follow the model of the Low Voltage 
Directive105, but wanted to lay down the specific products 
standards itself in implementing directives. Here, however, it can 
always point to the fact, in contrast with the electrical sector, that 
only a few construction products are covered by international or 
European technical standards106.
Aside from its failed attempt to secure far-reaching powers 
in implementing directives, the Commission is working on 
bringing out Eurocodes for the constmction industry; these would 
be a set of European regulations based on the result of work by 
major international technical and scientific associations for the 
design, dimensioning and construction of buildings and engi­
neering structures107. By contrast with the failed proposal for a 
directive on construction products of 1978, the 1987 proposal for 
a directive on constmction products, with its strengthening of 
standardisation committees and the procedure of conformity cer­
tification, implies, above all, a strengthening of industrial circles 
involved. Because of the comprehensive competence of the pro-
103 Cf. the European Parliament's opinion on the proposal for a directive 
on construction products, points 4 and 5, OJ C 140, 5 June 1979, 28 et 
seq. (29).
104 In detail, see Grabitz, 1980,48-55.
105 As for instance e.g. Bub, 1979, 673-675.
106 Cf. Lindemann/Reihlen/Seyfert, 1984, 184 et seq. See also point 11 of 
the explanatory statement on a proposal for a directive on construction 
products, COM (86) 756 final/3 of 17 February 1987, 6, according to 
which 15% of national draft standards reported under the information 
directive on standards and technical regulations related to construction 




























































































posed Standing Committee for the construction industry, the po­
sition of Member States ought, if anything, to'be strengthened, 
even though from the purely legal point of view, they can assert 
their influence only through an advisory committee rather than a 
regulatory committee.
2.7 Criticisms of the classical concept of integration
Along the road towards the new approach to technical har­
monisation and standards, criticism of the classical Community 
concept of integration was an important step. As described, the 
Community has for years pursued the aim of eliminating barriers 
to free movement of goods through vertical directives laying 
down uniform standards for particular products or groups of 
products, thereby providing firms with a broader area of action 
and at the same time creating uniform protective standards. By 
Art. 36 EEC, individual Member States may, as long as they 
comply with the principle of proportionality and non-discrimina­
tion, take measures to protect the health and life of people, and 
other objects of legal protection. These measures may have re­
strictive effects on free movement of goods. Harmonisation di­
rectives pursuant to Art. 100 EEC were intended to 
"communitarise" these protective policies, since if they continued 
to be on a national basis, market integration might be hampered. 
Along these lines, the Community, in its endeavour to create the 
internal market, pursued a highly fragmented product safety pol­
icy, structurally subordinated to internal market policy108. The
107 For more on this see Breitschaft, 1984. On European standardisation in 
the construction industry in general, see Kiehl, 1987.
108 On the uneven harmony between internal market and product safety 




























































































criticisms of the classical integration concept109 related mainly to 
the following points:
— The results of harmonisation work concerned only a few ar­
eas of industry110 and had in some sectors remained practi­
cally insignificant, considering the enormous number of 
technical regulations and standards in all Member States. 
For the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Britain and 
Italy alone, technical standards are estimated to total some 
50,000ln . In 1984 alone, 1,418 DIN standards112 and 609 
British Standards113 appeared, while in the same year — one 
of the most successful — the Council, under the programme 
to eliminate technical barriers to trade, adopted 16 directives 
and the Commission a further 7 on adaptation to technical 
progress114. Clearly, the figures are not simply comparable, 
since some of the national standards served to take over in­
ternational or European standards115 and as a rule national 
standards have, at any rate by comparison with European 
standards and with the relevant directives, a much narrower 
area of application116. It is nevertheless clear that the Com­
munity cannot, even if it concentrates on a few industries of 
particular importance to Community internal trade, keep up 
with the speed and intensity of regulation in the Member
109 A first comprehensive criticism can be found in the ESC's opinion on 
the issuing of barriers to movement of goods and harmonisation of rel­
evant legal provisions, of 21 November 1979, OJ C 72, 24 March 
1980, 8 et seq.; a balance sheet of the criticisms precedes the new ap­
proach, COM (85) 19 final of 31 January 1985, 3 et seq.; cf. also 
Pelkmans/Vollebergh, 1986, 25-27.
110 Cf. Table 2 supra.
111 Lukes, 1985, 198.
112 DIN in Zahlen, DIN-Mitt. 65 (1986), 314.
113 BSI, Annual Report, 1984 to 1985, 3.
114 Cf. Table 1 supra.
115 Of the 609 British standards adopted in 1984, for instance, 146 were 
identical to ISO standards, 49 to IEC ones and 37 to CEN or CEN- 
ELEC ones; BSI, Annual Report, 1984 to 1985, 3.
116 To clarify this, in 1986 there were in the electrical engineering area 6, 
463 DIN standards, but "only" 501 standards or harmonisation docu­
ments from CENELEC, and beside the 3 CEN standards on toy safety, 





























































































States. This is particularly true where it tries to go into tech­
nical, detailed regulations, specific to particular products.
— Even where directives were adopted, they often, as in the 
automotive sector117, regulated only particular aspects, 
whereas other aspects largely continued to get in the way of 
a genuine internal market.
— The procedure for developing and testing draft directives, 
and particularly the decision-making procedure, is ex­
tremely cumbersome and time-consuming. According to 
ESC indications118, it takes more than three years between 
publication of a draft in the Official Journal and final adop­
tion. The 15 directives adopted by the Council as a 
"package" on 17 September 1984 had been pending for de­
cision for an average of nine years, much too long a period 
to be able to respond quickly and flexibly to new needs and 
to steadily accelerating technological advance. This criti­
cism must of course be qualified by the observation that 
even at national or European level the conclusion of stan­
dardisation procedure often takes considerable time119. Con­
version of directives in Member States takes at least another 
year and a half, and is often delayed still further120.
— The frequently used procedure of optional harmonisation, 
while it facilitates compromise in the Council, is often not 
enough to bring about a genuine internal market. Here the 
ESC made the suggestion, apparently never taken up, that 
optional harmonisation solutions should in general be time- 
limited and be regarded as only a halfway house on the road 
to full harmonisation, in order to allow certain Member 
States and manufacturers enough time to adjust gradually121.
— Only part of the barriers to trade that actually exist can be dealt with 
by directives, since Art. 100 EEC presupposes that legal or adminis­
trative provisions in the area exist in at least one Member State, or that 
there are plans likely to lead to the creation of a trade barrier. Har­
monisation of inter-company technical standards by directives is pos-
117 See the comments under 2.4.3 supra.
118 OJ C 72, 24 March 1980, 9.
119 According to the procedure for producing DIN standards, some three 
years go by between application for standardisation and submission of 
finished DÎN standard: DIN (ed.), Handbuch der Normung, Bd. 1,2-5.
120 See the comments under 2.8 infra.




























































































sible only where technical norms are referred to by at least one Mem­
ber State in legal or administrative provisions122. The Commission 
summarised the position in 1980 as follows123:
"All the national standards being drawn up by the national 
standardisation authorities at the rate of dozens per week are 
not in fact provisions of law, regulation or administrative 
action. These national standards are not designed deliber­
ately in order to create obstacles but are generally meant to 
serve worthy aims: rationalisation of production, improve­
ment of product quality, protection of workers, users, con­
sumers or the environment, more economic use of energy 
and the like. Be that as it may, the way they are drawn up . . 
. gives the national manufacturers a twofold advantage over 
their competitors: they can be sure that in the preparation of 
these standards due consideration will have been given to 
their views and their manufacturing processes; they are 
aware of the intended pattern of development and modifica­
tion in advance of their competitors, and therefore have time 
to prepare for it".
— If directives are not confined to setting forth results to be 
achieved, but rather bindingly prescribe detailed technical 
specifications of design, they may hamper technical 
progress124.
— The unanimity requirement of Art. 100 EEC is indivisible, 
and therefore applies not only to the laying down of basic 
safety requirements in respect of the protective policies 
Member States may legitimately pursue under Art. 36 EEC, 
but also to the regulation of detailed technical requirements. 
The unanimity requirement is suspended only where adap­
tation of directives to technical progress has been entrusted 
to the Commission, in collaboration with a committee of 
Member State representatives. But is well-known that the 
attempt to give the Commission the power pursuant to Art. 
155 EEC, fourth indent, to enact implementing regulations 
has failed125. This solution would have meant both gaining
122 Langeheine, Art. 100, Nos. 18-23; Starkowski, 1973, 54-56.
123 Cited from the Commission communication to European Parliament 
and Council; extracts in EC Bulletin 1-1980, 12-13 (13).
124 Pelkmans/Vollebergh, 1986,25.
125 This is provided for in the draft Directive on construction products, OJ 




























































































time and giving the Council the needed leeway to work out 
the underlying political principles more clearly. A promi­
nent feature of work in the regulatory comrnittees is the 
common endeavour of specialists and technicians repre­
sented not to let failure to agree in committee leave the deci­
sion to politicians and diplomats on the Council with no 
technical competence. In votes, there is a strikingly high 
proportion of concurring opinions, and in most cases even 
unanimity126.
2.8 Difficulties with conversion into international law
The Commission's greater reluctance to enact new directives 
results in no small measure from the considerable difficulties in 
monitoring application of directives in Member States, and the 
amount of effort required to adapt them continually to technical 
progress127. Since the Commission intensified its monitoring ac­
tivities in 1977128, or one might say started paying more attention 
to implementation of Community law, it has often seen itself 
compelled to take action against several Member States simulta­
neously after expiring of the time-limit for conversion129. This is 
to preserve what has been accomplished and not to let the ap­
proximation of laws remain on paper, turning enactment of di­
rectives into purely symbolic politics.
This solution of delegation was once again suggested by the ESC, OJ C 
,24 March 1980, 11.
126 For details see Schmitt von Sydow, 1980, 157-172,
127 Op. cit., note 123, 14.
128 For details see Ehlermann, 1981. On implementation of Community 
law using the breach of treaty procedure see supra all 
Krislov/Ehlermann/Weiler, 1986, 59-88 and Weiler, The European 
Community System. Legal Structure and Political Process, forthcom­
ing. See also Hartley, 1981, 283-323; Everling, 1983, 105-109, 124; 
Evans, 1979; Ortlepp, 1987.
129 See the impressive list of actions for breach that appears monthly in the 




























































































Tables 4, 5 and 6 give a picture of the actions for treaty 
breaches brought by the Commission under Art. 169 EEC130. The 
actions start with a letter to the governments of the Member 
States concerned asking them to take a position on the non-con- 
version of a directive into national law, or else on an alleged 
breach of the EEC Treaty or of a regulation. The number of such 
letters grew from 97 in 1978 to 503 in 1985, that is to say they 
quintupled131. If the accusation is hereupon eliminated, the Com­
mission presents a recent opinion; here the rise was threefold, 
from 68 in 1979 to 233 in 1985. Whereas on the long-term aver­
age, six out of ten cases were resolved in the initial clarificatory 
stage before presentation of the reasoned opinion, in approxi­
mately four out of ten cases the Court of Justice had to be called 
in because the Member State involved had not complied with the 
Commission's reasoned opinion. In all procedural stages, some 
40% of cases concern the sector of the internal market and in­
dustry, i.e. the conversion of directives on elimination of techni­
cal barriers to trade or on infringement of free movement of 
goods. Table 5 shows that all Member States have been involved 
in actions for breach of treaty at all procedural stages, though to 
differing extents; Italy, France and Belgium are to the fore as 
well as Greece, considering its recent membership. Table 6 
shows that just 70% of actions for breach of treaty relate to faulty 
conversion or non-conversion of directives132. The breach actions
had to take action simultaneously against all Member States for non­
conversion of a particular directive.
130 Following H. Sieglerschmidt's report to the European Parliament on 
Member States' responsibility for application of Community law, EP- 
Doc. T 1052/82, the Commission submits annual reports to Parliament 
on verification of the application of Community law, 1983: COM (84) 
181 final of 11 April 1984, 1984: COM (85) 149 final of 23 April 
1984, 1985: OJ C 220, 1 September 1986, 1, 1986: OJ C 338, 16 De­
cember 1987, 1.
131 The decline in 1983 can be traced to the fact, that, year the Commis­
sion terminated many old actions in order on grounds of legal security, 
to replace them with more specific notifications of time-limits.
132 In 81% of cases (1978-85) the conversion measure had not yet been 




























































































for 1985 relate to 219 different directives, 64 of them laying 
down standards for industrial products133. In recent years the 
number of actions concerning breaches of the EEC Treaty has 
risen very considerably. Singling out the area of the internal mar­
ket and industry, these are almost always cases where the Com­
mission complains of breach of Art. 30 ff. EEC134.
Table 4: Actions for breach of treaty begun in the years from 1978 to 1985 
by procedural stage, and specifically for questions of the internal 
market and industry(l)
Year Letter of 
challenge








1978 97 60 68 49 15 9
1979 187 104 75 51 18 7
1980 227 140 68 41 28 25
1981 256 92 147 79 50 22
1982 335 97 157 92 45 21
1983 289 111 83 40 42 21
1984 454 172 148 46 54 23
1985 503 152 233 93 113 23
Total 2,348 928 979 491 365 162
(1) Source: Commission, Third Annual Report to the European Parlia­
ment on the Verification and Application of Community Law — 
1985, OJ C 220, 1 September 1986, 15.
converted; in 9%, measures notified were not in line with a directive, 
and 10% of actions were brought for faulty application of directives, 
OJ C 220, 1 September 1986, 16.
133 See OJ C 220, 1 September 1986, 50-77. These figures covered only 
actions brought, recent opinions and letters setting time-limits because 
of failure to notify national conversion measures.
134 For 1983 see: COM (84) 181 final of 11 April 1984, 32-39, for 1984: 
COM (85) 149 final of 23 April 1985, 34-43, for 1985: OJ C 220, 1 




























































































Table 5: Actions for breach of treaty begun between 1978 and 1985 
(number of letters of challenge) by Member State(l)
Member State Letters of Reasoned Recourse to
challenge opinions Court of Justice
Belgium 285 134 62
Germany 173 81 29
Denmark 129 32 11
Greece 163 63 16
France 421 175 62
Ireland 190 64 21
Italy 420 235 112
Luxembourg 192 66 17
Netherlands 189 66 16
United Kingdom 186 63 19
Total 2.348 979 365
(1) Source: Commission, Third Annual Report to the European Parlia­
ment on the Verification and Application of Community law — 1985, 
OJ C 220, 1 September 1986, 14.
(2) Only after 1982.
Table 6\ Actions for breach of treaty begun between 1978 and 1985, by le­
gal bases (directives — non-notification, non-correspondence, im­
proper application — or treaty/regulations) in total and specifically 
for questions of the internal market and industry(l)
Year Total
Directives
Internal Market and Industry 
Treaty/Regs. Directives Treaty/Regs.
1978 55 42 38 22
1979 150 37 82 22
1980 194 33 126 14
1981 196 60 75 17
1982 253 82 58 39
1983 186 103 65 46
1984 285 169 108 64
1985 301 202 92 60
Total 1,620 728 644 304
(1) Source: Commission, Third Annual Report to the European Par­
liament on the Verification and Application of Community law — 
1985, OJ C 220, 1 September 1986, 16.
Between 1978 and 1985 the lion's share of Court of Justice 
rulings in treaty breach actions, 122 out of 135, were in the 
Commission's favour, with only 13 in favour of the Member State 
involved. The Commission boasts the same successful score 
sheet in the group of cases that is quantitatively by far the largest, 




























































































dustry: 42 cases were decided in its favour, and 5 in favour of 
Member States involved135.
I
2.9 The GATT agreement on technical barriers to trade
The trade-restricting effect of technical standards is the ob­
ject of the GATT agreement on technical barriers to trade (the so- 
called GATT Standards Code) of 12 April 1979, which became 
effective on 1 January 1980 and was acceded to by the Commu­
nity, as well as the most important industrial countries'36. The 
agreement is aimed not only at bringing about a universal, equal 
level of safety, but at eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade 
caused by different technical requirements or different certifica­
tion and monitoring procedures. Fair, open application of techni­
cal regulations and standards is to be secured through renuncia­
tion of mutual discrimination, increased transparency in standard­
setting and certification systems, enhanced co-operation in the 
area of technical standardisation and a conciliation procedure. 
Goods from the territory of one contracting party may not be 
treated less favourably as regards technical standards and regula­
tion or certification and control procedures, than similar goods 
from another contracting party or goods of domestic origin (Art. 
1, 5.1, 7.2). The contracting parties undertake the use of relevant 
international standards, in so far as they exist, as a basis for their 
own standardisation work (Art. 2.2). This may be regarded as a
135 OJ C 220, 1 September 1986, 19-21.
136 The GATT agreement on technical barriers to trade is reprinted in OJ L 
71, 17 March 1980, 29. By its resolution of 10 December 1979, on the 
conclusion of multilateral agreements negotiated as part of the trade 
negotiations from 1973 to 1979, the Council approved the agreement; 
OJ L 14, 19 January 1980, 36-37. To convert the GATT agreement, the 
Council decision of 15 January 1980 on the provisions for laying down 
and applying technical regulations and standards, OJ L 14, 19 January 




























































































reference to the international state of the art as embodied in inter­
national technical standards. However, the technical standards 
produced by the ISO and IEC are not explicitly mentioned. As 
with Art. 6 EEC, the contracting parties are allowed wide-ranging 
autonomy in the area of safety regulations: ". . . for reasons of 
national security, to prevent misleading practices, to protect the 
safety and health of the person, the life and health of animals and 
plants or the environment, because of significant climatic or other 
geographical factors or because of fundamental technological 
problems" (Art. 2.2).
The contracting parties undertake to take part in producing 
international standards (Art. 2.3.) and to lay down technical re­
quirements where possible in relation to fitness for use and not in 
relation to design or descriptive characteristics (Art. 2.4). This 
leaves room for differing technical solutions as long as they meet 
the performance requirements. The contracting parties are 
obliged to publicise the introduction of technical standards de­
parting from international standards, to allow their trading part­
ners adequate time to comment and adjust, and to maintain an in­
formation office (Art. 2.5, 2.7, 2.8). Special importance can be 
attached to the attempt to arrive at mutual recognition of test re­
sults, conformity certificates or conformity marks. By Art. 5.2 the 
contracting parties guarantee that
"their central government offices will recognise test re­
sults, conformity certificates or conformity marks from 
competent offices in the territories of other contracting 
parties, or accept certificates made out by manufactur­
ers on the territories of other contracting parties even 
where test methods differ from their own, as long as 
they are convinced that the methods applied on the ter­
ritory of the manufacturing contracting party are ade-





























































































quately suitable for determining correspondence with 
relevant technical regulations and standards".
/
According to the GATT standards code, furthermore, each 
State that accedes to it guarantees that there is a central informa­
tion office on technical regulations, standards and marking sys­
tems (Art. 10). Particularly in favour of developing countries, 
mutual technical support in producing technical standards and in 
setting up standards organisations and certification systems is 
provided for (Art. 1l)137.
By mid-1984, 37 signatories had acceded to the GATT stan­
dards code, including 14 developing countries. By then some 
1,000 standardisation projects had been notified for which de­
parture from relevant international standards was planned138. The 
importance of the GATT agreement on technical barriers to trade 
lies in the strengthening of international and regional standardis­
ation, in the equal prominence given to certification besides stan­
dardisation, in the stress on the principle of mutual recognition of 
test results and conformity certificates and marks, in the setting 
up of an information system on technical standards and certifica­
tion and in the consideration given to developing countries' spe­
cial environmental, financial and commercial needs.
3. Approaches to a horizontally-oriented product 
safety policy
The programme to eliminate technical barriers to trade has 
seen its initial industrial policy orientation increasingly linked
137 In the interests of industrialised countries, performance-oriented stan­
dards, by comparison with design requirements, impede too speedy a 
transfer of technology. Cf. also Middleton, 1980, 207.




























































































with consumer policy objectives. The replacement of national 
product standards by the establishment of Community ones has 
always meant two things: removal of barriers to trade in goods 
(negative integration) and establishment of a more or less effec­
tive protective standard for the health and safety of consumers 
(positive integration). In addition to vertical product safety pol­
icy, aimed at individual products, Community consumer policy 
has developed horizontal approaches, embracing more than one 
product or group of products, for guaranteeing product safety.
3.1 Consumer protection and information programmes
The fundamental guidelines for a horizontally-based product 
safety policy can be found in the two action programmes on con­
sumer protection and information139, specifically in the section 
on protection of consumer health and safety. The principle set 
down there is:
"Goods and services offered to consumers must be 
such that, under normal or foreseeable conditions of 
use, they represent no risk to the health and safety of 
consumers. There should be quick and simple proce­
dures for drawing them from the market in the event of 
their presenting such risks"140.
As well as many indications on the promotion of consumer 
safety and health in harmonising legal regulations for individual 
products, the second programme contains a basis for a horizontal
139 First and second programmes on consumer protection and information 
policy (OJ C 92, 25 April 1975, 1; OJ C 133, 3 June 1981, 1). For the 
survey see Kramer, 1983. An interim report can be found in: Commis­
sion of the European Communities, Zehn Jahre Verbraucherpolitilc der 
Gemeinschaft. Ein Beitrag zum "Europa der Bürger", Luxembourg 
1985.
140 First programme (op. cit., note 139), point 15.1; Second Programme 




























































































product safety policy which — against the background of in­
creasing awareness of the limits to interventionist interference at 
the policy formation and programme implementation stage141 — 
stresses informative guidance and the provision of incentives to 
co-operation over intervention. As regards product safety, in part 
to facilitate identification of priorities, two information systems 
are proposed: a Community system of information on accidents 
in connection with the use of particular products, other than in 
occupational activity or road traffic, and one for rapid exchange 
of information on hazards arising in the use of consumer 
goods142.
To a large extent, Community consumer protection policy 
has had results that lag far behind its original programmatic in­
tentions. This is due to economic decline, the view that consumer 
protection is part of Member State rather than Community com­
petence, the unanimity requirement for law approximation pur­
suant to Arts. 100 and 235 EEC, and the concentration on vertical 
harmonisation143. For a long time successes were achieved essen­
tially only where product-specific regulations were issued to 
guarantee free movement of goods that also involved protection 
of consumer health and safety144. The principle of pursuing con-
141 The first clear and portentous signal was given by the Commission at 
its Comblain-la-Tour meeting in 1978. In drawing up a balance sheet 
of its work and redefining its course, it made new harmonisation mea­
sures dependent on the following four conditions being met:
—  Community action already requisite and not replaceable of measures by other 
actors;
—  positive effects on Community internal trade;
—  contribution to the economic and monetary integration of Europe;
—  adequate staffing and financial resources.
On this see Bourgoignie, 1987, 178. On criticism of the production and 
implementation of directives in connection with the programme on 
eliminating technical barriers to trade cf. 2.7 supra.




























































































sumer policy "piggyback" fashion to other policies cannot imme­
diately be transferred to horizontal product safety policy. This is 
one explanation for why it was only fairly late that the Commu­
nity developed systems to survey accidents and hazards in han­
dling products, and adopted the Product Liability Directive.
As a continuation of the two consumer protection pro­
grammes of 1975 and 1981, the Commission, in its communica­
tion to the Council entitled "A new impetus for consumer protec­
tion policy", proposed the following four components of its fu­
ture product safety policy145:
— Laying down of binding health and safety standards for 
manufacturers and suppliers, introduction of a general safety 
duty;
— co-operative action among national authorities responsible 
for consumer product safety;
— creation of Community institutions to monitor health and 
safety hazards arising in using consumer products;
143 Commission communication to the Council on a new impetus to con­
sumer protection policy, COM (85) 314 final of 23 July 1985, points 4- 
9. For an exhaustive analysis see Bourgoignie, 1987, 200-219.
144 Of the 28 most important texts adopted by the Council on consumer 
protection in the 10 years after 1975, not less than 24 under the pro­
gramme to eliminate technical barriers to trade referred to very specific 
products (vertical product safety policy), with only 4 that could be re­
garded as constituting horisontal product safety policy (indication of 
prices for foodstuffs, pilot experiment on accident information, rapid 
exchange of information on hazards arising in the use of consumer 
products, misleading advertising). By contrast, of the 8 most important 
consumer protection proposals before the Council for discussion in 
early 1985, not less than 6 were on aspects of consumer protection ap­
plying to many products (product liability, "door-to-door salesmen", 
consumer credit, advertising, price indications, accident information 
system). Calculated from Zehn Jahre Verbraucherpolitik (op. cit., note 
139), Annexes III and IV. For a critical account, specifically on prod­
uct safety, see BEUC, Manifest fiir die Sicherheit in Europa, BEUC- 
Nachrichten 47/1985.
145 New impetus (op. cit., fn 143), points 19-28. On the Commission 
communication, cf. the Council resolution of 23 June 1986, OJ C 167, 
5 July 1986, 1-2, and Stellungnahme von BEUC, BEUC-News, No. 




























































































— Community information and education on home and leisure 
product safety.
In pursuance of this new programmatic approach, explicitly 
identified as a complement to the new approach to technical har­
monisation and standards, the Commission and Council have al­
ready adopted a number of measures:
Amended proposal for a directive on the safety of toys146;
— directives on products which appearing to be other than they 
are, endanger the health or safety of consumers147;
— intensification of co-operation and information exchange 
with and among national authorities responsible for con­
sumer product safety148;
— interim report on the system for the rapid exchange of in­
formation on dangers arising from the use of consumer 
products, and initial proposals to extend the system149;
— extension of the demonstration project on a Community ac­
cident information system150;
146 In OJ C 282, 8 November 1986, 4, on 2 October 1987 the Commission 
presented another amended version, COM (87) 467 final. See also the 
observations in 3.2 and in Chapter IV, 3.2.
147 OJ L 192, 11 July 1987, 49. See also the observations in 3.4.
148 The first conference took place in May 1984 in Montpellier, and dealt 
with national and Community provisions in force on implementation 
and monitoring of consumer product safety. The effects of Community 
directives on tne conversion of standards and technical regulations and 
the monitoring of accidents caused by consumer products in the home 
were also discussed. Cf. Proceedings of the First European Conference 
on Inter-Administrative Co-operation in the Field of Consumer Product 
Safety in the Community, Montpellier, 28-30 May 1984, DG XI, -233- 
86. The second conference took place in June 1986 in The Hague, and 
dealt with the involvement of consumers in standardisation work, the 
development of a research programme on accidents in the private 
sphere, Community framework provisions on consumer product safety 
and the rapid information system on product hazards; cf. Bulletin EC 
6-1986, No. 2.1.166. The third conference was held in September 1987 
in Warwick.
149 COM (86) 562 final, 24 October 1986. For more on this see 3.4 infra.




























































































— communication to the Council on the integration of con­
sumer policy in the other common policies151;
— communication to the Council on the safety of consumers in 
relation to consumer products152;
— communication from the Commission on a Community in­
formation and awareness campaign on child safety153.
3.2 Proposal for a directive on the safety of toys — search 
for product-specific integration of internal market and 
product safety policies
Some peculiarities are displayed by the 1983 proposal for a 
framework directive on toy safety 154, which replaced an initial 
proposal from 1980155. The toy industry is characterised by con­
siderable international integration, and markets an extraordinarily 
varied range of products. Over 60,000 types of toys are marketed 
at present. These often have very short development periods, so 
that there is only a very limited time between development and 
marketing of a product, thus intensifying safety problems. Com­
munity-wide, some 2 million children per year have toy-related 
accidents.
What is aimed at is total harmonisation, since children's 
health and safety ought not to be protected to different extents in 
different Member States. Toys must meet a detailed catalogue of 
safety requirements which — in line with the variety of risks — 
relate to physical and mechanical risks, flammability, chemical
151 COM (86) 540 final, 24 October 1986. Cf. the Council resolution of 15 
December 1986 on the integration of consumer policy in the other 
common policies, OJ C 3, 7 January 1987, 1-2.
152 COM (87) 209 final, 8 May 1987.
153 COM (87) 211 final, 11 May 1987.
154 O JC 203,29 July 1983, 1-11.




























































































hazards, explosion risks, electrical risks, hygiene and radioactiv­
ity (Annex II). It is not proper use that is to be taken as a basis, 
but the usual mode of use and foreseeable misuse by children un­
der normal circumstances (Art. 2(1)).
A notable feature of the proposal, now abandoned, was that 
it not only aimed at removing barriers to trade, but above all at 
protecting children’s safety and health, for which it introduced 
some special legislative instruments. Thus, Member States were 
to report every three years on experience in safety checks carried 
out and in particular on accidents that had occurred when using 
toys (Art. 7 (3)). They had to ensure that toys not complying with 
the general safety principles and therefore hazardous to consumer 
safety and health were removed from the market without delay 
(Art. 9). Toy advertising was subject to minimum conditions to 
prevent consumers from being deceived as to the characteristics 
and safety level of toys, and to enable them to draw conclusions 
as to cautionary provisions in their use and as to the minimum 
age-limits applying to particular types of toys (Art. 10).
However, what makes the various proposals for directives 
on toy safety particularly interesting is that they document the 
regulatory shift from product-specific directives with detailed 
technical specifications up to the new approach, with its reference 
to technical standards156. The core of all the drafts is an annex 
containing general objectives on toy safety — or in the terminol­
ogy of the new approach, the basic safety requirements.
According to the first 1980 draft157, the technical standards 
to be observed for individual risks among those mentioned in the 
general safety objectives should be laid down in guidelines by the
156 For information on the various stages of this "regulatory odyssey" see 
the general explanatory statement to the proposal for a directive on toy 




























































































Council itself. The proposal for a directive contained general 
safety objectives and at the same time detailed annexes with 
Community technical safety standards, on testing of physical and 
mechanical properties and on the flammability of toys (Annexes 
V and VI); further directives on common technical standards 
concerning chemical, toxicological, electrical and other risks 
were contemplated (Art. 4 (1)). The initial attempt at broad refer­
ence to technical standards failed because no satisfactory techni­
cal standards for toy safety existed at a European level, and be­
cause European standardisation bodies did not get on with their 
work quickly enough, and were exposed to criticism from Mem­
ber States regarding the quality of their work.
The European Parliament hoped for a specific reference to 
technical standards instead of a description of technical charac­
teristics and test methods in the annexes to the directives158. The 
Commission thereupon split its proposal, bringing three varia­
tions before the Council in July 1983 for directives on toy safety. 
These included a framework directive containing general objec­
tives for toy safety from all viewpoints159, and two specific im­
plementing directives on the mechanical and physical proper­
ties160 and inflammability of toys161. The proposed implementing 
regulations referred — subject to particular amendments — to two 
European standards. Compliance with them was to be made 
binding (Art. 4 (1)). Departure was to be possible where toys 
were manufactured according to new technologies and the gen­
eral safety regulations were complied with (Art. 5(1)).
157 OJ C 228, 8 September 1980, 10.
158 COM (86) 541 final, 16 October 1986, 2.
159 OJ C 203, 29 July 1983, 1-11.
160 OJ C 203, 29 July 1983, 12-14.




























































































The October 1986 proposal162, fully adopts the regulatory 
concept of the new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards. The safety requirements, taken over essentially un­
changed, are (rebuttably) to be presumed compliant if their 
Community mark confirms that the toys meet particular har­
monised technical standards converted into national standards or, 
in the case where the harmonised standards are not applied or 
only partially applied or no standard exists, meet the basic re­
quirements of a Community design test. The proposal still con­
tains a few features attributable to a general product safety pol­
icy: where toys jeopardise the safety and health of users or third 
parties, Member States are called on to take all appropriate mea­
sures to remove them from the market, forbid their marketing or 
restrict it (Art. 7 (!)). While initially there was explicit provision 
for an obligation on other Member States to withdraw toys from 
the market and prohibit their being marketed where such a mea­
sure proved justified, now all that is planned is information of 
other Member States by the Commission (Art. 7 (4)). Member 
States are instructed to ensure that random checks on toys mar­
keted are carried out in order to verify their safety (Art. 12(1)).
3.3 Pilot experiment for a Community accident information 
system
The first important foundation stone towards the establish­
ment of a horizontal Community product safety policy was the 
Council's decision of 23 July 1981 on the "implementation of a 
pilot experiment relating to a Community system of information 
on accidents involving products outside the spheres of occupa­
tional activities and road traffic"163. The pilot experiment was
162 OJ C 282, 8 November 1986, 4 in the amended version of 2 October 




























































































carried out from 1 January 1982 onwards for a period of 30 
months and was to cover accidents in the home and its immediate 
proximity requiring medical treatment, and supply information on 
identification of the accident, its location, products involved, type 
of accident, type of injury, activity in progress at time of acci­
dent, its outcome and arrangements relating to the victim. The 
intention was to cover 320,000 cases per year, distributed pro­
portionately over Member States according to population, from 
hospitals, poison emergency centres and doctors. The object was 
to set up a Community system to collect information on home ac­
cidents in order to establish priorities for appropriate proposals to 
prevent accidents involving products164. All the States that have 
an information system for the systematic assessment of accidents 
in fact understood the setting-up of the system as a building- 
block towards a more comprehensive product safety policy165.
The pilot experiment, which left Member States free as to 
the mode of their participation (Art. 2 (2)), ended in relative fail­
ure166, because only Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark actu­
ally took part167, the other Member States either did not partici-
Chapter IV, 3.2.
163 Council Decision 81/623/EEC, 23 July 1981, OJ L 229, 13 August 
1981, 1.
164 Op. cit., note 162, 3rd and 4th recitals.
165 Cf. OECD, Data Collection Systems, 1978.
166 The final report on the results of the pilot experiment -published as an 
annex to the Commission's proposal for a Council decision introducing 
a Community system of information on accidents in which consumer 
products are involved, COM (84) 735 final, 7 January 1985 — rather 
complacently glosses over this. But see the report by the European 
Parliament Committee on the environment, public health and consumer 
protection on this Commission proposal, PE DOC A 2-183/85, 12 De­
cember 1985, 10.
167 That is, the Member States that already had a more or less developed 
system for monitoring accidents arising in product use; Britain has 
been running the "Home Accident Surveillance System" (HASS) since 
1976 (cf. Chapter II, 2.5 supra), the Netherlands have been doing 
studies since 1981 for the "Prive Ongevallen Registratie Systeem1 




























































































pate at all168 or supplied only fragmentary information169. Given 
the extremely limited financing, a representative data survey was 
never in question. Nevertheless, taking experience acquired in the 
US with the NEISS into account170 and including data from 
Member States that have an appropriate survey system, the pilot 
experiment did allow a more or less well-founded estimate of 
home and leisure accidents. The study concluded that in the Eu­
ropean Community annually more than 30,000 deaths and some 
40 million injuries result from accidents not related to work and 
traffic. Hospital treatment and health insurance costs alone 
amount to more than 30 million ECU annually.
On the basis of experience with the pilot experiment, the 
Commission once again, on 7 January 1985, proposed the setting 
up of a "Community system of information on accidents in which 
consumer products are involved"171. Despite the favourable opin­
ions from the Economic and Social Committee172 and the Euro­
pean Parliament173, all the Council managed to arrive at, with its 
decision of 22 April 1986 concerning a "demonstration project 
with a view to introducing a Community system of information 
on accidents involving consumer products"174, was the introduc­
tion of a further demonstration project, this time limited to 5 
years. Basic information is to be obtained from the casualty de­
volved in Scandinavian projects for surveying home and leisure acci­
dents. A survey is provided by the Commission of the European Com­
munities, Proceedings of the European Symposium on "Product Safety 
in European Community", Brussels, 17-18 May 1984, 60-120.
168 The Federal Republic, Greece and Luxembourg. For the justifications 
see the answer to written question No. 2194/84, OJ C 203, 12 August 
1985, 3.
169 Belgium, France, Ireland and Italy.
170 Cf. Chapter n, 4.2 supra.
171 O JC  117, 11 May 1985,4.
172 O JC  188,29July 1985,9.




























































































partments of hospitals selected by Member States in agreement 
with the Commission; in full operation, between one 
(Luxembourg) and 13 (Federal Republic of Germany) hospitals 
per Member State are to be covered. The object is the involve­
ment of 90 hospitals and collection of data on 400,000 to 900,000 
cases per year, distributed over Member States in proportion to 
population175. In duly justified circumstances, the Commission 
may accept information from alternative sources of an equivalent 
value. Member States may also forward additional information 
from poison antidote centres, family doctors, insurance compa­
nies or other information sources. The Commission is responsible 
for assessing data from the whole Community, uniformly coded; 
it may carry out detailed studies on the most serious and/or most 
frequent accidents (Art. 4 (1)). A maximum amount of 7 million 
ECU is provided for implementing the demonstration project for 
the first three years176.
The Council adopted the Commission's objective of using 
the information for "promoting improvements in product fea­
tures, their standards, their proper use by consumers and con­
sumer information and education aimed at preventing acci­
dents"177, but decided against the proposed documentation and 
information centre to make all non-confidential information 
accessible to those interested, which would have been important 
for achieving its goal178, and instead of annual reports called only 
for a final report179. This decisively restricts the possibilities of
174 O JL 109, 26 April 1986, 23.
175 Op. cit., note 105, Annex I.
176 This amount is regarded by the ESC (loc. cit., note 103), point 1.7, as 
utterly inadequate — understandably, since ignoring initial costs one 
arrives at less than 8 ECU per case, assuming coverage of only 
300,000 cases per year on average, for data collection, evaluation and 
administration.
177 Council Decision 86/138/EEC, 22 April 1986 (op. cit., fn 173), sixth 




























































































arriving at any specific action during the again extended test pe­
riod. The conveying of information to circles involved as quickly 
as possible, possible withdrawal of goods from the market/ and in 
general, the urgency of action on an accident information system 
had been underlined by the European Parliament180 and the Eco­
nomic and Social Committee in their opinions, the latter putting it 
particularly emphatically:
"Collecting statistics must not be an end in itself, 
and the Commission should set up procedures to 
ensure that action is taken in respect of products 
and features which cause accidents. Such action 
would involve for example product recall and 
redesigning of products and features and the 
setting of appropriate standards at Community 
and international level.”181
Indeed, it has to be said that today the link-up between acci­
dent surveys and other areas of product safety policy has not yet 
been achieved. Priority ought to go not to the building-up of the 
most perfect possible accident information system in the 1990's, 
but to rapidly converting already available data into Community­
wide action before completion of the demonstration project. This 
would mean making all non-confidential information collected 
available to interested circles, namely public authorities, manu­
facturers, traders, users, standardisation bodies and the Standing 
Committee on standardisation questions. Funds for the necessary 
in-depth studies on particularly hazardous areas found should al­
ready be made available.
178 Art. 7 of the Commission proposal (loc. cit., note 170).
179 Cf. Art. 8 of the Council Decision (loc. cit. note 173) and Art. 8 of the 
Commission proposal (loc. cit. note 170).
180 Op. cit., note 172, points 4 and 9.




























































































It is well known that only a small proportion of home and 
leisure accidents surveyed have causes attributable to the use of 
consumer products182. Such accident-causing products183 ought 
to be recorded whenever possible: along with any marks the 
products might bear, their condition at the time of the accident 
and detailed information on how the accident occurred, if 
improvement of hazardous products on a voluntary basis, the 
establishment of suitable safety standards with priority in proven 
hazard areas, or where necessary, the publication of warnings or 
the commencement of recall campaigns shall be achieved. In de­
signing the in-depth studies, representatives of standardisation 
workers should be brought in, to guarantee that information of 
importance to standard-setting is in fact collected184.
The Commission intends as part of its research and devel­
opment programme for 1987 to 1991 to coordinate and promote 
in-depth research work on the following priority areas: poisonous 
substances (especially child-proof seals), articles for children, 
playground devices and amusement parks, sport articles, do-it-
182 Even though the much played up finding of the HUK study for the 
Federal Republic (Pfundt, 1985, 190 — for more details see Chapter II, 
3.1 supra), that 99% of home and leisure accidents result from more or 
less serious mistaken actions, is not entirely confirmed by the other in­
formation systems.
183 Cf. the list drawn up by the HASS of products, articles and character­
istics in the household area with the most frequent involvement in ac­
cidents requiring hospital treatment, described in the Commission's 
preliminary draft, submitted in May 1986, for a multi-year action pro­
gramme on consumer safety and on measures to prevent home and 
leisure accidents (1987-91), 20-21. For a comparison see Pfundt, 1985, 
163-5.
184 On the supra see Falke, 1986, 19. On the connection between accident 





























































































yourself appliances, fire safety and products developed specially 
for the elderly and the handicapped185.
3.4 Information exchange on product hazards — approach to 
Community follow-up market control
To date there is not at the Community level any "simple but 
effective system allowing products and services hazardous to 
consumer health to be removed from the market"186.
The Community has contributed to the marketability of 
products in various ways: through its measures to eliminate tech­
nical barriers to trade, and still more through the new approach 
with its reference to standards and mutual recognition of 
certificates187, and the ECJ case law on freedom of movement of 
goods — namely that a product legally manufactured and 
marketed in one Community country must in principle be 
admitted into all other Community countries, irrespective of 
contrary national regulations, which cannot be legitimated by Art. 
36 EEC188. However, with a few exceptions189, it is not taking
185 Commission, preliminary draft multi-year action programme on con­
sumer safety and measures to prevent home and leisure accidents 
(1987-91), Brussels, May 1986, 29-30.
186 Thus the European Parliament's proposed amendment to the proposed 
system for information exchange on product hazards, OJ C, 19 July 
1982, 116 et seq. (117); it takes up a formulation from the first and 
second programmes on consumer protection and information. On the 
legal position in the Community and the individual Member States cf. 
Stuyck, Withdrawal, 1984; Kramer, Zum Rückruf von Produkten, 
1982; idem, Product Recalls, 1982. On the legal position in the OECD 
countries and the OECD's position, cf. OECD, Recall Procedures, 
1981.
187 For details see the comments in Chapter IV, 3.2.
188 More details in Chapter IV, 1.
189 Cf. the directives restricting the marketing and use of certain hazardous 
substances and preparations, on which see 2.4.2 supra, esp. note 79; cf. 




























































































any measures for Community-wide intervention against product 
hazards. It is in most cases left up to Member States to restrict or 
prohibit trade in suitable fashion on their territory when serious 
hazards arise from a product. For products to which Community 
safety standards apply, the safeguard clause procedure must be 
used190.
The reverse side of the Cassis de Dijon principle, according 
to which anything legally manufactured and marketed in one 
Member State may be marketed without restriction everywhere in 
the Community, leads to the political maxim that a product must 
be removed from the market in all Member States when serious 
risk has been found in one Member State, leading to a recall or 
marketing ban191. Behind this lies the general idea that free 
movement of goods should benefit only products that do not con­
stitute a hazard to consumer safety or health192. If a product could 
be recalled or banned from the market in one Member State but 
simultaneously freely marketed in others, this would be incom­
patible with the objective of creating a Community-wide level of 
comparable product safety and of guaranteeing free movement of 
goods only when this does not adversely affect the rightful pro­
tection of consumer safety and health193. A common market for 
products necessitates, if new border controls are not to be intro­
duced because of the possibility of resale and parallel imports, a
be, endanger consumer health and safety, OJ L 192, 11 July 1987, 49. 
See also Krämer, 1985, Nos. 239-241.
190 Cf. 2.5 supra.
191 For details on this, discussing it as a legal principle, see Krämer, 1985, 
Nos. 247-251. See also Kögler/Krämer, 192; Domzalski, 1984, 28.
192 The present position is bitterly described by Domzalski (1984, 30) as 
follows: "If there is one field in which the Community principle of 
'free movement’ is fully implemented, then it is without a doubt that of 
dangerous products".
193 Krämer (1985, No. 250) describes examples where recalls remain re­
stricted to individual Member States. On the related problem of ban­




























































































Community instrument for eliminating products hazards arising 
from it194.
\
The Council decision of 2 March 1984 "introducing a 
Community system for the rapid exchange of information on 
dangers arising from the use of consumer products"195 does not 
aim at introducing this sort of Community follow-up market 
control. Instead, all Member States are to be informed as rapidly 
as possible of urgent steps taken by one Member State (if possi­
ble only after consulting the producer, distributor or importer)196 
to prevent, restrict or attach particular conditions to the marketing 
or use of a product on its territory, or product group, because of a 
serious and immediate risk which that product or product group 
presents for the health or safety of consumers when used in nor­
mal and foreseeable conditions (Art. 1 (1)). The information sys­
tem applies to all products intended for use by consumers except 
those intended exclusively for professional use or those subject 
under other Community instruments to equivalent notification 
procedures (Art. 2). It has since been clarified that only medical 
specialties falling under Directives 75/319/EEC and 81/851/EEC, 
and notifications on animal diseases and residues in foodstuffs 
and fresh meat pursuant to Directives 64/432/EEC and 
82/894/EEC have an equivalent Community notification proce-
194 For details on this see Chapter VI, 3.4 infra.
195 OJ L 70, 13 March 1984, 16-17. For details on this see Milas, 1984. 
See also Pauli, 1984; Falke, 1986, 20-21. The European Parliament, 
which initially took a negative attitude to the Commission proposal (OJ 
C 172, 13 July 1981, 135-36), indicated its agreement only once the 
existing informal information exchange among European countries un­
der OECD auspices proved to be inadequate in the case of the dena­
tured Spanish oil, from which hundreds of people died and thousands 
were poisoned in the summer of 1981. See the European Parliament 
resolutions on the Commission proposal, OJ C 182, 19 July 1982, point 
3. In July 1985 the Commission, pursuant to Art. 4 of the decision, de­
cided the details of its implementation, communicated as Annex II to 
the interim report on the system for the rapid exchange of information 
on dangers arising from the use of consumer products, COM (86) 562 




























































































dure197. The safeguard clause procedure contained in many prod­
uct-related directives198 cannot be regarded as an equivalent noti­
fication procedure, as it is not aimed at equally rapid exchange of 
information, applies only to products complying with the har­
monised standards, and finally is intended, over and above urgent 
temporary intervention, to lead to revision of the Community 
standards themselves. The point of the system is to facilitate a 
rapid exchange of information in the case of a serious, immediate 
danger requiring immediate action, not long-term risks in the case 
of which the adjustment of product-specific requirements has to 
be considered199. For foodstuffs, which formally fall under the 
scope of the decision, the informally introduced and, according to 
report, well-functioning system has been retained and not ad­
ministratively integrated in the non-food area200.
The Commission, under which an advisory committee is set 
up to implement the decision (Art. 7), is the central relay station 
for information. It receives notification of emergency measures 
taken, verifies it and telexes it to the competent authorities of the 
other Member States (Art. 1 (3)). These have to inform it without 
delay of any measures they may have taken following receipt of 
the information; the Commission in turn forwards this informa­
tion to the competent authorities of other Member States (Art. 3). 
At the request of authorities supplying the information, it may in 
justified cases be treated as confidential (Art. 6). By March 1988 
the Council was to decide in the light of experience obtained
196 Cf. point 4 of the detailed description of the procedure.
197 See interim report (op. cit., note 194), section VI.
198 Cf. 2.5 supra.
199 See interim report (op. cit., note 194), section IV and point 2 in the 
detailed description of the procedure.




























































































whether to continue or revise the system, initially restricted to 4 
years (Art. 8 (2)).
Between March 1985 and September 1986, 34 cases were 
reported in the foodstuffs area and 33 in the non-foodstuffs area. 
In the latter area, communications overwhelmingly concerned 
electrical appliances, but also toys, and were concentrated almost 
exclusively in the last half-year period201; now that initial diffi­
culties have been overcome, a further increase in notifications is 
to be expected. It is at present being considered whether and to 
what extent European consumer organisations should be given 
the information received and whether information should be ex­
changed on a voluntary basis even before such a decision is 
taken202. The Commission has commendably announced its in­
tention to include information for third countries in the early 
warning system, so as to prevent export of hazardous products or 
substances banned in the Community203.
One point that should be verified is whether the information 
exchange should remained confined to sovereign governmental 
urgent measures. It is likely that voluntary recall or warning 
campaigns by manufacturers and importers, not infrequently in 
response to pressure from government agencies204 or consumer 
organisations or the media, are commoner than governmental 
marketing bans or restrictions. Government agencies more often 
act in an advisory capacity rather than with repressive police
201 Cf. the lists of cases notified since March 1985, printed as an annex to 
the interim report (op. cit., note 194).
202 See interim report (op. cit., note 194), section VIII.
203 New impetus (op. cit., note 143), point 25. Cf. also the European Par­
liament resolution instructive in mis context, on the export of pesti­
cides to third countries, OJ C 307, 14 November 1983, 109 et seq.
204 In this connection, cf. the cooperation between manufacturers and the 
Institute for Research and Standards in Ireland and the Consumer 




























































































measures in monitoring the safety of technical consumer prod­
ucts205. Agencies responsible for monitoring product safety in 
Member States ought to exchange information regularly on their 
experience in this area of their work. Whether other Member 
States in turn act when they have received the information and 
what functionally equivalent measures they take after how long a 
time is an important preliminary question for the setting up of 
Community follow-up market controls206.
Important supplementary functions or initiatives, correction 
and information are results of the efforts of consumer associa­
tions to set up information networks on product hazards207. All 
too often the authorities merely react to public pressure, or else 
keep important information from the public by minimising haz­
ardous situations. Since 1981 the BEUC has, with its BEUC 
Communications, set up a sort of Interpol system for hazardous 
products. By mid-1985 some 140 different products had been in­
dicated as hazardous, though without distinction as to whether the 
case concerned a ban or warning from a public body, a voluntary 
recall by a manufacturer or a comparative test of goods208. In 
view of the practice by multinational concerns of selling off haz­
ardous products and chemicals in Third World countries that 
have been banned in industrialised countries, the worldwide ac-
supra all the British Code of Practice on action concerning vehicle 
safety defects.
205 Thus in the German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1984 tests un­
der the GSG showed 5,393 defects out of 18,997 appliances tested; in 
only 27 cases (i.e. 0.5% of the appliances found defective) was mar­
keting or exhibiting prohibited; Jahresbericht 1984 der Gewerbeauf­
sicht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 232.
206 More details in Chapter VI, 3.4.
207 On the activities of BEUC and IOCU, see Domzalski, 1984.




























































































tivities of the IOCU (International Organisation of Consumers' 
Unions)209 deserve particular attention.
V
3.5 The Product Liability Directive
Almost a decade after submission of the Commission's first 
proposal210, the Council arrived on 25 July 1985 at adoption of 
the Directive on Defective Products211.
The main lines of the Directive can be summarised as fol­
lows212: the manufacturer213 of a product — except for primary 
agricultural products (Art. 2) — is liable, even without fault, for 
damages caused by a defect in the product (Art. 1). The require­
ments as to proof are strict: the injured person has to prove the 
damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and 
damage (Art. 4)214. Liability cannot be excluded by contractual
209 A particular strongpoint of IOCU's activities is in the area of pharma­
ceuticals (Health Action International — HAI) and pesticides 
(Pesticide Action Network — PAN).
210 OJ C 241, 14 October 1976, 9. Following opinions from the ESC (OJ C 
114, 7 May 1979, 15) and the European Parliament (OJ C 127, 21 May 
1979, 61), the Commission submitted an amended version in Septem­
ber 1979 (OJ C 271, 26 October 1979, 3).
211 O JL  210, 7 August 1985, 29.
212 On the product liability directive in general see Taschner, Kommentar, 
1986; Schmidt-Salzer, Kommentar, 1986; Taschner, Die künftige Pro­
duzentenhaftung in Deutschland, 1986; Hollmann, 1985; Brügge- 
meier/Reich, 1986; Reich, 1986; Reich, 1987, Nos. 86-112; Krämer, 
1985, Nos. 320-330; Schmidt-Salzer, Die EG-Richtlinie Produkhaf- 
tung, 1986; Schlechtriem, 1986; Storm, 1986; Pauli, 1986; Lorenz, 
1987; Frietsch, 1987; Budde/Reihlen, 1987; Whittaker, 1985.
213 By Art. 3 of the directive, a "producer" is the manufacturer of the final
Eroduct, a raw material or a partial product, or any person describing imself or herself as a producer, the so-called quasi-producer, and im­
porters bringing products, from "Third Countries" into the territory of 
the Common Market. If the producer of a product cannot be estab­
lished, then any supplier may be liable on certain conditions.
214 This distribution of the onus of proof is called by Taschner in Die kün­




























































































provision and is unlimited in extent, although Member States 
may set a limit, of at least 70 million ECU for a given producer, 
for deaths or personal injuries caused by identical items with the 
same defect (Art. 16 (1)). The Directive does not apply to prop­
erty damage in the industrial sphere; even property damage to 
non-commercial consumers is not compensated for fully, but only 
above a limit of 500 ECU (Art. 9 (b)). Member States' provisions 
relating to non-material damage remain unaffected (Art. 9, last 
sentence). Manufacturers are not liable where the product com­
plies with mandatory regulations issued by the authorities (Art. 7
(d) ). Liability does not extend to development hazards, that is, to 
defects that could not be discovered given the stage of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time of its manufacturing (Art. 7
(e) ), unless a Member State explicitly so provides (Art. 15 
(l)(b)). Liability is extinguished 10 years after marketing of the 
specific product in question (Art. 11). As to the latency period of 
up to 30 years between the action of chemicals and other harmful 
substances such as asbestos and the manifestation of damage and 
other after-effects, this is a very significant exclusion of liability, 
since in this sort of situation, the conditions for tortious liability 
should normally not exist.
The central provision for the directive's safety concept, Art. 
6 (1), affirms215:
Charta to protect industry against unjustified claims". For criticism see 
Briiggemeier/Reich, 1986, 153-54; Krämer, 1985, No. 328, with refer­
ences to the potentially considerable effects in the area of regulatory 
practice outside the Courts.
215 Cf. the tenor of Art. 1 of the French law No. 83-660 of 21 July 1983 on 
consumer safety: "Products and services must under normal conditions 
of use, or any other conditions of use reasonably foreseeable by the ex­
pert, offer the level of safety that can legitimately be expected, and 
may not endanger the health of persons1'. — Cf. the comments in 




























































































"A product is defective when it does not provide the 
safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all 
circumstances into account, including:
a) the presentation of the product;
b) the use to which it could reasonably be ex­
pected that the product would be put;
c) the time when the product was put into cir­
culation".
Accordingly, defectiveness of a product follows not from its 
lack of fitness for use, but from a lack of the safety that the public 
is entitled to expect216. The use of the "informed public" as a ref­
erence point provides courts in Member States with considerable 
leeway in putting the norm into practice. "The relevant safety ex­
pectations within the meaning of Art. 6 (1)", conclude Brugge - 
meier and Reich217, "are precisely what the courts find to be nec­
essary in the individual case in terms of hazard protection, in the 
interest of protecting the integrity of the citizens of the Common 
Market".
Different definitions of safety expectations by courts in in­
dividual States cannot be mled out218. In view of the differing le­
gal traditions and divergent safety philosophies in Member 
States, any farther-reaching attempt at harmonisation would 
probably be in vain. Consideration should however be given as to 
whether an information system on relevant decisions by national 
courts219 might not restrain excessive divergence. Such an infor­
mation system would also help with deciding in 1995 on a secure
216 As the sixth recital in the Product Liability Directive explicitly states.
217 Briiggemeier/Reich, 1986, 150.
218 Taschner, Kommentar, 1986, Art. 6, Nos. 5-7, regards the danger of 
divergent decisions by the courts of different Member States as rather a 
theoretical one. He bases himself not only on the possibility of pre­
liminary rulings from the ECJ, which favours uniform practice (op. 
cit., No. 7), but also on an exhaustive list of examples of product de­




























































































basis of knowledge as to the inclusion of agricultural products 
and development risks, and as to the liability restrictions for 
damage resulting from deaths or personal injury (cf. Art. 15 (3) 
and Art. 16 (2)). Even before this second stage of the harmonisa­
tion process, it would also provide further indications of product 
hazards, possibly useful for setting standards.
The directive's concept of defect is, even though this termi­
nology220 is not used, oriented towards foreseeable misuse. Ac­
cordingly, a manufacturer cannot escape liability with the de­
fence that the specific use of the product did not correspond with 
proper use; otherwise, by restrictively defining use he could de­
cide as to the defectiveness of his product and thus as to his own 
liability. Conversely, not every misuse counts against the manu­
facturer, but only misuse that could be foreseen221.
A product which met ordinary safety expectations at the 
time it was marketed does not subsequently become defective be­
cause an improved product is marketed later (Art. 6 (2)). Ac­
cordingly, tighter technical standards do not make a previously 
marketed product meeting all safety standards defective.
Among the grounds for exclusion of liability, the provisions 
of Art. 7 (d) are significant for our purposes. A manufacturer of a 
defective product that has caused damage can exculpate himself 
by showing that the defect is due to compliance of the product 
with mandatory regulations issued by the authorities. This does 
not include technical standards from private standardisation or­
ganisations, since they are not issued by the public authorities 
and compliance is not mandatory. Nor does this change where
219 Briiggemeier/Reich, 1985, 150-51.
220 Cf. Chapter I, 2.1 supra.
221 Cf. Taschner, Kommentar, 1986, Art. 6, Nos. 16-18; Schmidt-Salzer, 




























































































technical standards have by way of sliding reference, been made 
an integral part of a product safety regulation such as under the 
German Appliances Safety Act or the Low Voltage Directive or 
the new approach to technical harmonisation and standards. In 
this case all that is legally relevant for the manufacturer are the 
basic safety requirements, or the general safety obligation of the 
Appliances Safety Act222; compliance with the relevant technical 
standards merely justifies the rebuttable assumption that the 
binding safety requirements have been met. In order not to ham­
per technical progress, departure from technical standards is al­
lowed, sometimes explicitly, if the same level of safety is 
achieved in other ways when sliding reference is used223. In this 
case, the onus of proof that products meet the basic safety re­
quirements is on the manufacturer224. In other words, compliance 
with particular European or national technical standards to which 
the Community or Member State legislator has referred does not 
allow the manufacturer to apply the exclusion of liability under 
Art. 7 (d)225. As an argument for this, Taschner226 adds:
"Manufacturers in a particular industry, normally the
authors of such technical standards, may not, by issu-
222 § 3 (1) (1) GSG.
223 Thus § 3 (1) (2) GSG.
224 On the supra cf. the 3rd and 4th basic principles in the new approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards, OJ C 136, 4 June 1985, 1 et 
seq. (3). See further the comments in Chapter IV, 3.2.
225 See also Taschner, Kommentar, 1986, Art. 7, Nos. 24-35; Brtigge- 
meier/Reich, 1986, 152-53; Reich, 1987, Nos 95a; Kramer, 1985, No. 
325; Frietsch, 1987, 137; Hollmann, 1985, 2394-95; Schlechtriem, 
1986, 1036-37; Lorenz, 1987, 12. The only divergent view as far as 
can be seen is from Budde/Reihlen, 1987, 66, who, however, gener­
ously overlook the characteristic of the bindingness of standards and 
Schmidt-Salzer, Kommentar, 1986, Nos. 99-104, for the case where 
interpenetration or statutory regulation with various intercompany sets 
of regulations and administrative practice put manufacturers concerned 
into a position that is identical with a mandatory statutory norm.




























































































ing standards that exclude liability, make themselves 
the masters of their own liability”.
The ground of exculpation in Art. 7 (d) applies only where 
statute or ordinance has bindingly prescribed one particular 
method of production, to which the product defect is causally to 
be attributed. Compliance with a statutorily prescribed minimum 
standard is not enough, since nothing prevents the manufacturer 
from going beyond this minimum standard and increasing the 
safety of his product. Compliance with the basic safety require­
ments under the new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards is not automatically enough to free the manufacturer 
from liability227.
Positive and negative lists issued by the authorities do not 
constitute grounds for exclusion from liability under Art. 7 (d). 
Use of an admissible food additive (in the case of positive lists), 
or of a non-prohibited additive in the case of cosmetics (in the 
case of negative lists) is freely open to the manufacturer, but not 
bindingly prescribed; positive and negative lists are aimed merely 
at ruling out the use of particular hazardous substances, but not at 
bindingly prescribing a particular way of producing a product228.
According to Art. 7 (e), a manufacturer is not liable where 
he shows that the "state of scientific and technical knowledge at 
the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as 
to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered". The manu­
facturer cannot exculpate himself by showing that he complied 
with the state of scientific and technical knowledge229. The state 
of scientific and technical knowledge is in Art. 7 (e) a criterion
227 Taschner, Kommentar, 1986, Art. 7, Nos. 25 and 33.
228 Particularly incisive is Krämer, 1985; No. 325; see also Taschner, 
Kommentar, 1986, Art. 7, No. 31; Briiggemeier/Reich, 1986, 153; Re­




























































































not for the manufacturer's action but for the recognisability of the 
defect. What is decisive is not the individual manufacturer's ac­
tual possibilities of knowledge, but whether anyone at all could 
have possibly recognised the defect because the scientific and 
technical aids objectively existed230. Since scientists and technol­
ogists exchange information worldwide, it is not the scientific 
and technical expertise available in the manufacturer's country 
that counts231. Nor is it relevant whether the science and technol­
ogy are generally recognised and generally available232. Science 
lives on the methodical encouragement of doubt, and constantly 
re-defines technical risks; to see it as the administration of pre­
sumably established stocks of knowledge is to misunderstand it. 
Accordingly even potential hazards expressed in outsider views 
but scientifically justified are to be taken into account233. Before 
marketing a hazardous substance — development risks are rele­
vant above all for the chemical and pharmaceutical industries — 
all investigations into the state of science and technology that 
may provide information to determine side-effects and after-ef­
fects are to be employed, or to be considered. This does not of 
course eliminate the dilemma that the research laboratories of in­
dustry, which frequently have a monopoly on knowledge, do not
229 But see Kretschmer, 1986, 35; by contrast Taschner, Die EG-Richtlinie 
zur Produzentenhaftung und die deutsche Industrie, 1986, 55.
230 Taschner, Kommentar, 1986, Art. 7, No. 44; Brüggemeier/Reich, 1986, 
153.
231 Taschner, Kommentar, 1986, Art. 7, No. 45.
232 But see Taschner, Kommentar 1986, Art. 7, No. 45. Cf. also Schmidt- 
Salzer, Kommentar, Art. 7, Nos. 133-148, who wishes to go further 
and focus on whether knowledge of the relevant hazard has become 
general knowledge among experts in the area concerned. He however 
takes it that the legal meaning and purpose of Art. 7 (e) is to clarify 
that, in principle, tortious liability should continue to apply to devel­
opment risks (op. cit., Art. 7, Nos. 139-142).




























































































necessarily see their task as being the publication of scientific 
knowledge and the advancement of science234.
All in all, this probably means that the Product Liability Di­
rective's contribution to harmonising the level of product safety 
will remain limited235. Important questions of liability law are not 
harmonised; apart from the non-material damages and develop­
ment risks already mentioned, and property damage in the com­
mercial area, this also applies to recalls and to product monitor­
ing. This means that the harmonisation of product liability aimed 
at in the Directive has hardly been achieved; it was regarded as 
necessary because "existing divergences may distort competition 
and affect the movement of goods within the Common Market 
and entail a different degree of protection of the consumer”236. 
The exclusion of compensation claims for damage to commer­
cially used property means, in view of the fact that the major 
proportion of product liability cases handled through insurance 
companies falls into the commercial sector237, that the differing 
cost burden on manufacturers in individual Member States be­
cause of differing liability regulations remains unaffected. In the 
case of damage to non-commercial users, too, the goal of har­
monisation has been achieved only in embryo. In the case of 
property damage, the injured person will, in order to have access 
to excluded personal damages, which is anything but a petty
234 Instructive examples in Krämer, 1985, No. 326.
235 On this see Brüggemeier/Reich, 1986, 155; Schmidt-Salzer, Die EG- 
Richtlinie Produkthaftung, 1986, 1103-04; Schlechtriem, 1986, 1043; 
Storm, 1986, 116-218; Pauli, 1986, 154-55; Lorenz, 1987, 36-37. The 
limited success of the harmonisation is explicitly admitted in the sec­
ond-last recital to the Directive: "Whereas the harmonisation resulting 
from this cannot be total at the present stage, but opens the way to­
wards greater harmonisation".
236 First recital to the Product Liability Directive.
237 According to a letter from the HUK Association to the Federal Minis­
ter of Justice of 15 November 1979, 3, 75% of damage involving lia­




























































































amount, have recourse to the general law of tort. In the case of 
personal injury as well, in order to assert claims to a solatium, he 
will likewise have to proceed under the relevant general law of 
tort238. One should not, however, lose sight of the fact that the 
Product Liability Directive ought to lead to an improvement in 
consumer safety especially in countries where product liability is 
still regulated on a pure basis of tortious liability, with a corre­
sponding burden of proof on the injured person.
contractual partners, mainly because of subsequent damages arising 
due to defects in preliminary products supplied.





























































































The new  approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards, its preparation through ECJ case law  on 
A rticles 30, 36 EEC and the Low V oltage Directive, and 
the clarification o f  its operating environm ent by the 
Single European A ct
Following several declarations by the European Council 
since 1982, achievement of a single European internal market has 
become the focus of the Commission's efforts towards integra­
tion1. The general economic and social policy consequences of 
achievement of an integrated internal market can hardly be over­
estimated, and the issues of the relationship between internal 
market and product safety policies, on which this study concen­
trates, cover only a small range of the questions that will have to 
be thought through in order to "complete the internal market". 
But even this range is wide enough. The far-reaching integration 
policy expectations bound up with internal market policy presup­
pose the overcoming of technical barriers to trade arising partic­
ularly from differences in product safety law in Member States: 
the European Internal Market cannot be achieved without the 
Europeanisation of product safety law.
The description of law approximation policy under the 1969 
General Programme to remove technical barriers to trade2 has 
repeatedly confirmed the notion that internal market policy must 
always include coverage of product safety policy implications of 
legal harmonisation measures. Let us only recall the broad use of 
escape clauses in relevant Community directives3, the collapse of
1 Cf. esp. the Commission's White Paper to the European Council on 





























































































initiatives in the area of construction materials4, the lack pf' suc­
cess in efforts to supplement harmonised product standards in the 
automotive sector with an integrated safety policy programme5 
and the general resistance to a "horizontal" European product 
safety policy6. The problems with internal market policy can 
clearly not be explained exclusively by the fact that Member 
States seek to assert their own economic interests in negotiations 
on legal approximation measures; they point at the same time to 
the fact that the issue of product safety is felt as a politically sen­
sitive area where political actors resist delegating powers of 
action and decision to the Community.
The documents in which the Commission explained its 
interpretation of the stagnation of legal harmonisation policy and 
the need for a new approach to harmonisation did not clearly 
address the connections between internal market policy and 
product safety policy. Instead, the Commission points primarily 
to the general difficulties of the European legislative process: the 
hurdles of the unanimity principle, the multiplicity of technical 
provisions in need of harmonisation and the quantity of national 
standardisation material and the need for flexible adaptation of 
harmonised provisions to technical developments7. This diagno­
sis is in line with the therapy recommended by the White Paper 
on completion of the Internal Market8: the Community should in 
the future base itself as far as possible on mutual recognition of 
the equivalence of national provisions or standards, confining 
itself in legal approximation policy to harmonising binding safety
2 Chapter ID, 2.
3 Chapter III, 2.5.
4 Chapter III, 2.6.
5 Chapter III, 2.4.3 end.
6 Chapter III, 3.




























































































and health requirements, to be specified by the European stan­
dardisation organisations, supplemented by mutual recognition of 
national standards. The following description begins with the 
Commission's diagnosis and view of the problems. It therefore 
initially ignores the connections between internal market policy 
and product safety policy, to concentrate on analysing the pre­
conditions stated by the Commission and the new harmonisation 
policy elements so far discernible. But this procedure should in 
no way be regarded as uncritical acceptance of the White Paper's 
premises and expectations. The principle of equivalence and 
mutual recognition of national provisions referred to by the 
Commission will instead be considered in the light of an analysis 
of relevant ECJ case law and Articles 30 and 36 EEC regarding 
its scope; it will emerge that this case law already largely respects 
safety policy interests of Member States (Section 1 below). But 
the Commission's second premise, namely that the regulatory 
model of the Low Voltage Directive of 19 February 19739, the 
first to apply the technique of harmonisation of safety objectives 
and reference to standards at Community level, can be gener­
alised, will likewise be shown to be highly problematic, since the 
regulatory technique of the Low Voltage Directive presupposed 
specific conditions in the electrical sector, and the safety policy 
and legal problems arising out of the Directive are by no means 
entirely solved (2 below). We shall then return to describing the 
new approach to technical harmonisation and standards (3 
below). A further point to be clarified will be how the Single 
European Act, in particular Art. 100 a (4), will affect the applica­
bility of the new approach (4 below). Finally, the new harmoni­
sation policy will be considered in terms of its compatibility with 
the EEC Treaty (5 below).
8 Op. cit. (note 1), 14 et seq.





























































































1. Mutual tension between marketability o f  goods and 
product safety in the light o f  Articles 30 and 36 
EEC
The relationship between marketability of goods and prod­
uct safety requirements is fundamentally regulated in Articles 30 
and 36 EEC. In recent years extensive ECJ case law has devel­
oped here, meeting with an extremely strong response in the lit­
erature10. As Table 1 shows, of 140 judgments delivered by the 
ECJ by 31 March 1987 on free movement of goods, only a little 
over a quarter (42) were based on an action for breach of treaty 
brought by the Commission; such actions occurred in significant 
quantity only with the case law following-up the Cassis judg­
ment.
Table 1: ECJ judgments on free movement of goods over particular periods, 
by type of proceedings (1)














10 From the already enormous literature, mention should be made espe­
cially of Gormley, 1985 and Oliver, Free Movement, 1982. See also 
the commentaries on Art. 30-37 EEC by Colliard/Herzog, Matthies and 
Wagenbaur. A review of individual groups of cases is given also by 
Dauses, 1984, 201-206; Masclet, 1986, 253-267; Mattera, 1983; idem, 
1984; Moench, 1982 and Rabe, 1984. On the connection between the 
case law on Art. 30 et seq. EEC and consumer protection see Reich, 
1987, Nos. 11-26; Bourgoignie, 1987, 159-172; Stuyck, Free Move­




























































































65 38 103 12.7From Cassis 
judgment until 
March 1987 (5)
Total 98 42 140 7.8
(1) Calculated from the European Court reports and communications 
regarding the ECJ's work.
(2) Case 7/68, Judgment of 10 December 1968, ECR [1968] 634.
(3) Case 8/74, Judgment of 11 July 1974, ECR [1974] 834 (Dassonville).
(4) Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979] 649 (Cassis 
de Dijon).
(5) Case 178/84, Judgment of 12 March 1987, published in NJW 1987, 
1133 (Beer Purity Ordinance).
In the period after the Dassonville judgment the number of 
judgments handed down triples annually, and after the Cassis 
Judgment doubles again. Quantitatively, the most important 
group of cases relates to health protection, industrial property 
rights, regulations for the prescribing, designation and presenta­
tion of products and price regulation measures. The decisions 
relate mainly to the foodstuffs sector, with alcoholic drinks con­
tinually presenting the ECJ with an opportunity to develop its 
case law on free movement of goods. Outside the foodstuffs 
sector, there is a strikingly high proportion of judgments con­
cerning medicines, and a small one for technical products. The 
following survey shows the product groups covered by judgments 










































































































We shall now review the development of the case law on 
free movement of goods to the extent that it is of importance for 
the development of the new approach to technical harmonisation 
and standards and to the need for a horizontal Community prod­
uct safety policy. The case law on Art. 30 EEC and its impact on 
harmonisation policy will first be dealt with (1.1), then the case 
law on Art. 36 EEC and Member States' possibilities of action 
( 1.2).
1.1 Development of the case law on Art. 30 EEC and 
conclusions for harmonisation policy
Art. 30 EEC prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports 
and measures having an equivalent effect between Member 
States; Art. 34 does the same for exports; Art. 36 allows Member 
States, under specific severely restricted conditions, to make 
exceptions to these prohibitions.
1.1.1 The concept o f  measures having equivalent effect and 
the Cassis de Dijon Judgment
It was first with the "Dassonville" judgment11 that the ECJ 
undertook a comprehensive definition of the central concept of 
measures having equivalent effect. This basic rule has been re­
peated by the Court in large numbers of later judgments, and 
continues to be the basis for the case law; the Commission, too,
11 Case 8/74, Judgment of 11 July 1974, ECR [1974] 837 - Dassonville. 




























































































observes it in bringing actions for breach of treaty against Mem­
ber States. It says:
"Any trade regulations of Member States likely to 
obstruct Community internal trade directly or indi­
rectly, actually or potentially, is to be regarded as a 
measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction"12.
With this, the ECJ has in the interest of free movement of 
goods gone far beyond the statement made by the Commission in 
Directive 70/50/EEC13. There it had distinguished between mea­
sures applicable without distinction to domestic and imported 
goods (Art. 3) and those applicable other than without distinction 
(Art. 2). The latter group of discriminatory measures, of such a 
nature as to restrict imports, should without exception come 
under the prohibition of Art. 30 EEC. Measures applicable with­
out distinction would by contrast conflict with Art. 30 EEC, only 
where "the restrictive effects on the movement of goods exceed 
the limits of the typical effects of such commercial regulations" 
(Art. 3 (1)). This is said to be the case notably where "the restric­
tive effect on free movement of goods is disproportionate to the 
object aimed at" or "where the same objective can be attained by 
another means hindering trade as little as possible" (Art. 3 (2)). 
The broad interpretation of the concept of measures having 
equivalent effect is also expressed by the fact that mere likeli­
hood of a trade-restrictive effect is sufficient, so that the effect of 
restricting trade need not have actually occurred or have reached 
a particular intensity. Any sovereign measure, likely even only 
indirectly, to negatively affect the flow of goods between States 
is here in principle, a prohibited measure having equivalent
12 Case 8/74, Judgement of 11 July 1974, ECR [1974] 837 at 852 - 
Dassonville.
13 OJ L 13, 19 January 1970, 29. For details on the concept of measures 




























































































effect. The "broad, catch-all criterion" for measures having 
equivalent effect opens up for the Community "wide-ranging 
possibilities for control of national measures"14.
On general interpretive principles, Art. 36 EEC, which 
allows Member States to evade the prohibition in principle on 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect, 
for the sake of particular objects of legal protection, is to be 
interpreted narrowly, and the list of objects of legal protection 
contained in it is to be treated as comprehensive15. With this as a 
starting point, the ECJ faced a dilemma if it did not want to 
subject the general power of Member States to regulate produc­
tion and marketing or to control economic policy completely to 
the verdict of Art. 30 EEC. Either it could give an expansive 
interpretation to the object of legal protection in Art. 36 EEC or it 
could restrict the concept of measures having equivalent effect, at 
any rate for the area of measures applicable without distinction, 
by contrast with the Dassonville formulation16. With the well- 
known judgment in the "Cassis de Dijon" case of 20 February 
197917, the Court of Justice took the latter path, thereby laying 
the foundations for a new approach to harmonisation policy in the 
area of free movement of goods and for systematic monitoring by
with Directive 70/50/EEC see Veelken, 1977; Ehlermann, 1977; Tim­
mermans, 1981, 285-290, Wägenbaur, Art. 30, Nos. 5-31.
14 In the elastic formulation of Steindorff, 1986, 697.
15 Continuing case law: cf. Case 7/61, Judgment of 19 December 1961, 
ECR [1961] 695 at 720 - Commission v. Italy; Case 13/68, Judgment 
of 19 December 1968, ECR [1968] 679 at 694 - Salgoil; Case 113/80, . 
Judgment of 17 June 1981, ECR [1981] 1625 at 1637 - Commission v. 
Ireland.
16 Ehlermann, 1977, 589.
17 Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979], 649 - Cassis 
de Dijon. Cf. on this judgment also Barents, 1981, 271 at 291-299; 
Capelli, 1981; Masclet, 1980; Mattera, 1980; Micklitz, 1983, 485-487; 
Millarg, 1979; Oliver, CMLR 19 (1982), 227-237; Rabe, 1984; Seidel, 





























































































the Commission of Member States' compliance with the Treaty in 
this area.
In this case, the ECJ dealt for the first time with a measure 
applicable without distinction. It explicitly stressed that in the 
absence of Community regulations on manufacture and market­
ing, it was a matter for Member States to enact the relevant reg­
ulations for their territory, and continued:
"Barriers to Community internal trade arising from the 
differences in national regulations on the marketing of 
its products must be accepted as long as these provi­
sions are necessary in order to meet binding require­
ments, notably the requirements of effective tax con­
trol, public health protection, the integrity of trade and 
consumer protection"18.
This makes it clear that restrictions on Community internal 
trade arising from regulations applicable equally to domestic and 
foreign products do not automatically fall under the prohibition 
of Art. 30 EEC, but may be justified, however, always requiring 
justification, where there is no relevant Community regulation. 
The binding requirements do not constitute additional grounds of 
justification besides the objects of legal protection listed in Art. 
36 EEC; instead, their presence makes a regulation or proceeding 
no longer describable as a measure having equivalent effect19.
The list of binding requirements is not exhaustive: others 
that enter in are environmental protection and measures to 
improve working and living conditions20. This must, though,
18 Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979] 649 at 662 - 
Cassis de Dijon.
19 Explicitly clarified in Case 113/80, Judgment of 17 June 1981, ECR 
[1981], 1625 at 1638 - Commission v. Ireland; Case 220/81, Judgment 
of 22 June 1982, ECR [1982] 2349 at 2360 - Robertson.





























































































involve a non-economic objectives in the general interest, which 
take precedence over the requirements of free movement of 
goods. The Court of Justice does not rely here on the external 
justification for a measure, but seeks to disclose the "true rea­
sons", to prevent, say, protectionist industrial policy objectives of 
Member States being pursued under the cloak of consumer pro­
tection21.
Member States' measures must be necessary, and also pro­
portionate in nature and implementation; they must be the means 
that restrict free movement of goods as little as possible22. 
Accordingly, for instance, marketing bans are not in general justi­
fied in order to protect consumers against confusion and decep­
tion; as a rule, indications on the packaging will suffice23. In 
testing the binding requirements, the principle of the second sen­
tence of Art. 36 EEC should be applied, with the result that no 
primacy can be assigned to national regulatory powers when 
these are used as a means of arbitrary discrimination or as a dis­
guised restriction on trade between Member States. Altogether,
21 Cf. Reich 1982, 455; idem 1987, Nos. 25. Two particularly instructive 
examples are Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR 
[1979], 649 at 662 - Cassis de Dijon, and Case 178/84, Judgment of 12 
March 1987, published in NJW 1987, 1133 et seq. — Beer purity law. 
This last judgment provides a clear statement that the law of a Member 
State must not be used to "fix existing consumer habits in order to 
maintain an advantage acquired by the domestic industry involved in 
satisfying them" (op. cit., Nos. 32). On this judgment see Dauses, 
1987, 256-263; Funck-Brentano, 1987; Moench, 1987; Rabe, 1987; 
Zipfel, 1987.
22 Cf. Steindorff, 1984, 346; Wagenbaur, Art. 36, Nos. 68-72; Case 
104/75, Judgment of 20 May 1976, ECR [1976] 613 at 635-36 - de 
Peijper; Case 35/76, Judgment of 15 December 1976, ECR [1976] 
1871 at 1885 et seq. - Simmenthal.
23 Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979]649 at 664 - 
Cassis de Dijon; Case 788/79, Judgment of 26 June 1980, ECR [1980] 
2071 at 2078 - Gilli & Andres; Case 27/80, Judgment of 16 December 
1980, ECR [1980] 3839 at 3854 - Fietje; Case 130/80, Judgment of 19 
February 1981, ECR [1981] 527 at 536 - Kelderman; Case 261/81, 
Judgment of 10 November 1982, ECR [1982] 3961 at 3973 - Rau -  
De Smedt; Case 178/84, Judgment of 12 March 1987, Para. 35 and 36, 




























































































the ECJ has developed a carefully graded scheme for balancing 
between the Community objective of free movement of goods 
and particular regulatory interests of Member States, not a rigid 
scheme of rules and exceptions24.
1.1.2 The consequences o f the Cassis Case Law for legal 
approximation
In view of an increasing number of restrictions on free 
movement of goods and against the background of the evident 
bottlenecks resulting from the classical harmonisation concept, 
the Commission took the Cassis case law as a basis for explain­
ing the scope of the Cassis judgment to Member States, the Euro­
pean Parliament and the Council in a communication, and for 
drawing some conclusions and guidelines for verifying treaty 
compliance and reorienting legal approximation policy25. It 
summarises the case law as follows, underlining the principle of 
mutual recognition:
"The principles deduced by the Court imply that a 
Member State may not in principle prohibit the sale in 
its territory of a product lawfully produced and 
marketed in another Member State even if the product 
is produced according to technical or quality require­
ments which differ from those imposed on its domestic 
products. Where a product «suitably and satisfactorily» 
fulfills the legitimate objectives of a Member State's 
own rules (public safety, protection of the consumer or 
the environment, etc.), the importing country cannot 
justify prohibiting its sale in its territory by claiming
24 Cf. Reich, 1987, No. 25; idem, 1982, 454.
25 Commission communication on the implications of the ECJ Judgment 
of 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 ("Cassis de Dijon"), OJ C 256, 3 
October 1980, 2-3. See Barents, 1981, 296-299; Gormley, 1981; Mat­





























































































that the way it fulfills the objectives is different from 
that imposed on domestic products"26.
It draws the conclusion that many barriers to trade can be 
removed merely by strictly applying the prohibition of Art. 30 
EEC, where they are not justified by Art. 36 EEC or as manda­
tory requirements within the meaning of the ECJ case law. It 
announces that it intends to tackle commercial rules covering the 
composition, designation, presentation and packaging of products 
or requiring compliance with certain technical standards. For 
preventive control of potentially trade-restricting measures by 
Member States, it announces its proposal for an information pro­
cedure in the area of standards and technical provisions27. Above 
all, however, efforts at harmonisation are to be concentrated in 
areas "where barriers to trade to be removed arise from national 
provisions which are admissible under the criteria set by the 
Court"28.
The case law on Art. 30 and 36 EEC means a demarcation 
between the principle of the country of destination, according to 
which all goods or services must meet the standards of the 
respective country of destination, and the contrary principle of 
the country of origin, whereby import of all goods legally mar­
keted in the country of origin is unrestricted. With this demarca-
26 OJ C 256, 3 October 1980, 2-3.
27 The corresponding proposal was submitted to the Council on 25 
August 1980, OJ C 253, 1 October 1980, 2 et seq.
28 OJ C 256, 3 October 1980, 3. For the new approach in Community 
foodstuffs law the Commission draws the conclusion that in future it 
should only contain provisions based on considerations of the protec­
tion of essential general interests, namely the protection of public 
health, consumer needs for information and protection in areas other 
than health, fair competition, need for government supervision. See the 
Commission communication to Council and European Parliament on 
"Completing the Internal Market: Community Foodstuffs Law", COM 
(85) 603 final of 8 November 1985, points 8 and 9. Cf. the critical 
opinions from the ESC, OJ C 328, 22 December 1986, 23, and the 





























































































tion, it simultaneously determines the extent to which measures 
on approximation of laws are necessary in order to eliminate bar­
riers to trade29.
The Cassis judgment (and the Commission communication) 
were on the one hand welcomed as, in principle, allowing mar­
keting of the most diverse local specialties throghout the Com­
munity, thereby increasing consumer choice30, but on the other 
hand criticised as facing the national legislature with the dilemma 
of either discriminating against domestic industry or giving up 
higher quality standards in favour of adaptation to the lowest 
common denominator31. The latter standpoint was represented 
particularly strongly by the government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany in the Cassis case:
"Ultimately, the regulation binding in all Member 
States would be that of the country setting the lowest 
requirements; since this legal conclusion would be 
based on the directly applicable provision of Art. 30, 
these legal changes will have to have been effected 
already, at latest by 1 January 1970. Because of the 
automatic effect of Art. 30, in the future further 
amendments to national legal provisions could be 
adopted continually as soon as only one Member State 
adopted a new regulation with lower requirements. In 
the extreme case, then, one Member State could, with­
out any co-operation or information of other Member 
States, determine legislation for the whole Community.
The outcome would be that the minimum requirements 
would, without the harmonisation provided for in Art.
100 EEC, requiring consensus by Member States, be
29 Cf. Steindorff, 1986, 689-699.
30 Cf. Mattera, 1980, 511 et seq.
31 See the opinion of the Consumer Advisory Committee on the conse­
quences of the ECJ's Cassis de Dijon Judgment, CCC/29/81 Rev. ENV 




























































































reduced to the lowest level to be found in the regula­
tions of any one of the Member States"32.
To date, the fear that the new jurisprudence will lead to a 
levelling down to the lowest common denominator has proved 
unwarranted33. This is partly because Member States can defend 
themselves against undermining of standards by appealing to 
mandatory requirements, where a legitimately pursued general 
object of protection of a non-economic nature is endangered34. 
Above all, however, it goes much farther to meet Member States 
interests in protection, especially as regards the very frequently 
mentioned protection of health35, than the Commission with its 
rigid scheme of rule and exception and its stress on "very strict 
criteria" and on the possibility of non-compliance "only under 
very restrictive conditions" tries to make out. In its endeavour to 
bring in a change to its policy on eliminating technical barriers to 
trade, the Commission has enthusiastically had recourse to the 
Cassis case law, but has one-sidedly generalised the interpretive 
principles, which the ECJ, particularly in its subsequent case law, 
has still more finely differentiated36.
It is plain that harmonisation remains indispensable only in 
areas where Member States can base themselves on objects of 
protection under Art. 36 EEC or on mandatory requirements37. 
However, a few restrictions should be mentioned: the Commis-
32 Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979], 649 at 656 - 
Cassis de Dijon.
33 See Stuyck, Free Movement, 1984, 95-96.
34 See Matthies, Art. 30, No. 24; Welch, 1983, 66.
35 This will become clear from the analysis of individual cases in Chapter 
IV, 1.2.
36 Micklitz, 1983, 487; and with particular clarity Barents, 1981, 298. On 
the tendency in the Commission communication to overshoot, see also 
Bourgoignie, 1987, 171 f.; Welch, 1983, 64; Reich, 1987, No. 25; 
Steindorff, 1984, 347.
37 On the new approach to approximation of laws see New Roads for 




























































































sion's rigid scheme of rules and exceptions between free move­
ment of goods and Member States' interests in protection is not 
appropriate; the circumstances in which a Member State can 
appeal to mandatory requirements depend on the balancing out of 
many considerations, which can be done only from case to case. 
The principle of mutual recognition operates bilaterally between 
the States involved in the trade concerned but not uniformly at 
Community level38. Elimination of barriers to trade through Art. 
30 EEC presupposes unless Member States voluntarily refrain 
from asserting particular domestic standards for imported prod­
ucts, an initiative by manufacturers, importers or the Commis­
sion, and can come about only reactively and case by case; law 
approximation can act preventively and much more comprehen­
sively39. Furthermore, pronouncements of the Court of Justice 
can act only by way of quashing, in the sense that rules may be 
abolished without substitution, but not replaced by new require­
ments under the Community Treaty40. Finally, overstressing neg­
ative harmonisation through Art. 30 EEC would mean transfer­
ring to the Court evaluative tasks that normally fall within the 
province of the legislator41.
There is agreement that application of Art. 30 EEC cannot 
be made dependent on prior harmonisation of laws. This was 
unmistakably stated by the Court of Justice in case 193/8042,
1980, 622-630; Mattera, 1980, 510 f.; Sedemund, 1987; Wagenbaur, 
Art. 30, No. 41.
38 See Rabe, 1983, 63.
39 Wagenbaur, 1983, 906-7.
40 Seidel, 1984, 81.
41 See the preliminary remark on the new approach to technical harmoni­
sation and standards, COM (85), 19 final, 31 January 1985, 5.
42 Case 193/80, Judgment of 9 December 1981, ECR [1981] 3019 at 3033 




























































































when it also stressed the different objectives of Articles 30 and 
100 EEC43:
"The fundamental principle of a unified market and its 
corollary, the free movement of goods, may not under 
any circumstances be made subject to the condition 
that there should first be an approximation of national 
laws, for if that condition had to be fulfilled, the prin­
ciple would be reduced to a mere cipher. Moreover, it 
is apparent that the purposes of Articles 30 and 100 are 
different. The purpose of Article 30 is, save for certain 
specific exceptions, to abolish in the immediate future 
all quantitative restrictions on the imports of goods and 
all measures having an equivalent effect, whereas the 
general purpose of Article 100 is, by approximating the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States, to enable obstacles of whatever kind 
arising from disparities between them to be reduced.
The elimination of quantitative restrictions and mea­
sures having an equivalent effect, which is . . . carried 
into effect by Article 30, may not therefore be made 
dependent on measures which, although capable of 
promoting the free movement of goods, cannot be con­
sidered to be a necessary condition for the application 
of that fundamental principle".
Art. 30 EEC offers citizens of the Common Market the pos­
sibility through the preliminary-ruling procedure of securing the 
application of Community law in the national sphere, especially 
since they do not have to bear political aspects in mind to the 
same extent as the Commission44.
Technical standards drawn up by private institutions and 
therefore not legally binding, do not count as measures having 
equivalent effect within the meaning of Art. 30 EEC. There is a
43 Roth, 1977, 24-30; Dauses, 1984, 206; Wagenbaur, preliminary obser­
vation on Arts. 30-37, Nos. 68-73; Matthies, Art. 30, No. 25.
44 Cf. in Table 1 supra the numerical relation between actions for breach 




























































































different case, however, where compliance with them is mandato- 
rily prescribed de jure or de facto by government action45. To 
date, the Court of Justice has found a measure of equivalent ef­
fect in only one case where the measure was neither a sovereign 
one nor binding on its addresses. It arrived at this conclusion, 
against the Advocate General's opinion, in the case of the "Buy 
Irish" publicity campaign by the Irish Goods Council, an associ­
ation of leading representatives of the business world set up as a 
company limited by guarantee, without investment of capital, to 
promote the sale of Irish products. It attributed the campaign as a 
whole to the Government, which had established the programme, 
made the major staffing decisions and borne the overwhelming 
share of the financing46. Comparable circumstances are not pre­
sent in the case of technical standardisation by private standardis­
ation bodies47.
1.2. Development of the case law on Art. 36 EEC
On the conditions set out in Art. 36, Member States may 
break the prohibition in principle on quantitative restrictions and 
measures having equivalent effect and maintain or introduce reg­
ulations or practices restricting free movement of goods, in order 
to protect the objects of legal protection listed. These measures 
may not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination
dures, which often go back ultimately to actions brought by citizens of 
the Common Market.
45 See answer to Written Question No. 835/82, OJ C 93, 7 April 1983, 1- 
2. — Buy Irish; and Mattera, 1984, 286-87.
46 Case 249/81 Judgment of 24 November 1982, ECR [1982] 4005 at 
4021-4023. See the note by Rabe, EuR 1983, 341-343.
47 For details on the relationship between technical standards and Art. 30 




























































































or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States (Art. 
36 EEC, second sentence).
With its underlying pro-integration approach, the Court has 
given this exceptional provision a narrow interpretation in several 
respects. Among the principles that can be taken as established 
are: Art. 36 covers only situations of a non-economic nature and 
cannot be understood as an escape clause against the economic 
effects of the opening up of markets48; the list of objects of pro­
tection in Art. 36 EEC is exhaustive and cannot be extended by 
conclusions from analogy, Art. 36 EEC is not intended to reserve 
particular fields for the exclusive competence of Member 
States49.
1.2.1 Art. 36 EEC and Member States' room fo r  manoeuvre
Only where Community directives provide for complete 
harmonisation of all measures necessary to safeguard the objects 
of legal protection mentioned in Art. 36 EEC and there are 
Community procedures to secure compliance, are Member States 
no longer able to appeal to Art. 36 EEC and take individual mea­
sures. Instead, they must press for amplification or amendment of 
the Community regulation, or take advantage of escape clause 
procedures contained in the Community regulation50. Here verifi­
cation is required as to whether a Community provision consti-
48 Case 7/61, Judgment of 19 December 1961, ECR [1961] 695 - 
Commission v. Italy.
49 Continuing case law: Case 35/76, Judgment 15 December 1976, ECR 
[1976] 1871 at 1886 - Simmenthal; Case 5/77, Judgment 5 October 
1977, ECR [1977] 1555 at 1576 - Tedeschi; Case 153/78, Judgment 12 
July 1979, ECR [1979] 2555 at 2564 - Commission v. Germany.
50 Case 5/77, Judgment of 5 October 1977, ECR [1977] 1555 at 157 - 
Tedeschi; Case 251/78, Judgment of 8 November 1979, ECR [1979] 
3369 at 3388 - Denkavit; Case 227/82, Judgment of 30 November 




























































































tutes a definitive regulation or was introduced only as a minimum 
measure, not ruling out additional national provisions51. More­
over, the content of the individual Community regulations and 
harmonisation programmes must be looked at to see whether all 
relevant objects of protection under Art. 36 EEC are already cov­
ered52. In other words, Community regulations have a blocking 
effect on Member States only to the extent that they actually meet 
the individual interests in protection under Art. 36 EEC. Should, 
for instance, a Community regulation take account of the me­
chanical hazards of a product but not the toxic ones, to that extent 
Member States' competence will remain.
This applies, too, where hitherto unrecognised hazards 
become manifest in an area that has been definitively regulated 
by the Community. Here the widespread escape clause proce­
dures should ensure that the stage of harmonisation reached is not 
endangered by the need for additional action to guarantee protec­
tion of the objects of Art. 36 EEC; the desire of a Member State 
for additional safety measures will either prove unfounded 
following testing by the Commission or in breach-of-treaty pro­
ceedings before the ECJ, or else be incorporated in the Commu­
nity regulation with effect for all Member States, where it proves 
justified and the necessary majority for an adaptation is secured.
October 1985, ECR [1985] 3097 at 3123 - Mischfuttermittel; Case 
247/84, Judgment of 10 December 1985, ECR [1985] 3887 at 3903-04 
- Léon Motte. See also Wâgenbaur, Art. 36, Nos. 12-17.
51 As in Case 4/75, Judgment of 8 July 1975, ECR [1975] 843 at 859 - 
Rewe-Zentralfinanz.
52 Very instructive on this is Case 251/78, Judgment of 8 November 
1979, ECR [1979] 3369 at 3389-90 - Denkavit, which also contains an 
indication that the Council should in harmonisation use the method of 




























































































1.2.2 Proportionality controls by the ECJ
The Court of Justice subjects measures justified in principle 
under Art. 36 EEC to strict proportionality control, refusing 
approval for a measure where the same objective could be 
secured by measures that less restrict internal Community trade. 
The Court of Justice has concluded from this that, for instance, 
Member States "may not needlessly require technical or chemical 
analyses or laboratory tests where the same analyses and tests 
have already been carried out in another member country and 
these findings are available to their authorities or can be made 
available on request"53. Admissibility in one Member State does 
not automatically justify admissibility in another unless a direc­
tive explicitly lays down mutual recognition of permits and certi­
fication. However, an importing Member State must for purposes 
of permits take similar tests and analyses already done in another 
Member State into account. Administrations of Member States 
must provide each other with administrative assistance in making 
test results available54. The Court of Justice has frequently 
stressed that it is in the interest of free movement of goods to 
carry out sanitary controls in the country of manufacture, and that 
it is appropriate for the sanitary authorities of the Member States 
concerned to co-operate in order to avoid duplication of checks55. 
This leaves untouched the power to carry out random checks. The 
Court has also concluded from the proportionality principle that 
the aim of reducing the burden on the administration or reducing 
public expenditure does not justify any stronger intervention, and 
that administrations are bound to make reasonable efforts to
53 Case 272/80 Judgment of 17 December 1981, ECR [1981] 327 at 3291
- Biologische Producten. Cf. answer to the Written Question No. 
1928/84, OJ C 233, 12 September 1985, 5.
54 For details cf. Gormley, 1985, 154-174.





























































































secure the necessary indications by active administrative 
efforts56.
1.2.3 Member States' leeway in evaluating questions o f 
health protection and safety design
In recent years voluminous case law has developed on the 
question of health protection within the meaning of Art. 36 
EEC57. It amounts to allowing Member States to engage in pre­
ventive health policies of their own where a Community regula­
tion is absent, with the objective of keeping foodstuffs as free as 
possible from hazardous substances. National regulations may 
take account of climatic conditions, the population's eating habits 
and their state of health, and therefore differ from one country to 
another. Continuing uncertainties over scientific findings may 
also be taken into account.
On the basis of Art. 36 EEC, the Dutch prohibition on nisin 
as a conservation additive for processed cheese intended for the 
Dutch market, was found to be justified:
"If these studies have not yet reached unambiguous 
conclusions regarding the maximum quantity of nisin 
that a person can consume without serious danger to 
health, this is mainly because of the fact that evaluation 
of the risk bound up with consumption of this additive 
depends on a number of variable factors, in particular 
on eating habits in the country concerned and on 
whether, in determining the maximum quantity of nisin 
to be set for every product, not only the level to be set 
for a particular product, for instance processed cheese,
56 Case 104/75, Judgment of 20 May 1976, ECR [1976] 613 at 634-35 - 
de Peijper.





























































































is to be taken into account, but also those to be set for 
all other products to be rendered imperishable"58.
When complete harmonisation has not been achieved, 
Member States remain free to take action if uncertainties still 
exist at a given stage of research. Both the eating habits of their 
population and the needs of free movement of goods must be 
taken into account to determine the extent to which they wish to 
guarantee protection of the health and life of people59. Accord­
ingly, the Dutch ban on adding vitamins was declared to be com­
patible with Community law on the grounds that, although an 
health-endangering effect was not proven, it could not be ruled 
out given excessive consumption in the whole diet in its unfore­
seeable, unverifiable composition; the Court added, however, that 
marketing is to be permitted where the addition of vitamins cor­
responded to a genuine need, in particular in regard to technology 
or nutrition60.
A particularly illuminating judgment regarding the far- 
reaching powers that the Court allows Member States in the area 
of preventive health protection was given in Case 97/8361. The
58 Case 53/80, Judgment of 5 February 1981, ECR [1981] 409 at 422 - 
Eyssen (Nisin).
59 Case 272/80, Judgment of 17 December 1981, ECR [1981] 3277 at 
3290 - Biologische Produkten; Case 174/82, Judgment of 14 July 1983, 
ECR [1983] 2445 at 2463 - Sandoz; Case 227/82, Judgment of 30 
November 1983, ECR [1983] 3883 at 3905 - van Bennekom; Case 
97/83, Judgment of 6 June 1984, ECR [1984] 2367 at 2386 - Melkunie; 
Case 247/84, Judgment of 10 December 1985, ECR [1985] 3887 at 
3904 - I.don Motte; Case 54/85, Judgment of 13 March 1986, pub­
lished in NJW 1987, 565-66, para. 15 - Maleinsaurehydrazid; Case 
304/84, Judgment of 6 May 1986, published in RIW 1986, 1002-03, 
para. 21 - Muller. In general on the alleviation of the requirement of 
proof in favour of a State acting against previously and recognised 
hazardous situations, see Skordas, 1986, 122-127.
60 Case 174/82, Judgment of 14 July 1983, ECR [1983] 24445 at 2460- 
2464 - Sandoz. In an observation on this judgment, Meier, RIW 1983, 
866, suggests the presumptive rule that in all cases where national 
provisions on marketability allow exceptions for goods intended for 
export, there is a presumption that the consumer protection provisions 




























































































Court held that Member States are free to set threshold values for 
microbiological substances in milk, to protect particularly sensi­
tive consumers that may be well below the endangerment levels 
for normal consumers discussed by scientists, but not established 
with certainty. Account may also be taken here of national usage 
regarding the storage of milk products between the moment of 
purchase and consumption.
Member States may also prohibit pesticide residues in food­
stuffs entirely, leading to a trade block in treated food and veg­
etables. In this connection, they may adopt regulations which 
may be different according to the country, climatic conditions 
and the population's eating habits and state of health, and set dif­
ferent rates for the same pesticides in different foodstuffs62. 
While this judgment found a policy for preventing pesticide 
residues in foodstuffs to be compatible with Community law, an­
other judgment found a policy to limit additives in food prepara­
tion to be permissible. Imported foodstuffs can accordingly be 
subjected to national licensing procedures which test not only 
whether the colouring agent used may be dangerous to human 
health, but also whether there is a technological, economic or 
psychological need for colouring the foodstuffs concerned. In 
assessing hazards, Member States must here take account of the 
findings of international scientific research, especially the work 
of the Community’s Scientific Committee on Foodstuffs, but may 
in evaluating them into account take specific eating habits in the 
importing Member State63.
61 Case 97/83, Judgment of 6 June 1984, ECR [1984] 2367 at 2386 - 
Melkunie.
62 Case 94/83, Judgment of 10 September 1984, ECR [1984] 3263 at 
3280 - Heijn. Cf. answer to Written Question No. 1581/84, OJ C 176, 
15 July 1985, 4-5. Cf. also Case 54/85, Judgment of 13 March 1986, 
published in NJW 1987, 565 f., para. 15 - Maleinsàurehydrazid.
63 Case 247/84, Judgment of 10 December 1985, ECR [1985] 3887 at 




























































































In judgments on food additives and pesticide residues, the 
Court of Justice deduced from the proportionality principle of 
Art. 36 EEC, second sentence, the requirement that marketing 
bans be restricted to the extent actually necessary for the protec­
tion of health. A marketing ban will have to be lifted where 
according to the state of international scientific research, a sub­
stance presents no danger to health and meets a genuine need, 
notably one of a technological nature. Moreover, parties con­
cerned should be allowed the possibility of applying, in an easily 
accessible procedure which must be completable within an 
appropriate time, to have use of particular additives made admis­
sible through a legal act of general effect64. On the basis of these 
criteria, the German beer purity law proved incompatible with 
Community law, on the grounds that it was disproportionate to 
rule out all additives admissible in other Member States on 
grounds of preventive health protection, instead of adducing 
proof of health risk for each substance65. The submission of the 
German government, the defendant, stating that beer was a food­
stuff consumed in considerable quantities by the German people 
and that on general preventive health protection grounds, it was 
advisable to restrict the quantity of additives consumed as far as 
possible66, was rejected as insufficient. It was necessary to justify 
the exclusion of particular substances on grounds of specific haz­
ards.
published in RIW 1986, 1002-03, para. 24 - Muller; Case 178/84, 
Judgment of 12 March 1987, para. 44, published in NJW 1987, 1133 et 
seq. - Beer Purity Law.
64 Cf. Case 174/82, Judgment of 14 July 1983, ECR [1983] 2445 at 2463- 
64 - Sandoz; Case 247/84, Judgment of 10 December 1985, ECR 
[1985] 3887 at 3905-06 - Léon Motte; Case 304/84, Judgment of 6 
May 1986, published in RIW 1986, 1002-03, paras. 23-26 - Muller.
65 Case 178/84, Judgment of 12 March 1987, paras. 47-53, published in 
NJW 1987, 1133 et seq. - Beer Purity Law.
66 Loc. cit., para. 48. Cf. also the corresponding submission by the 
Federal Republic of Germany in Case 53/80, Judgment of 5 February 




























































































A judgment of direct relevance for technical safety law is 
the one in case 188/84 on the licensing of woodworking 
machines in France67. The French conception of industrial safety 
starts from the idea that users of machinery must be protected 
against their own mistakes, so that machines must be designed in 
such a way that they can be used, mounted and maintained with­
out risk (design safety)68. In Germany, by contrast, the principle 
is that the worker must, through thorough vocational training and 
further education, leam to handle any problem that might arise in 
machine operations. The Commission expressed the view that 
Member States ought not to block the import of machines based 
on other conceptions of industrial safety, but that have proven to 
be just as safe as appliances in accordance with the national reg­
ulation69. The Court of Justice accepted this principle but arrived 
at a different conclusion:
"Moreover, it may not prevent the marketing of prod­
ucts originating in another Member State which, in 
respect of the level of protection of safety and human 
life, are in line with what is aimed at in the national 
regulation. Accordingly, it would be contrary to the 
principle of proportionality for a national regulation to 
require that imported products should comply with 
every detail of the provisions and technical require­
ments applying to products manufactured in the 
Member State concerned, though they provide the 
same level of safety to users. By contrast, Community 
law in its present state does not oblige Member States 
to permit hazardous machines on their territory where
67 Case 188/84, Judgment of 28 January 1986, ECR [1986] 419 - Wood­
working machines. On this Judgment see also Chapter il, 1.10.1 supra 
and Sedemund/Montag, 1987, 548.
68 Decree 80-543 of 15 July 1980 on the labour code, Art. R. 233-85 (1).





























































































these do not demonstrably guarantee the same level of 
protection to users on that territory"70.
The Court of Justice ruled in favour of France, since the 
Commission, which was bringing the action, had not shown that 
the conception of industrial safety underlying the German safety 
provisions guaranteed the same safety for users of the machines 
as the French conception. It would even be irrelevant if it were 
statistically shown that machines manufactured according to the 
industrial safety conceptions of other Member States cause no 
more accidents than machines in accord with the French regula­
tion, since mere consideration of statistics left out other factors 
such as the differing levels of employee training71.
Lacking a Community regulation, accordingly, Member 
States are free to pursue their own safety conceptions and reject 
appliances and machines that cannot be shown to offer the same 
degree of safety, taking differing habits of use into account. The 
establishment of essential safety requirements according to the 
new approach is aimed at getting Member States to agree to a 
unitary safety conception or to several safety conceptions recog­
nised as equivalent, so as to exclude in the harmonised area the 
sealing-off of markets by appeals to different ones.
2. From special case to m odel — the harmonisation 
method o f the Low Voltage D irective
Directive 73/23/EEC of 19 February 1973 on the harmoni­
sation of the laws of Member States relating to electrical equip­
ment designed for use within certain voltage limits — the Low 
Voltage Directive72 — with its new harmonisation technique of




























































































sliding reference to harmonised standards, became the model for 
the new approach to technical harmonisation and standards73. For 
many years it had been regarded by many officials in govern­
ments and the Commission as an original sin that ought not to be 
repeated74. With annual output worth some 80,000 million ECU 
in 1981, Community internal trade in electrical appliances 
amounted to some 35,000 million ECU; an estimated 70% of 
turnover in the electrical sector comes under the Low Voltage 
Directive75.
2.1 Peculiarities of the electrical sector
There are good reasons why, for many years, it was specifi­
cally only in the electrical sector that the general-clause method 
of reference to the European state of safety technology was 
applied76. These reasons also indicate that experience with the 
Low Voltage Directive can be transferred only to a limited extent 
to other areas of industry77. Electrical standardisation has for 
decades occupied a special place in all industrial countries. The 
rapid pace of development in the electrical field would have been 
inconceivable without a highly developed regulatory apparatus 
for technical safety, containing comprehensive provisions for the
71 Loc. cit., paras. 17-22.
72 OJ L 77, 26 March 1973, 29. Cf. Winckler/Cassassolles/ Verdiani, 
1974; Orth, 1984; Tronnier, 1986.
73 Cf. Garvey, 1984, 46; Braun, 1985, 182; Bruha, 1986, 9. See also the 
Commission communication on the application of the Low Voltage 
Directive, OJ C 59, 9 March 1982, 2 et seq. (3), which announces tne 
transference of this model to other branches of industry.
74 Cf. Winckler, 1985, 34; Schloesser, 1976, 27.
75 Cf. the communication on the application of the Low Voltage Directive 
(op. cit., note 73), 2.
76 On this see Leber/Oehms/Winckler/Orth, 1983.




























































































hazards arising from electricity, which is not directly perceptible 
by the senses. By comparison with other manufacturing sectors, 
safety standards have in electrical engineering by far the greatest 
importance within the whole set of relevant standards. Electrical 
standards are more highly systematised and intermeshed than in 
other areas. This is because despite an almost limitless variety of 
products, there are comparable modes of operation and sources of 
hazards, but also because electrical products are almost without 
exception, dependent on particular supply and transmission sys­
tems. This means that very often appliances and installations 
from the most diverse manufacturers are connected with each 
other. Accordingly, comprehensive, and in view of the very high 
international trade in this sector, at least internationally compati­
ble provisions are essential for the numerous points of intersec­
tion, and in order to guarantee interchangeability of parts. This 
has meant that with electrical standards, by comparison with 
other industrial sectors, there is wide-spread technical consensus 
both nationally and internationally, a very high density of regula­
tion and a particularly high degree of application and bindingness 
of standards78.
The particularly rapid technical development here calls for 
correspondingly quick and independent possibilities of action and 
a flexible organisational structure in standardisation work. Due to 
the overall postive experience with private standardisation 
organisations, there are in most countries no special national 
provisions in the electrical area. Table 2 gives a picture of the set 
of electrical standards and other standards in 1986 worldwide, in 
Europe and in Western Germany, bringing out the particularly
78 Accordingly, in view of a manifest overlap of interests, the statement 
(Leber/Oehms/Winckler/Orth, 1983, 827) that electrical standards are 
as a rule neutral as regards interests, since organised expert knowledge 
can be found not only in the manufacturing industry but also among 
energy supply undertakings, telecommunications agencies and 




























































































strong position of electrical standardisation and its autonomy in 
standardisation as a whole.
Table 2: Numbers of electrical and other technical standards at national, 
regional and international levels in 1986(1)




of Germany DKE in DIN: 6.792
(1) Source: DIN-Geschaftsbericht 1986/87, 24-33.
2.2 A conspectus of the Low Voltage Directive
The Low Voltage Directive applies to all electrical equip­
ment for use with a voltage rating of between 50 and 1,000 volts 
for alternating current and between 75 and 1,500 volts for direct 
current (Art. 1). It covers in particular household electrical appli­
ances, portable tools, lighting equipment, wires, cables and 
transmission lines and installation equipment. The Directive does 
not apply to particular groups of appliances in which there is 
great public interest, covered by specific directives (electrical 
equipment for use in an explosive atmosphere79, electrical 
equipment for radiology and medical purposes, electrical parts 
for goods and passenger lifts, electricity meters) nor to electric 
fence controls nor radio electrical interference (see the list of 
exceptions in Annex II to the Directive). It is particularly impor­
tant that even domestic plugs and socket outlets are also explic­
itly excluded80.
Art. 2 lays down the basic requirements for marketable 
electrical products. Electrical equipment may be marketed only if
79 OJ L 43, 20 February 1979, 20. This Directive works with the tech­
nique of rigid reference to standards.
80 Cf. Winckler/Cassassolles/Verdiani, 1974, 29.































































































"having been constructed in accordance with good engineering 
practice in safety matters in force in the Community, it does not 
endanger the safety of persons, domestic animals or property 
when properly installed and maintained and used in applications 
for which it was made". The reference to the state of the art — 
good engineering practice — means that what applies is technical 
development at a given point in time, not widespread recognition 
and a proof in practice of particular rules — which would mean 
that the rule would always lag behind steadily advancing techni­
cal development, as with the reference to "generally recognised 
rules of art" in the German Appliances Safety Act81. The affir­
mative statement that in the event of a differing level of safety 
technology in individual Member States, all ought to apply the 
highest level82, does not fully bring out the graded harmonisation 
machinery of the Directive, developed because the desired 
success in harmonisation at an enhanced safety level could not be 
ensured simply by having product requirements follow directly 
from such a formulaic prescription.
Firstly, the principal elements of the safety objectives are 
listed in Annex I. This list of eleven safety objectives, kept 
extremely general in its terms, is a compromise between the 
countries that wished to content themselves with the general ref­
erence to good engineering practice in safety matters (the general 
clause method in pure form), and those that called for the safety 
objectives to be specified more exactly83. The safety objectives 
contain, among others, the following statements:
81 A detailed comparison of the GSG and First Ordinance under the Act 
on technical work materials, whereby the Low Voltage Directive was 
transported into German law, can be found in Zimmermann, 
Geratesicherheitsgesetz, 146-161.
82 Op. cit., 149. Schmatz/Nôthlichs, Kennz. 1610,9.




























































































— Instructions on proper, risk-free use must appear on the 
electrical equipment.
— Manufacturers' or brand-names or trademarks should appear 
on the electrical equipment.
— The electrical equipment should be made in such a way as to 
ensure that it can be safety and properly assembled and con­
nected.
— For protection against hazards that might arise from the 
electrical equipment, technical measures are to be 
prescribed, so that if the equipment is used in applications 
for which it was made and is adequately maintained, then 
protection against direct and indirect electrical contact is 
guaranteed, no dangerous temperatures, arcs or radiation are 
produced, there is adequate protection against non-electrical 
dangers and the insulation is suitable for foreseeable condi­
tions.
— Technical measures are to be laid down to ensure that the 
electrical equipment meets expected mechanical require­
ments, is resistant to non-mechanical influences and stands 
up to foreseeable conditions of overload.
It is presumed that electrical products meet these safety
objectives when the equipment:
— complies with harmonised standards (Art. 5), i.e. those pro­
duced by CENELEC;
— where harmonised standards within the meaning of Art. 5 
have not yet been drawn up and published, complies with 
the safety provisions of the International Commission on the 
Rules for the Approval of Electrical Equipment (CEE) or of 
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (Art. 
6);
— where no harmonised standards within the meaning of Art. 5 
or international standards pursuant to Art. 6 exist, has been 
manufactured in accordance with the safety provisions of 
the Member State of manufacture, if it ensures equivalent 
safety to that required in the country of destination (Art. 7).
In order not to block technical innovations, which are in
general followed only after a certain lapse of time by technical




























































































mentioned but meeting the general safety objectives are also ad­
mitted to free movement (Art. 8 (1)). Conformity with the safety 
objectives may be shown by an expert report (Art. 8 (2)). The 
free movement of electrical products meeting the safety 
objectives on the terms just set out may not be impeded on safety 
grounds (Art. 3).
The presumed conformity of products with technical stan­
dards within the meaning of Articles 5, 6 and 7 is attested by a 
conformity mark issued by an accepted national body85, or by a 
"certificate of conformity", or in the absence thereof, in particular 
in the case of industrial equipment, the manufacturer's 
"declaration of conformity" (Art. 10). Measures to restrict mar­
keting or free movement may be taken by Member States only 
through the safeguard clause procedure (Art. 9).
2.3 Individual questions on the Low Voltage Directive and 
its application
For years there was considerable uncertainty as to the inter­
pretation of the Low Voltage Directive. This resulted not least 
from the regulatory technique, which was unusual for many 
Member States, and was not cleared up until the ECJ ruling of 2 
December 1980 in preliminary ruling procedure 815/79-Cre- 
monini v. Vrankovich86. On the basis of this ruling, the Commis­
sion once again summarised the legal framework of the Directive 
and its application in a explanatory communication to all con­
cerned87. Further clarifications emerged from the meeting of the
85 The list of centres is published in OJ C 184, 23 July 1979, 1.
86 Case 815/79, Judgment of 2 December 1980, ECR [1980] 3583 - 
Cremonini v. Vrankovich. Cf. Hartley, 1982. Also illuminating is Case 





























































































working group on elimination of technical obstacles to trade in 
the electrical sector held on 20 December 1983, on application of 
the Low Voltage Directive88. The following observations on in­
dividual provisions of the Low Voltage Directive are based es­
sentially on the Commission communication and the findings of 
that working session.
2.3.1 Harmonised standards
The pillars of the Low Voltage Directive are the harmonised 
standards within the meaning of Art. 5. They definitively replace 
other categories of technical standards mentioned in the Direc­
tive. They are to be laid down by the standards organisations 
joined together in CENELEC by mutual agreement, and should 
be brought up to the latest state of technological advance and of 
development of the rules of art of safety technology (Art. 5 (5), 
second sentence). To date, CENELEC has in connection with the 
Low Voltage Directive, produced well over 100 harmonised 
standards. Harmonised standards may be arrived at by
— drawing up a European standard, published by all national 
committees of CENELEC unchanged as a national standard, 
or by
— use of a harmonisation document to be incorporated verba­
tim, without change, in their national standards by all 
national committees of CENELEC89.
87 Communication on the application of the Low Voltage Directive, (op. 
cit., note 73).
88 COM/III/1412/83 -  Rev. 3.
89 After the judgment in the Cremonini v. Vrankovich case, CENELEC 
took the decision henceforth to publish only European Standards in the 
area of the Low Voltage Directive, instead of the hitherto usual 
harmonisation documents; see CENELEC memorandum No. 10 on




























































































The Commission publishes the harmonised standards in the 
Official Journal; this publication is for purposes of information 
and thus has a purely declarative function90. The list published in 
September 1984 summarised harmonised standards agreed on up 
to that date91. The 94 harmonisation documents92 covered extend 
to the following areas:
Household appliances 43
Electricity lines 15
Work appliances and tools 13
Lamps 7
General safety provisions 6
Measuring devices 5
Miscellaneous 5
The results of CENELEC's work may be adopted by major­
ity vote, effective for outvoted committees too, though in princi­
ple unanimity is aimed at and almost always obtained93. This 
procedure of unanimous voting by the national committees 
accords with Art. 5 of the Directive, which says that harmonised 
standards are to be drawn up by "common agreement"94. This is 
justified on the basis that the Community legislator has left the
90 Otherwise it would be even more disastrous that publication has so far 
been affected only with very considerable delay. This is complained of 
by Winckler, 1985, 36.
91 OJ C 235, 5 September 1984, 2 et seq. The previous three lists are 
published in OJ C 184, 23 July 1979, 5 et seq., OJ C 107, 30 April 
1980, 2-3, OJ C 199, 5 August 1980, 2-3.
92 This does not take the numerous amendments to harmonised standards 
into account.
93 As with Art. 148 EEC, the votes for each country are weighted. The 
blocking minority is three members, or 16 weighted Noes. In other re­
spects, the procedure is so arranged that on the one hand, agreement 
among the Community partners cannot be prevented by non-Member 
States, and on the other, as a rule as far as possible, a comprehensive 
regional result even going beyond the Community is secured; for 
details see the CENELEC rules of procedure, last amended in Septem­
ber 1985.
94 On this see the Communication on application of the Low Voltage 




























































































method of reaching mutual agreement within the discretion of the 
standardisation bodies. Moreover, compliance with harmonised 
standards could not be mandatorily prescribed, but is merely a 
presumption that the safety objectives, the only decisive things, 
have been complied with. Finally, adoption and updating of the 
harmonised standards constitute a continuous process which in its 
effects is very similar to the procedure for adjusting directives to 
technical progress, which also operates by qualified majority. It 
should be added that the comparison between CEN and 
CENELEC specifically shows how much the adoption of har­
monised standards and their adaptation to technical progress 
required on safety grounds is hampered if majority decisions do 
not also bind outvoted committees. Where there are serious 
reservations as to safety, the Member State, not the standardisa­
tion committee, has the safeguard clause procedure of Art. 9 open 
to it.
In the case of many harmonisation documents, various types
of national divergence were provided for, namely
— mandatory departures of type "A" on the basis of differing 
legally prescribed requirements as to the extent of safety;
— mandatory departures of type "A" on the basis of the 
conditions of the electricity supply system;
— departures of type "B" on the basis of particular technical 
circumstances, elimination of which is a matter for the stan­
dardisation bodies95.
point 2.3.2; Advocate General J.-P. Warnke in his closing speech in 
Case 123/76, ECR [1977] 1449 at 1466-1468.
95 Cf. CENELEC Memorandum No. 5, "Document of principle for 
national departures from harmonisation documents, with particular 
reference to the Low Voltage Directive" and COM M/1412/83 — Rev. 
3, point 2.3.3. In 1983, according to expert estimates, about one third 
of harmonised standards were affected by departures of type A because 





























































































Following the ruling in the Cremonini v. Vrankovich case, it 
was clarified96 that type B departures are not admissible, since no 
discrepant national standards apply alongside the harmonised 
standards. Nor could type A divergences continue to claim any 
validity alongside a harmonised standard, since compliance with 
discrepant national safety provisions operates as a presumption of 
compliance with the general safety objectives only where no 
harmonised standards pursuant to Art. 5 or no safety require­
ments published pursuant to Art. 6 exist. They can be adduced 
only in connection with the safeguard clause procedure of Art. 9.
In this explosive conflict of interests, the Commission seeks 
as far as possible to ensure that the safeguard procedure of Art. 9 
is not opted for, but solutions are found in informal ways by 
removing national discrepancies or incorporating them in the 
standard concerned97. Indeed, it explicitly notifies Member States 
of the possibility of affecting the production of harmonised stan­
dards through the various standardisation bodies98. K. Fitting has 
the following to say about a remarkable practice by the German 
authorities of securing for themselves a right of participation in 
European standards99:
"Following adoption of a harmonisation document by 
CENELEC" . . . "the DKE sends the competent 
German government department" . . . "initial copies of 
the drafts for incorporation into national standards. The 
German government department, on the basis of the 
safeguard clause contained in the Low Voltage Direc­
tive, tests the substantive content of the standard to see
96 Cf. the Communication on application of the Low Voltage Directive 
(loc. cit., note 73), point 6.2.1; COM III/1412/83 — Rev. 3, point 
2.3.3.; CENELEC Memorandum No. 10 (loc. cit., note 89), points 3.3 
to 3.5.
97 Cf. COM III/1412/83 — Rev. 3, point 2.3.3 end.
98 Loc. cit., point 2.3.1.




























































































whether there are serious technical safety objections to 
its adoption. If there are no grounds for applying the 
safeguard clause, a communication is sent to the DKE 
to the effect that publication in the relevant VDE 
publications can proceed. Following this publication 
the standard is finally also published in the Federal 
Gazette" . . . "with the consequence that a harmonised 
standard can now come about if the procedure in other 
Member States has likewise come to a positive 
outcome” . . . "Where the Federal Government has 
severe technical safety objections, it informs the DKE 
of these. There is no publication in the Federal Gazette, 
so that there can be no harmonised standard. Since the 
Federal Government is now applying the safeguard 
clause, it notifies the Commission of this fact, pursuant 
to Art. 9 of the Low Voltage Directive".
The safeguard clause, really intended as a remedy against 
the marketing of electrical equipment that complies with stan­
dards but is unsafe, is here being used so that the German author­
ities can check compliance of the intended harmonised norms 
with the general safety objectives. The new approach provides for 
a procedure of its own, though a Community one, in order to test 
harmonised standards adopted by the European standardisation 
bodies, or else the national standards that for the moment con­
tinue to apply, for compliance with the essential safety require­
ments100.
National requirements arising from differences in climate, 
electricity network, voltages, types of plug and socket etc., which 
cannot be changed for a fairly long time, are incorporated into the 
text of the European standard as "special national conditions"101.
Publication of safety requirements of international stan­
dardisation bodies pursuant to Art. 6 of the Directive has 
remained of no importance in practice. Consistently, this possi-




























































































bility of reference is no longer taken up in the new approach. If 
even the standards organisations cannot manage to agree on 
harmonised standards pursuant to Art. 5, it is very probable that 
the objections raised are so weighty that Member States will 
oppose planned publication in the consultation procedure pro­
vided for by Art. 6 (3)102. Note should, however, above all be 
taken of the CENELEC mode of procedure: it takes up work of 
its own only when no international standards are likely to be 
available in a reasonable time, but otherwise bases itself on IEC 
standards and confines joint amendments to these to a mini­
mum103.
2.3.2 Equivalence o f safety level
Art. 7 has raised severe problems of interpretation. It says 
that where harmonised standards do not exist and no international 
safety provisions have been published, electrical equipment is 
admitted to free movement where it meets the safety require­
ments of the manufacturing country and offers the same safety as 
required in the country of destination. Following the Cremonini 
v. Vrankovich ruling, it may be taken as clarified that Art. 7 is 
transitional in nature, applying only to the period where har­
monised standards have not yet been established for the whole 
area of application of the Low Voltage Directive104. It is conceiv­
able that in this transitional period national standards which lag 
behind the requirements of Art. 2 taken together with Annex I, 
that is, the general safety objectives, will in one Member State or
101 CENELEC Memorandum No. 10 (loc. cit., note 89), point 3.3.
102 Winckler/CassassollesAVrdiani, 1974, 16.




























































































another continue to apply. In this case, it should be ensured that 
the safety level prescribed in the importing Member State is not 
reduced. The importing country cannot however require the same 
safety also to be achieved by the same means, nor can it call for 
any higher degree of safety than that required by Art. 2 and 
Annex I105.
Art. 7 also makes it clear that Member States may not link 
the marketing of electrical equipment that meets the prescribed 
safety objectives, to the condition of complying with particular 
provisions regarding quality or performance106.
2.3.3 Safeguard clause procedure
A Member State which for safety reasons prohibits the mar­
keting of electrical equipment or restricts its free movement, need 
only, but must always, employ the safeguard clause procedure of 
Art. 9, if conformity with the general safety objectives is to be 
presumed because a conformity mark, certificate of conformity 
from an authorised office, declaration of conformity from the 
manufacturer or expert report pursuant to Art. 8 (2) is available. 
It has to inform the Commission and all Member States on 
measures taken, since all are — at least possibly — "involved", 
and has to indicate the ground for its decision. If a measures has 
been taken because of a shortcoming in a technical standard, the 
Commission sees itself as obliged to act in order to maintain a
104 According to industry figures, harmonised standards already existed 
for over 90% of turnover in equipment covered by the Low Voltage 
Directive; cf. COM III/1412/83 — Rev. 3, para. 2.4.1.
105 On the foregoing cf. the closing speech by Advocate-General J.-P. 
Warner in Case 815/79, ECR [1980] 3583 at 3624-25; cf. also Hartley 
1982, 59.
106 Communication on application of the Low Voltage Directive (loc. cit., 




























































































uniform safety standard in the Community even where other 
Member States have no objections to the national measures107, 
though the Directive does not provide for any action in this case. 
In its details, the safeguard clause procedure is rather unclearly 
and awkwardly constmcted as regards its conditions, course and 
consequences. Its main function is in preventing Member States 
from unilaterally interfering with movement of electrical equip­
ment meeting the general safety objectives, and in setting up a 
mechanism for mutual consultation and opinion. The Commis­
sion takes the role of a moderator here; it may secure opinions 
and pass them on, formulate recommendations or statements.
2.3.4 The CENELEC certification agreement
The application of a conformity mark to electrical equip­
ment or the issue of a certificate of conformity by the authorised 
centers in Member States must, as the Cremonini v. Vrankovich 
judgment explicitly states, be recognised by all Member States as 
a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the technical stan­
dards pursuant to Articles 5, 6 or 7 and thus also with the safety 
objectives laid down in the Directive. This conformity mark or 
certificate thus gives entitlement to marketing and to free move­
ment, subject to the safeguard clause procedure, in the whole 
Community. Conformity marks are not only proof of conformity, 
but in countries where they have been issued by the competent 
centres in that country, additionally mean an indisputable 
commercial advantage. Accordingly, it is in the interest of manu­
facturers to secure the national mark of every Member State in 
which they wish to market their products. The CENELEC certifi­
cation agreement of 11 September 1973 in the version of 29 
March 1983108 (CCA) facilitates the acquisition of such marks




























































































without needless repetition of tests. A manufacturer who has 
already secured a conformity mark on the basis of the prescribed 
tests may, by submitting the tests result on a form, secure the 
mark of another office too, in a rapid, informal procedure109. 
There are agreements between the test centres on initial inspec­
tion of the place of manufacture and on monitoring of the manu­
facturing process and of marketing. Where a manufacturer so de­
sires, he can on the basis of one test acquire national conformity 
marks for all Member States more or less automatically. The 
Commission energetically supports this agreement, which it 
regards as an advance on the system of mutual recognition of 
conformity marks and certification in the Low Voltage Directive 
and as making introduction of a Community mark practically 
superfluous110. What is ultimately decisive is the initial test 
which does not necessarily have to be done in the manufacturer's 
country.
The HAR agreement describes a procedure for issuing 
and using a jointly agreed marking for cables and 
insulated wires meeting the harmonised standards111. 
National test centres mark the cables and wires not 
only with the national test mark but also with the 
CENELEC test mark HAR. Accordingly, in the area of 
cables and wires, a European test mark does exist 
which all certification centres have to recognise. A 
further special procedure exists for construction 
components in electronics, regulated by the CENELEC 
Committee for Electronic Components (CECC)112.
108 Which replaces similar agreements of 2 May 1968, 1 April 1971 and 
11 September 1973.
109 For details see Warner, 1983, 87-88; id e m , 1984, 36-37. For instance, 
the VDE test centre has in recent years given some 140 tests annually 
in the form of CENELEC communications of test results, to German 
manufacturers that had presented them to the various foreign 
CENELEC test centres to secure their test marks.
110 COM 111/1412.83 — Rev. 3, points 2.6.2 and 2.6.3.
111 Details in Warner, 1983,87-88; idem , 1984,37-38,50-51.




























































































Internationally, however with a restriction mainly to 
Europe, the certification of electrical products is 
organised by the International Commission for 
Conformity Certification of Electrical Products (CEE), 
recently integrated into the IEC113. Since 1963, its 
predecessor organisation114, which until 1981 had also 
issued standards in the electrical sphere, had provided a 
system of certification, the CB procedure115. Under this 
system, tests by any member organisation are mutually 
recognised. The CB certificate as such does not give 
entitlement to application of a test mark, but merely 
facilitates the securing of other national test marks 
among the CEE member countries.
Public supervision, government influence or even any sort 
of consumer involvement are scarcely conceivable in the 
CENELEC certification system. There is only very restrictively 
any competitive situation among individual test centres, or 
mutual verification. It is clear that in the case of certification, 
marketing interests outweigh verification of compliance with 
standards. Besides the necessary cross-co-operation among certi­
fication centres, an international certification system ought to 
require that certification be centralised in the individual Member 
States, precise requirements be placed on the staffing and equip­
ment of centres, clear test criteria worked out and ample consen­
sus reached among centres involved when defining the target 
safety standard. The requirements would have to be strict. Once 
conformity marks have been conferred, marketing restrictions can 
be arrived at only through a time-consuming, rather cumbersome 
safeguard clause procedure.
For certification questions arising in implementing the new 
approach, it would be useful to examine the extent to which use
113 Details in Warner, 1983, 88-9; idem, 1984, 38, 46-7.





























































































is made of certification by manufacturers even outside the indus­
trial use of products, and what precautionary measures ought to 
or can be taken against misuse116.
2.4 Inadmissible delegation of public tasks to private
standardisation bodies?
Finally, it should be considered whether the form of sliding 
reference to technical standards chosen in the Low Voltage 
Directive does not constitute inadmissible delegation of public 
tasks to private standardisation bodies. The ECJ has not dealt 
explicitly with this question, but has not expressed any doubt as 
to the admissibility of the reference technique employed in the 
Low Voltage Directive117. The possible criticism has been 
brought out very succinctly by E. Rôhling118, in specific refer­
ence to the Low Voltage Directive, and can be summarised as 
follows:
Sliding reference to technical standards in their current ver­
sion is alleged to constitute inadmissible delegation of sovereign 
powers to non-sovereign organisations, since the tasks transferred 
go far beyond mere implementing powers, Community agencies 
are allowed practically no influence on the production of the 
technical standards and the balance between Community institu­
tions is encroached upon. Reference to standards can allegedly
115 CB — Certification Body — In the period from 1963 to 1984 some 
6,500 CB certificates were issued.
116 Cf. COM III/1412/83 — Rev. 3, point 2.6.4.
117 Case 123/76, Judgment of 14 July 1977, ECR [1977] 1449 - Commis­
sion v. Italy; Case 815/79, Judgment of 2 December 1980, ECR [1980] 
3583 - Cremonini v. Vrankovich.





























































































not be justified even on the grounds that it is a very technical 
matter, regulation of which would present Community institu­
tions with insoluble tasks. Given that only vague, undisputed 
general safety objectives are laid down, standard-setting bodies 
are alleged to decide by themselves as to the extent of hazards the 
public is to be exposed to. Community institutions, moreover, are 
not so much allowing themselves in the case of application of 
reference standards to be guided by consideration of the 
hazardousness of the individual products, but more by the extent 
to which international standards exist for the given areas, or at 
least international standardisation bodies are viable. The stan­
dard-setting bodies are made up largely of representatives of 
interested business circles, not subject to any effective public 
control, and on the whole do not offer the guarantee of setting 
technical specifications oriented solely towards the requirements 
of the common good (consumer and environmental protection, 
safety). Finally, there is an objection on grounds of democratic 
legitimation, namely that the however weak control over Council 
members by national parliaments is still undermined.
These massive objections will not be gone into any further 
here in connection with the Low Voltage Directive. They arise in 
dealing with the new approach, in part with modified parameters, 
and will there be discussed in detail119. The Low Voltage Direc­
tive and the new approach have carefully been designed so as to 
leave the following legal fallback position open120: products need 
meet only the essential safety requirements laid down by the 
Council. Harmonised standards, and to a restricted extent national 
standards, too, justify only a presumption of compliance with the 
general safety objectives, which could in principle also be met in
119 Cf. Chapter IV, 5.
120 See COM IH/1412/83 — Rev. 3, point 2.3.1 and Winck-
Ier/Cassassolles/Verdiani, 1974, 31 on the Low Voltage Directive. On




























































































other ways. Member States could satisfactorily meet their respon­
sibility for consumer safety through the safeguard clause proce­
dure as well as through the laying down of the fundamental 
safety requirements.
3. The new  approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards
The development of a strategy aimed at guaranteeing the 
conditions for marketability of goods on European markets is 
among the essential legal requirements for renewed efforts to 
bring about the internal market. The new approach to harmonisa­
tion policy is justified above all by the principle of "equivalence" 
of safety policy objectives in Member States, supported by the 
Cassis de Dijon Judgment of 1978, which should require mutual 
recognition of national provisions121 and permit the generalisa­
tion of the reference technique first practised in the 1973 Low 
Voltage Directive122. But the political impulses and preliminary 
conceptual date much further back123. Both the European Parlia­
ment124 and the Economic and Social Committee125 had already 
recommended the reference method in their resolutions or opin­
ions on the 1969 General Programme to eliminate technical bar-
of 7 May 1985, OJ C 136, 4 June 1985, 1 (at 2-3). The legal conception 
was early worked out in basic outline by Starkowski, 1973, 143-160.
121 Cf. in the Commission's White Paper on Completion of the Internal 
Market (note 1) in particular points 63 and 77, and for qualifications to 
this principle cf. supra 1., esp. 1.2.3.
122 The White Paper (loc. cit., note 1), point 63, is able to point in this 
connection to the Council Resolution on conclusions regarding stan­
dardisation of 16 July 1984 (OJ C 136, 4 June 1985, 2); see also the 
Commission communication "Technical Harmonisation and Standards: 
a new approach", COM (85) 19 final of 31 January 1985, 6.
123 Cf. Chapter III, 2.3 (c).




























































































tiers to trade, as an alternative to the "traditional" method of 
approximation of laws126. In the early 70's, these suggestions 
were taken up in the German literature, and the outlines of the 
new approach were formulated127: Directives should lay down 
"basic requirements", and conformity with technical standards 
should justify a presumption of compliance with these require­
ments128. In accordance with this presumption, Member States 
ought to take "all necessary measures to ensure that administra­
tive authorities recognise as conforming with the basic require­
ments, such goods as meet standards laid down by the Commis­
sion, following consultation of the Standardisation Commit­
tee"129. Manufacturers can furthermore declare, and where neces­
sary prove, the basic conformity of products not complying with 
standards130.
But these proposals were by no means unanimously 
accepted. As suggested notably by Rohling131, the regulatory 
technique of reference to standards substantively meant delega­
tion of legislative powers, inadmissible according to the EEC 
Treaty132; if the Community wished to take advantage of the 
expert knowledge of standardisation organisations, it ought first
125 OJ C 132, 6 December 1968, 1, 4-5.
126 The ESC's opinion (op. cit.) reads like a downright anticipation of the 
new approach: "Thus, it would be conceivable for the Community 
directives first to list the safety objectives to be secured, and then to 
indicate that these would be taken as achieved as long as a particular 
standard, initially harmonised at the level of the Member States, is 
complied with. This would give a chance to bring proof that the safety 
objectives have been met even without compliance with the standard 
concerned”.
127 Cf. esp. Starkowski, 1973, 104 et seq., 143 et seq.; more recently, also 
Grabitz, 1980, 82-91 and earlier Seidel, 1969, 960 et seq. and idem, 
1971,745-46.
128 Cf. Grabitz, 1980, 82 et seq.
129 Starkowski, 1973, 151.
130 Starkowski, 1973, 115-16; Grabitz, 1980, 88.




























































































to guarantee the Commission's influence on the standardisation 
procedure in any such co-operation, and then adopt the procedure 
of Art. 155, fourth indent, for the legal "ratification" of the results 
of standardisation133.
This already brings out the major legislative policy prob­
lems to be overcome in working out the new approach. The 
following survey will however give legal assessment second 
place to the solutions or proposed solutions developed by the 
Commission134, in order to consider their practicability.
3.1 The Information Directive of 20 March 1983
The first legislative act in which the Community systemati­
cally embarked on the transition to a new harmonisation policy 
was the Directive of 20 March 1983 "laying down a procedure 
for the provision of information in the field of technical standards 
and regulations"135. This Directive went beyond the existing 
restriction of harmonisation policy to the legal and administrative 
provisions mentioned in Art. 100 (1) EEC to cover also their non­
governmental appendage, namely national technical standards136. 
The directive was also innovative because of the measures by 
which it sought to oppose the emergence of technical barriers to 
trade. Art. 8 obliges Member States (and Art. 4 national 
standardisation bodies) to "immediately communicate to the 
Commission any technical draft regulation" (and national stan­
dards programmes and draft standards)137. This information is to
132 See 2.4 supra, as well as 5.1 infra.
133 Rôhling, 1972, 132 et seq.; on this more at 5.2 infra.
134 On this cf. 5 infra.
135 OJ L 109, 26 April 1983, 8.




























































































enable the Commission to seek European solutions for the area 
concerned and initiate negotiations on such solutions. The legal 
instrument given by the Information Directive for this purpose is 
a time-limited anticipation of the primacy doctrine138, which 
replaces the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 28 May 1969139. The 
Commission or a Member State can cause adoption of technical 
regulations to be delayed for six months (Art: 9 (1)) and the 
Commission even by 12 months, if it announces an intended 
directive (Art. 9 (2)). Art. 7 (1) obliges Member States to ensure 
that standards are suspended for a period of six months if 
production of a European standard is intended. It is noteworthy 
that the Information Directive "institutionally" restricts the 
supremacy claim of European law by taking Member States' 
interests into account and giving standards institutions a possibil­
ity of collaboration140. These opportunities of influence are 
guaranteed by the Standing Committee of Member States' repre­
sentatives set up by Art. 5, which shall be consulted on all 
important matters and may deal with any questions it finds 
important (cf. Art. 6 (5) and (ó)). National and European stan­
dardisation organisations may themselves be represented on the 
Committee directly through experts or through advisers; in other 
respects they are recognised by Art. 6 (1) as permanent inter­
locutors. Member States' safety policy interests are taken into 
account by Art. 9 (3), which grants Member States the right "for 
urgent reasons relating to the protection of public health and 
safety" to introduce effective national provisions immediately.
The objectives of Europeanisation of technical regulations 
and standards and the institutional innovations in the Information
137 The information from national standards organisations is collected by 
the European standards organisations CEN/CENELEC and passed on 
to the Commission; see Anselman, 1986, 937.
138 Cf. Rehbinder/Stewart, 1985, 331.




























































































Directive already adumbrate important components of the new 
approach. The Information Directive itself admittedly imposes in 
the first place a very considerable burden of work upon the 
Commission. Following entry into force of the Directive on 1 
January 1985, the Commission had by May 1986, already 
received 80 relevant communications, brought about the post­
ponement of procedures in 32 cases and announced the adoption 
of directives in 10 cases141.
Evidently, however, the "information ethics" documented in 
these figures is still not enough. At any rate, the Commission 
pointed out in a communication of 1 October 1096 that failure by 
Member States to comply with their information and postpone­
ment obligations was an infringement of Community law from 
which citizens of the States concerned could derive a right to 
non-application of provisions enacted in contradiction with the 
provisions of the Information Directive142. The Commission can 
base its legal position on ECJ case law on the direct effect of sec­
ondary Community law. However, the expectation that the post­
ponement periods provided for in the Information Directive could 
allow European solutions for the pertaining technical regulations 
and standards to be found and applied would be unrealistic. The 
most important effect of the Information Directive is no doubt 
instead that the creation of an information system at the Commu-
140 On the general context, see Chapter III, 1.2.2.
141 "First report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the implementation of the Commission's White Paper on 
completion of the internal market", COM (86) 300 final of 26 May 
1986, 14; also the answer to written question No. 1376/86 OJ C 143, 1 
June 1987, 12-13. In its second report on the implementation of the 
White Paper the Commission reported on 294 drafts notified, on 124 of 
which it had formally asked for a change, COM (87) 203 final of 19 
May 1987, 13.
142 Commission communication on non-compliance with particular provi­
sions of Directive 83/189 EEC, OJ C 245, 1 October 1986, 4; see also 
the answers by Lord Cockfield to question No. 39/86 in the European 




























































































nity level and the involvement of the Member States and their 
standardisation organisations in the process of Europeanisation of 
technical regulations and standards143.
This assessment is confirmed by the proposals submitted by 
the Commission on 20 February 1987. By these, the scope of the 
Information Directive is to be considerably expanded, extending 
in future to farm products, foodstuffs and fodder, pharmaceuticals 
and cosmetics144; at the same time, it is intended that the Stand­
ing Committee set up by Art. 5 of the Information Directive 
should be involved in working on standardisation contracts (Art. 
1 (2)). The postponement periods in Art. 9 of the Directive are 
not extended. However, in the future, communication of a pro­
posal for a directive to the Council (and not only announcement 
of a corresponding "intention") would bring on the postponement 
obligation (Art. 1 (3)(b)). The Commission's explanatory docu­
ment of 13 February 1987145 stresses that the various postpone­
ment periods resulting from the announcement to Member States 
of an intention and the communication of proposals for directives 
to the Council are not to be combined.
1376/86, OJ C 143, 1 June 1987, 13, and Anselmann 1986, 937, on the 
adoption of national standards.
143 Cf. also Pelkmans, 1985, 69 et seq.
144 Cf. Art. 1 (1) of the proposal for a Council directive amending Direc­
tive 83/189 EEC on an information procedure in the area of technical 
regulations and standards, OJ C 71, 19 March 1987, 12; on agricultural 
products see the supplementary proposal in OJ C 71, 19 March 1987, 
13.




























































































3.2 Harmonisation of safety objectives and their
implementation in standards
The overstraining of the Community's law-making capaci­
ties by procedures under Art. 100 (1) EEC has led to the testing 
of three146 strategies to reduce its burden. All are to be continued 
under the new approach. In accordance with the extensive inter­
pretation of Art. 30 EEC147 advocated by the Commission 
following the Cassis de Dijon decision148, in areas where reliance 
can be placed on mutual recognition of national regulations and 
standards, harmonisation of laws is to be avoided where possible; 
existing regulations and standards are instead to be checked for 
proportionality149. The scope of this strategy is, however, lim­
ited150. Another way of unburdening the cumbersome procedure 
of adopting new directives is through the delegation of power to 
enact implementing provisions to the Commission pursuant to 
Art. 155, fourth indent151. The White Paper mentions the success 
of this method152, which however cannot easily be reconciled 
with efforts at increasing involvement of standardisation organi­
sations in harmonisation policy153. The third method of allieva- 
tion, the reference technique first practised in the Low Voltage
146 A fourth road is so-called optional harmonisation (Chapter III, 2.3 (b) 
supra), which is however not mentioned in the White Paper and is 
critically commented on in the explanatory memorandum on the new 
approach (op. cit., note 122, 4).
147 Cf. 1.1.2 supra, text on note 26.
148 Case 120/78, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECR [1979] 649.
149 See point 65 in the White Paper (note 1).
150 See 1.2.3 supra and point 64 in the White Paper (note 1).
151 Cf. the proposal for a directive on construction products, OJ C 308, 23 
December 1978, 3 and Chapter III, 2.6 supra, and the ESC's opinion on 
problems of barriers to trade and the harmonisation of relevant legal 
provisions, OJ C 72, 24 March 1980, 8.
152 Op. cit. (note 1), point 70.




























































































Directive of 19 February 1973154, is unambiguously and em­
phatically favoured in the new approach.
This means, in the White Paper's terms, that harmonisation 
of legal regulations should in future be confined to "binding 
health and safety requirements", to "basic preconditions for a 
product's marketability", while production of relevant technical 
specifications should be left to European standardisation organi­
sations155. The allaying effect of this inclusion of standardisation 
organisations in harmonisation policy depends in the first place 
on the demarcation between the "basic safety requirements" and 
the "technical specifications”. The Low Voltage Directive, 
explicitly emphasised in the explanatory memorandum on the 
new approach as a model for the new regulatory technique156, 
does describe the mandatory safety objectives comprehensively, 
but only by vague general clauses157. Descriptions of this nature, 
as the literature on the Low Voltage Directive brings out, allow 
only preliminary assessments; they become "practically applica­
ble. . .only by actually adducing the standards"158. It is particu­
larly this consequence of the reference technique that the new 
approach evidently does not wish to accept. According to the 
preparatory document of 31 January 1985, the essential safety 
requirements must be worded precisely enough "in order to cre­
ate, on transposition into national law, legally binding obligations 
which can be imposed"159. The Model Directive approved by the 
Council contains the following addition: "They should be so for­
mulated as to enable the certification bodies immediately to cer-
154 OJ L 77, 26 March 1973, 29.
155 Op. çit. (note 1), points 65, 68.
156 Op, çit. (note 1), 5.
157 Of. 2.2 supra.
158 Schmatz/Nothlichs, Nos. 1610, 11,13, cf. 17-18.




























































































tify products as being in conformity, having regard to those 
requirements in the absence of standards"160.
This addition has led to considerable hesitation and contro­
versies. Pelkmans, for instance, warns161 that it threatens to 
endanger the whole planning of the new approach and ought 
therefore to be understood merely as a call for involvement of 
national certification centres in cases where neither European or 
national standards guarantee the safety of a product162. In its re­
port on technical harmonisation and standards in the Commu­
nity163, the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy called for the deletion of 
this addition, and an April 1986 question by one MEP164 
suggested that it be treated as non-mandatory. The answer to this 
question, communicated by Lord Cockfield on behalf of the 
Commission165, makes the legal position clear and yet seems to 
dodge the issue:
As far as the requirements on the precision of safety 
objectives are concerned, the addition is "only a 
comment intended to define the relationship between 
the essential safety requirements (point B III) and the 
means of proof of conformity and effects (point B V
160 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985, OJ C 136, 4 June 1985, 2.
161 Pelkmans, 1985, 115, says that this is "de dood in de pot” (see also 
Pelkmans, 1987, 265 et seep). See further Hartlieb/Krieg, 1987, 127 as 
well as the interesting opinion in Dey, EG-Richtlinie, 1987, 234 on the 
planned directive on safety of machines: that it is appropriate "to con­
tinue . . . efforts at a general, comprehensive standard on the safety of 
machines and not wait for the appearance of a directive". In any case, a 
few months later the Commission presented its proposal for a Council 
directive harmonising the legal provisions of Member States for 
machines, OJ C 29, 3 February 1988,1.
162 Cf. 3.3 infra.
163 PE Doc. A 2-54/86, 16 June 1986, point 7.
164 OJ C 19, 26 January 1987, 5.




























































































3). An essential aspect of the harmonisation arrange­
ments proposed by the Commission in its communica­
tion of 31 January 1985 is that the manufacturer would 
be able to choose between certification by a third party 
on the basis of the essential requirements, on the one 
hand, and the declaration of conformity with standards, 
on the other. There is therefore a choice that makes it 
possible to retain the voluntary nature of standards, 
which is the basic feature of the «new approach».
The Commission in no way takes the view that this 
principle will necessarily lead the Council to adopt 
directives laying down very detailed essential safety 
requirements, since the testing bodies appointed by the 
Member States to check the conformity of manufac­
tured products with the essential requirements, nor­
mally have expertise based on lengthy experience. This 
ensures that the obligations deriving from a directive 
that has clearly formulated the standard of safety to be 
attained by the products in question will be correctly 
interpreted and applied.
It will also be possible for suitable informal procedures 
to be established in each case, so as to allow satisfac­
tory co-operation between the appointed certification 
and testing bodies, thus ensuring that the provisions of 
the directives in question are correctly and uniformly 
applied . . . The Commission considers, in any event, 
that such a question should be examined in connection 
with each specific case, rather than form the subject of 
a general discussion on the interpretation of the Coun­
cil Resolution of 7 May 1985".
In the meantime, the first directives or draft directives based 
on the Model Directive are available, providing clearer indica­
tions of the function of the essential safety requirements. The 
Directive for simple pressure vessels166, with its descriptions of 
the essential safety requirements, is not comparable with the 
general clauses of the Low Voltage Directive. The characteristics 
of the materials to be used are laid down in detail in Annex I167;
166 OJ L 220, 8 August 1987,48; the Directive of 27 June 1976 harmonis­
ing Member States' provisions via common provisions for pressure 




























































































further binding provisions deal with design and loading capacity, 
manufacturing procedures and requirements for commissioning 
the vessels. Regarding the volume of these provisions, the 
explanatory statement to the draft directive says that "differences 
of principle regarding aspects of safety" ought to be decided by 
the competent bodies of the Community, since otherwise they 
would "inevitably reappear at the level of European standardisa­
tion bodies"168.
The second draft directive submitted on the basis of the new 
approach concerns the safety of toys169. Art. 2 (1) lays down a 
general safety obligation whereby manufacturers must bear in 
mind the foreseeable use of toys and the "normal behaviour of 
children". This general safety obligation is specified in Annex II, 
initially in "general principles”, according to which children are 
to be protected not only against risks due to the construction and 
composition of the toy, but also, where design measures are not 
possible, against those inherent in its use170. The lengthy Annex 
II establishes requirements on physical and mechanical proper­
ties, flammability, chemical properties, explosion, electrical 
properties, hygiene and radioactivity. Annex IV additionally
1976, 153 and the three individual directives subsequently adopted 
remain unaffected.
167 In the explanatory statement to the ’’proposal for a Council directive 
harmonising the legal provisions of Member States for simple pressure 
vessels", COM (86) 112 final of 14 March 1986, 9, the possibility of 
rapidly amending these provisions is pointed out; the possibilities of 
Art. 155, fourth indent, EEC were, however, not fully utilised.
168 Op. cit., 6; by contrast, the EP Committee for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy, loc. cit. (note 163), 11, finds that the 
proposal for a directive bears the traces of the "old . . . now outdated 
method"; the EP resolution of 19 June 1987 goes in the same direction 
; OJ C 190, 20 July 1987, 173.
169 Proposal for a Council directive harmonising the legal provisions of 
Member States on the safety of toys, OJ C 282, 8 November 1986, 4. 
On this the amended proposal of 2 October 1987 is now available, 




























































































contains differentiated requirements as to warnings concerning 
the age of children, nature of the toys, and risks involved. All 
categories of risks and warnings were contained in the Commis­
sion's 3 July 1980171 Draft Directive, from which they were taken 
over into the proposal for a framework Directive of 23 June 
1983172. The 1980 draft dealt in Annexes V and VI with Com­
munity standards for physical and technical properties and the 
flammability of toys, but in 1983 corresponding standards were 
incorporated into separate directives173. A simplified procedure 
for amending these mandatory standards had been provided for 
both in 1980 (Art. 17) and in 1983 (Art. 13). The regulatory tech­
nique of the draft as now submitted thus builds on preliminary 
work already done. This continuity emerges particularly clearly 
from the fact that the binding standards in the 1980 and 1983 
drafts merely took over provisions from the European standardis­
ation organisations, seeking to make them mandatory even 
though not yet formally adopted at the time by the national stan­
dards organisations. These draft standards have since been devel­
oped into mandatory European standards. Article 5 of the new 
proposal can therefore now refer to the very regulations that pre­
vious drafts sought to make legally binding174.
The Commission's most recent project to date175, the pro­
posal for a directive on construction products176, is likewise the 
resumption of a long-discussed project177. The development is
170 The quality of the German version of the draft directive is such that the 
meaning of the text can often be deduced only by considering the 
versions in other languages.
171 OJ C 228, 8 September 1980, Annex III, and IV.
172 OJ C 203,29 July 1983,1, Annex II and III; cf. Chapter HI, 3.2 supra.
173 OJ C 203, 29 July 1983, 12 (mechanical and physical properties); OJ C 
203, 29 July 1983, 1 (flammability).
174 On the role of national standards and of conformity certificates for toys 
not conforming to standards see point 3.3 infra.
175 April 1987; intensive preparation was done in particular on the Direc­




























































































very easy to follow, because the original draft provided for wide- 
ranging "implementing powers" for the Commission pursuant to 
Art. 155, fourth indent, and provoked considerable resistance 
from business circles involved. On the other hand, the circum­
stances that had at the time induced the Commission to take 
advantage of these regulatory powers have not changed: there are 
still hardly any European or international standards for construc­
tion materials, and the multiplicity of existing national standards 
referring to them relates to differing national statutory provisions 
on buildings178. In these circumstances, the Commission's pro­
posal cannot apply the new approach in the way the Model 
Directive assumes. The safety requirements in the Directive on 
construction materials contain essential requirements to which 
construction works, i.e. buildings and civil engineering works, 
have to conform, and which may influence the specific charac­
teristics for products relating to such points as stability, safety in 
case of fires, hygiene, health, the environment, safety in use, 
durability, protection against noise and energy saving179. The 
Commission explicitly stresses that it would not, in general, be 
possible on the basis of these requirements "to directly establish a
be so comprehensively set out that it could be seen as a supplement to 
the Low Voltage Directive and at the same time as an appendix to the 
GSG (see references in Dey, 1987, EG-Richtlinie 233 et seq.). How the 
relationship here between legally binding safety objectives and legally 
non-binding standardisation principles is to be arranged is not yet 
clear; it can be expected, though, that the working out of "basic safety 
objectives" will also have to be shifted more to the standardisation 
organisations, the more comprehensive the scope of a machine direc­
tive is supposed to be — this is decidedly the view of Dey, Status 
Europäischer Normen, 392-93. The proposal since submitted for a 
directive on machines, OJ C 29, 3 February 1988, contains an exten­
sive catalogue of basic safety requirements.
176 Proposal for a Council directive harmonising the legal and administra­
tive provisions of Member States on construction products, OJ C 93, 6 
April 1987, 1.
177 Cf. Chapter III, 2.6; this stagnation is supposed to be overcome by 
reshaping it in accordance with the new approach.
178 See the references in Commission document COM (86) 756 final of 8 




























































































presumption of conformity with the essential requirements by 
means of a type-examination carried out by an approved 
body"180. Since the regulatory lacunae between the "essential 
requirements" and actual construction products will not in the 
foreseeable future be closed by European standards either, the 
Commission proposal provides for "European technical 
approval". Approval bodies authorised by Member States should, 
"on the basis of common approval guidelines for the product", in 
co-ordination with approval bodies in other States issue 
"European technical approval" on the legal basis of this directive 
(Annex II, (3) (1) and (6)).
The multiplicity of regulatory proposals through which the 
Commission has sought to apply the new approach confirm the 
doubts of earlier commentators on the feasibility in practice of 
the Model Directive181. It also corresponds to the pragmatically 
sibylline statements by its leading supporters182. These were to 
the effect that, when delimiting "essential safety requirements" in 
need of harmonisation from mere specifications of those 
requirements which need not to be uniform, the ideas of the 
Model Directive could obviously not be taken over without 
review; instead, this delimitation would in each case have to be 
oriented according to the state of national and international stan­
dardisation, the range and objects of provisions in force, the 
nature of the risks concerned and the likely product users.
It should be noted that these internal differentiations 
inevitably affect a further area already mentioned in the prepara­
tory document to the new approach183 and now specifically
179 According to the list in Annex I.
180 Loc. cit. (note 178), point 10.
181 See Joerges, 1986, Section III 1 b.




























































































stressed in the proposal for a directive on construction prod­
ucts184: the abandonment of detailed design specifications in 
favour of "performance" standards. The distinction between 
"performance" and design is evidently intended not merely to 
paraphrase the difference between "safety objectives" and their 
"specifications", but at the same time to refer to a more general 
competition-policy dimension of the debates on the regulatory 
technique of product safety law. The preferability of performance 
standards is because as repeatedly asserted in the U.S., such 
provisions leave room for technical innovation and make it 
harder to turn the standard-setting process into a way of warding 
off competition185.
The theoretically clear distinction between performance and 
design standards in the practice of standard setting has repeatedly 
lead to wellnigh unsolvable problems of demarcation. It may, 
moreover, prove questionable from a safety policy viewpoint 
where and in so far as alternative design solutions are not con­
ceivable186. Accordingly, the Draft Toy Directive, to the extent 
that it deals with chemical properties of toys, contains threshold 
values for particular substances and references to relevant prohi­
bitions in Community law187. The explanatory statement on the 
proposal for the Directive on simple pressure vessels points out, 
in connection with restrictions relating to materials, a further 
problem with performance standards188: the development of suit­
able certification procedures and mutual recognition of confor-
183 Loc. cit. (note 122), 5.
184 Loc. cit. (note 176), Art. 5 (2).
185 See Klayman, 1982, 104 et seq.
186 Op. cit., 105 et seq.
187 Loc. cit. (note 169), Annex II (3).




























































































mity certifications becomes more urgent and at the same time 
more difficult as the manufacturer's leeway is broadened.
3.3 Proof of conformity, mutual recognition, certification189
The retreat from approximation of laws to the harmonisation 
of essential safety requirements is motivated by internal market 
and competition policy concerns. Following these objectives, the 
new approach envisages a variety of alternatives for manufactur­
ers in order to comply with the mandatory requirements of direc­
tives and a range of ways of showing the safety conformity of 
their products which are patterned on the Low Voltage Direc­
tive190. Section B VIII and V of the Model Directive of 7 May 
1985191 provides the following alternatives:
— Maunufacturers can design their products according to 
European standards, or where such standards do not (yet) 
exist, national standards (Section B V (1) (a) and (b)).
— They are, however, also free to use designs not foreseen in 
the standards that still meet the mandatory safety objectives 
(Section B V (3)).
Conformity is attested by
— certificates, marks of conformity or reports of results of tests 
by a "third party" (Section B VIII (1) (a) and (b)),
— a declaration of conformity issued by the manufacturer, in 
which case a surveillance system may be required (Section 
B V III(l)c ).
Self-certification by manufacturers was also accepted in 
principle by the Low Voltage Directive, though for products not 
conforming to standards, the submission of an expert report was
189 A general survey is given by Volkmann, 1987.





























































































required192. The Model Directive correspondingly draws a dis­
tinction: "when the product is not in conformity with a standard", 
its safety conformity must be "declared by the means of an attes­
tation delivered by an independent body" (Section B V (3) (2)).
3.3.1 Recognition o f national standards
Reference to national standards is explicitly termed a 
"transitional measure" in the Model Directive (Section B V (1) 
(b)). Nevertheless, this recognition of national standards is of 
fundamental importance. It corresponds to the assumption, con­
tained in the Commission's White Paper193 and repeated in the 
explanatory material on the new approach194, that the objects of 
national safety provisions mostly coincide and that one may 
therefore take the equivalence of differing mandatory provisions 
and voluntary standards as a basis. It is far from clear, where this 
confidence derives from and why the statements in the General 
Programme on elimination of technical barriers to trade of 28 
May 1969 that harmonisation measures are indispensable195 have 
since been superseded. The technical safety development in the 
electrical sector, which the regulatory technique of the Low Volt­
age Directive could take as a basis196, has, after all, not taken 
place in other sectors. This is amply confirmed by the difficulties
192 Art. 8 (2); cf. 2.2 supra, text accompanying note 84. Similar provisions 
are found in "traditional" directives in so far as they contain deviation 
clauses; cf. EG Art. 7 (2) and Art. 23 of the Directive of 17 September 
1984 on lifting and conveying equipment, OJ L 300, 19 November 
1984, and the Pressure Vessels Directive of 17 June 1976 (note 166); 
see also Art. 5 of the proposals for directives on toys of 1980 (note 
171) and 1983 (note 172).
193 Op. cit. (note 1), para. 65.
194 Loc. cit. (note 160), 2 and in the relevant Commission Communication 
(note 122), 6.





























































































in delimiting the "essential safety objectives" from mere 
"manufacturing specifications" in the Commission's new propos­
als for directives197; and the proposal on construction materials 
shows that a basic pattern of "equivalent" safety objectives that 
merely have to be specified by standards cannot be achieved 
without further action.
In its provisions on mutual recognition of national stan­
dards, the Model Directive is more cautious than the thesis of the 
equivalence of national safety provisions would imply. The 
Model Directive thus provides for a special procedure that must 
be gone through before national standards are recognised. 
National standards which in the view of Member States meet the 
safety objectives of Directives are to be communicated to the 
Commission, which forwards them to the other Member States 
and consults the Standing Committee before allowing official 
publication198. Even though the description of the Committee's 
remit states that consultation is aimed more at providing "a 
framework . . .  for discussion of any reservations on the part of 
the Commission or a Member State” than at "carrying out a sys­
tematic check on the whole content of the standards", the Model 
Directive does basically take account of the perception that there 
can be an obligation on Member States to mutually recognise 
national standards only within a context of harmonisation of the 
legal provisions underlying these standards199. There is certainly 
a reduction from the requirements of the first paragraph of Art. 
100 EEC if the Commission is to have a right of ultimate deci­
sion on inclusion of national standards in the "standards cata­
logue" of Community law. But this power is compensated for by 
Member States' right of objection in administering the standards 
catalogue (and also by the fact that conformity to standards can
197 3.2 supra.




























































































always justify only a presumption of compliance with the safety 
objectives)200.
3.3.2 Mutual recognition o f conformity certificates and 
certification procedures
Uniformity of the safety level through European standards 
and the equivalence of national standards is a necessary but not 
yet a sufficient condition for the practicability of the new 
approach. Safety presumptions bound up with compliance with 
standards must be attested, and these attestations must be mutu­
ally recognised. This principle of the Model Directive can be 
accepted by Member States only where the equivalence of those 
attestations is guaranteed. This is especially true in connection 
with the Model Directive's reference in its deviation clause 
(Section B V (3) (2)) to the certification of safety conformity of 
products not conforming to standards by "independent bodies". In 
the case of such attestation, each Member State has to rely on the 
reliability of the certification procedures of foreign agencies.
The Model Directive largely ignores the thorny question of 
how equivalence of national safety certificates can be guaranteed. 
It merely lists a number of different means of attestation201 
(certificates and marks of conformity issued by a third party, 
results of tests by a third party, manufacturer's declarations of 
conformity and surveillance systems), but does not specify the 
requirements that these certification bodies have to meet202. It is
199 Cf. Chapter M, 1.1, text accompanying note 11.
200 Cf. Sections VI (2), VII and VIII (3) of the Model Directive (note 160), 
and for more details on the safeguard procedure 3.4 infra.
201 The Community approaches are based on the ISO/IEC guidelines 
issued in recent years; cf. Volkmann, 1987, 420.




























































































only with the directives and proposals for directives submitted on 
the basis of the new approach that we come upon more precise 
regulatory proposals, meant as examples, on the certification 
issue.
The Directive on simple pressure vessels, following numer­
ous predecessors203, distinguishes between design testing to ver­
ify the safety conformity of the manufacturer's designs (EC type- 
examination) and monitoring of the production process relating to 
actual compliance with the accepted designs (EC verification)204. 
The Commission favours the setting up of quality guarantee sys­
tems under official control in factories themselves, through which 
manufacturers would assume primary responsibility for monitor­
ing their production processes205. Arrangements of this type are 
provided for in the Draft Toy Directive. Here, too, a distinction is 
drawn between type-examination (Articles 8 (2), 10) and 
surveillance of the manufacturing process, for which again the 
manufacturer himself is to be primarily responsible (Art. 8(1)).
Both design checks (type-examination) and surveillance of 
quality control systems are incumbent on national bodies. 
Accordingly, the new directives must seek to guarantee the 
equivalence of the administrative practice of these bodies. For 
this purpose, requirements are established for the independence, 
technical competence and requisite equipment of those bodies206. 
The administrative sovereignty of Member States, however, re-
203 In particular following the Pressure Vessels Directive of 1976 (note 
166); cf. also, among the directives adopted as a package in 1984, the 
Directive on lifting and conveying equipment (note 192), Chapters HI, 
VI and V, VI.
204 Loc. cit. (note 166), Arts. 10-15.
205 Cf. in the explanatory statement cited in note 167 supra, point I (9) and 
Art. 12 of the Directive.
206 Directive on simple pressure vessels (note 166), Annex III (and with 
the same wording, Annex III of the 1976 directive, note 166); proposal 




























































































mains unaffected, since they alone decide whether the bodies 
they have designated meet the Community requirements207.
The urgency and also the complexity of the certification and 
recognition issue emerges most clearly from the new proposal for 
a directive on construction products208, since in this sector the 
disparities between national provisions on building and engi­
neering works are considerable and the absence of international 
and European standards is unlikely to change much in the fore­
seeable future. Even the recognition of national standards and of 
technical approval, pursuant to Art. 12 and Art. 7-10 of the pro­
posal respectively, in reality call for Europeanisation of those 
standards and approval decisions and can therefore be attainable 
only gradually as part of a continuous process of co-operation 209. 
This applies equally to conformity certificates, provided for in 
Art. 3 and 13. Significantly, Art. 13 and the related Annex IV (2) 
assume that the certification procedures will have to differ 
according to types of products and risks, and that the appropriate 
attestations will in each case have to be laid down in the stan­
dards and technical approvals (Art. 13 (4), (5)). Standardisation 
and certification thus emerge as interdependent and indispensable 
elements in the new approach.
This summary of a perusal of the new directives and draft 
directives is in line with the outcome of Community endeavours 
hitherto to clarify the relationship between safety objectives and 
design specifications. Regulatory conceptions based on the new 
approach contain clear guidelines for future Community policy,
1978 (D) on the recognition of testing and monitoring marks by certifi­
cation centres, printed in DIN-Mitt. 59 (1980), 613-14 and for more 
details on the situation regarding electrical appliances, 2.3.4 supra.
207 See Art. 9 (3) in both directives or proposals for directives (notes 166 
and 169).




























































































but at the same time must yield to needs for differentiation210. 
Ultimately it will be only the practical application of the new di­
rectives that will show how far Member States are really prepared 
to trust the test practices of foreign agencies, and whether they 
will be able to come to terms with the system of manufacturer 
self-certification favoured by the Community, which can only 
indirectly be controlled by national or independent bodies. The 
primary competence of Member States' administrations in inter­
preting safety objectives, implementing control measures and 
applying certification programmes can at any rate be exploited 
openly or indirectly to bring to bear reservations against the new 
policy or objections to the practice of other Member States.
3.4 Safeguard clause procedure and follow-up market con­
trols
Even in directives adopted in accordance with the 
"traditional" harmonisation policy, safeguard clauses have 
become usual. These cut into the supremacy claim of European 
law by allowing Member States to appeal to their safety policy 
interests within the meaning of Art. 36 EEC and initiating a 
procedure to amend the directives211. The Model Directive
209 Cf. 3.2 supra, text at notes 175 et seq. and the bilateral "special proce­
dure" provided for in Art. 16 of the Directive.
210 A separate regulatory technique was chosen in the Directive of 1 
December 1986 on airborne noise emitted by household appliances (OJ 
L 344, 6 December 1986, 24). This Directive does not as the title 
would suggest deal directly with limiting noise emission. Instead, it 
seeks to guarantee the freedom of internal Community trade in cases 
where one Member State obliges manufacturers of household equip­
ment to indicate its noise emissions (Art. 5). For these cases, the 
Directive prescribes a measuring procedure permitting tolerances of "at 
most 2dB ' and also referring, to specify the procedure, to European 
standards and national standards and regulations (Art. 6 and 8). The 
Community law requirements on the test procedure and the provisions 




























































































(Section VII), and following it all new directives and proposals 
for directives212, contain corresponding provisions.
Incorporation of safeguard clauses is in fact inevitable for a 
variety of reasons: The new harmonisation policy lays down only 
basic safety objectives bindingly, and is in principle here con­
fined to "performance" standards; the specification of safety 
objectives by private standardisation organisations is to imply 
only a presumption of safety conformity; the European standardi­
sation organisations can decide by qualified majority; last but not 
least, Member States agencies may autonomously verify the 
Community requirements. It is easy to conceive of a large 
number of conflicts in which Member States might assert their 
safety policy interests. Member States may in particular, even 
where products have a certificate of conformity, prohibit their 
marketing, referring to the inadequacy either of autonomous con­
formity certification or even of European and national stan­
dards213. The solution of such conflicts is referred by the Model 
Directive initially to the Standing Committee, which has to take a 
position on objections to European or national standards. On the 
basis of the Committee's opinion, the Commission then has to 
decide. If it finds the objection justified and revokes recognition 
of a standard, a State finding itself disadvantaged by this may 
proceed in accordance with Art. 173 EEC. If instead, the 
Commission finds the objection unjustified, the rejected State has 
the same possibility. Conversely, procedure according to Art. 169
5 and 6) are intended to make superfluous the checks by national agen­
cies on manufacturer self-certification.
211 Cf. Chapter III, 2.5, and specifically on the Low Voltage Directive 
2.3.3 supra.
212 Art. 2 of the Directive on simple pressure vessels (note 166); Art. 7 of 
the proposal on toys (note 169); Art. 21 of the proposal on construction 
products (note 176).




























































































EEC is open to the Commission where a Member State keeps to 
its measures contrary to the Commission's decision214.
However, the possibilities of safety-motivated action open 
to Member States not only concern the recognition of standards 
and conformity certificates, but could also directly affect the 
marketability of products. By Section VII (2) of the Model 
Directive, the Commission shall, where it finds the action taken 
by a Member State justified, "point out to the other Member 
States that (all else being equal) they are also obliged to prevent 
the product in question from being placed on the market". No 
legal basis for this Community-wide applicability of a measure 
by a single Member State is contained in the Model Directive 
itself. Even if the Commission manages to assert its interpretation 
of the basic safety objectives, there is no means of action avail­
able to it whereby it could compel active intervention by the 
administrative bodies of Member States.
The new directives or proposals for directives respond 
differently to this regulatory lacuna in the Model Directive. The 
Directive on simple pressure vessels215 contains provisions on 
review of the recognition of standards (Art. 6) and on information 
of the Commission on unilateral measures (Art. 7), but in no way 
guarantees their applicability Community-wide. The safeguard 
clause in the proposal for the Directive on construction materi­
als216 likewise deals only with the need to amend standards and 
approve decisions, without making it clear how a justifiably 
adopted protective measure by one Member State can be made 
applicable Community-wide. By contrast the proposal for a toy 
directive217 aims at Europeanising follow-up market controls.
214 Cf. Weber, 1982, 321 et seq.
215 Loc. cit. (note 166).




























































































Article 7 (1) obliges all Member States to take "all appropriate 
measures to withdraw" unsafe toys "from the market and prohibit 
their placing on the market" and to inform the Commission of 
such measures. This information is aimed not only at revision or 
supplementation of standards; the Commission is instead to ver­
ify the justifiability of national measures and inform other Mem­
ber States, while according to the 1986 proposal it should if 
national measures prove justified, remind other Member States of 
the need to take similar action (Art. 7 (4))218. The Directive on 
airborne noise emitted by household appliances219 likewise 
"walks on two legs": Art. 9 regulates the procedure for reviewing 
European standards and national standards or technical regula­
tions220, while Art. 7 obliges Member States to take steps to 
secure correction of faulty information from manufacturers221.
Visualising the number of potential conflict situations that 
are supposed to be dealt with through the safeguard clause proce­
dure, one is forced to conclude that this procedure has been 
overloaded; on the one hand, through the twofold load of per­
fecting standards, approval criteria and certification procedures
217 Note 169.
218 The 1983 preliminary draft (note 171) was still clearer; Art. 10 obliges 
Member States to recall dangerous toys, though "subject to Community 
provisions", and, in lack of such provisions, national laws. The 1983 
preliminary draft (note 172) provided in Art. 9 for a general obligation 
for recalls on the authority. The HP has since, in its opinion on the 
Commission draft (OJ C 246, 14 September 1987, 85) called for miti­
gation of these control provisions, whereas the ESC (OJ C 232, 31 
August 1987, 22) calls for their extension. The amended Commission 
proposal (COM (87) 467 final) now provides only for information to 
Member States.
219 Note 210.
220 On this differentiation see 5.3 infra.
221 The most detailed regulations on follow-up market control to date are 
contained in the proposal for a directive of 8 October 1986 on 
"products which, seeming to be other than they are, endanger the 
health or safety of consumers" (OJ C 272, 28 October 1986, Art. 3). In 




























































































and on the other, through having to cope with emergency deci­
sions because of newly recognised dangers. This point and its 
consequences will be returned to222.
3.5. Improving the position of European standards
All documents on the new harmonisation policy treat refer­
ence to national standards as merely a transitional solution223. 
Co-ordination of future directives with corresponding work by 
the European standardisation organisations is therefore a key 
feature of the new approach, or conversely, the new approach 
means a "rather fateful challenge" to European standardisation224.
The Commission's efforts at intensifying European stan­
dardisation work go back to 1980. Even then the Commission 
recognised that all efforts at approximation of laws and at appli­
cation of Community law would not be enough to bring about the 
internal market unless the barriers to trade resulting from national 
standards were simultaneously removed225. The ambitious goal 
of preparing European standards "without 'deviations"' (and "at 
the rate of several hundred a year"226) could admittedly not be 
achieved227. The most important positive outcome of this early 
initiative was instead the Directive of 28 March 1983 on an
als are withdrawn; all that is still provided for is an "exchange of 
views" on national measures (Art. 4).
222 Cf. Chapter V, 3 and Chapter VI, 3.4.
223 Cf. only Section V (1) of the Model Directive (note 160).
224 Anselmann, 1986, 993.
225 Technical barriers to trade: A new Commission approach, EC Bull. 1- 
1980, 12, 15-16.




























































































information procedure in the area of technical regulations and 
standards228.
The starting position for European standardisation is clearly 
precarious. "Disorientation and remoteness from reality", as R. 
Winckler was warning as long ago as 19 80229, characterise the 
situation of European standardisation organisations. The reasons 
for this judgement are multifarious. Orientation of standardisation 
work to the internal market of the Community does not a priori 
correspond to the interests of standardisation organisations (nor 
of their supporters), which have always regarded international 
standardisation under ISO and IEC as having priority230. The 
stagnation and shortcomings in implementation of traditional 
harmonisation policy and legal establishment of standards to date 
are hardly likely to help increase their attractiveness or involve­
ment in European standardisation work231. The new approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards is now intended to create
227 This is made clear by the following table on growth of the body of 
standards under CEN/CENELEC, ISO/1EC and DIN in the years from 
1980 to 1986:
Year CEN/CENELEC ISO/IEC DIN
1980 492 5,909 18,739
1981 537 6,273 19,430
1982 568 6,756 19,970
1983 625 7,210 20,299
1984 668 7,757 20,732
1985 747 8,275 20,566
1986 829 8,726 19,937
Source: DIN-Jahresbericht 1982/83, 2; DIN-Mitt. 65 (1986), 314; DIN- 
Geschâftsbericht 1986/87, before p. 1. The figures given for 
CEN/CENELEC also include CENELEC harmonisation documents 
and Euro-standards for iron and steel.
228 On this see 3.1 supra.
229 Winckler, 1980, 85; see also Winckler, 1978, 59 et seq.




























































































fundamentally improved co-operation conditions for both the 
Community and the standards organisations. Standards organisa­
tions gain additional importance from the reference technique 
itself and from the now essential co-ordination between policy on 
directives and standardisation work, while the Commission 
expects the concentrating of harmonisation policy on the laying 
down of essential safety objectives to unburden political deci­
sion-making processes in the Community. The "general guide­
lines on co-operation"232 agreed to by the Commission and the 
European standards organisations CEN/CENELEC on 13 
November 1984, laid the foundations for future co-operation. 
Four elements in this document should be stressed:
— The Commission recognises the "competence" of 
CEN/CENELEC for producing European standards; it will 
in principle support these organisations through orders for 
standards, and also support their work financially.
— CEN and CENELEC for their part guarantee that they will 
take account of the safety requirements specified in 
Community directives and in the Commission's orders for 
standards.
— Co-operation between the Commission and the standardisa­
tion organisations starts from the preparatory stage of direc­
tives; the Commission will also bring the standardisation 
organisations in for general issues of "common interest"; on 
the other hand, Commission representatives will take part in 
meetings of the technical boards and technical committees 
of the standardisation organisations.
— CEN and CENELEC guarantee that "interested circles, in 
particular government authorities, industry, users, 
consumers and trade unions will if they wish, be able to be 
genuinely involved in the development of European 
standards".
All these elements of co-operation call for further clarifica­
tion. Thus, the safety policy importance of future standardisation




























































































work depends essentially on the specific form of the "basic safety 
objectives" in the new directives — at the CEN annual meeting in 
1985 the fear was already being expressed "that individual 
debates on the boundary between governmental stipulation and 
standardisation are clearly unavoidable"233. But particularly now 
that European standardisation organisations are being assigned 
the substantive tasks that result from a reticent formulation of 
safety objectives, they must redefine their relationship to national 
and international standardisation. They will increasingly be 
taking over the functions of safety standardisation hitherto 
handled by national and international standardisation bodies. It 
remains to be seen, whether the European organisations will be 
able to overcome the considerable reservations that in the past 
have been voiced against the usefulness of establishing a new 
organisational level between national and international standardi­
sation234.
The desired "functional shift" in European standardisation is 
unlikely to ease an arrival at consensus among national delega­
tions at the European level. Even in the past, a voting procedure 
applied in CENELEC for members from the Community that was 
patterned on Art. 148 EEC, and that required member organisa­
tions to transpose European into national standards within six 
months235. CEN likewise had a qualified majority rule, but here 
outvoted members were not obliged to adopt the European stan­
dard236. Following the agreement of 13 November 1984 between 
Commission and CEN/CENELEC, the voting rules of CENELEC 
were taken over in CEN and the incorporation of European stan-
232 Reprinted in DIN-Mitt. 64 (1985), 78 -79.
233 See the report by Mohr, 1986 and note 175 supra.
234 Cf. Seidel, 1981, 1121; Seidel, 1985.
235 Cf. Mohr, 1980; Schulz, 1984.
236 For more details, see point 3.5 and 3.6.1 in the CEN rules of procedure 




























































































dards into national ones was also guaranteed237. The now unified 
voting rules differ markedly from the unanimity rules of Art. 100 
(1) EEC. On the other hand, economic conflicts of interest among 
Member States continue to exist238, and one shall in other re­
spects have to wait and see how the voting rules in the standardi­
sation organisations will impinge on Member States' behaviour in 
the Council when adopting new directives, and then in any 
recourse to the safeguard clause. Finally, it is hard to see how the 
participation rights for "interested circles" are to be structured 
and implemented239.
3.6 The decision-making powers of the Commission and the
powers of the Standing Committee
The restructuring of legal harmonisation policy not only 
leads to a "functional" involvement of private organisations in the 
Community's law-making process, but also affects the relation­
ship between Member States, Council and Commission. The 
Council’s role will, according to the ideas of the Model Directive, 
be confined to laying down the basic safety requirements. This 
means that Member States are no longer to be involved directly 
("in legislative policy") in transposing the new directives. This 
limitation of their possibility of influence explains the setting up 
of a Standing Committee pursuant to Section IX of the Model 
Directive, identical with the one set up by the 1983 Information 
Directive. Pursuant to Art. 6 of the Information Directive, it is to 
be involved in discussion of standardisation projects240 and may
237 Cf. Mohr, 1986. The new draft Directive on toys (note 169) already 
assumes these changes.
238 Cf. Chapter III, 1.2.1.




























































































be brought into the standstill procedure under Art. 8 (2) of that 
Directive. The Standing Committee is now also concerned with 
administering the list of recognised standards (Section VI (2)); it 
is to be consulted in the safeguard clause procedure (Section VII 
(2)) and furthermore "any question regarding the implementation 
of a Directive may be submitted to the Committee" (Section X 
(2)). Nevertheless, the Commission's legal prerogative remains 
clear. As regards the Committee's function in managing the list of 
standards, Section X of the Model Directive states in sibylline 
fashion that "the object of the consultation of the Committee . . . 
is more to provide for a forum for the discussion of the objections 
. . . than to carry out a systematic examination of the entire con­
tents of the standards". Its formal powers are clearly limited. The 
Committee cannot, by contrast with "management" and 
"regulatory” committees, compel the Council through its vote to 
reformulate its decision, but is a mere consultative body, an 
"advisory committee" therefore, as the final conference on the 
Single European Act recommended, in the area of application of 
Art. 100 a241. The comprehensive formal powers of the Commis­
sion are supposed to make the decision-making procedure effec­
tive. But having regard to the legal-policy explosiveness of the 
questions that might arise, particularly in the safeguard clause 
procedure, it is to be expected that the practical importance of the 
Standing Committee (and the sub-committees) will be greater 
than the legal status assigned to it suggests. And quite irrespec­
tive of how the actual decision-making process develops, the 
question still has to be asked whether the shape given to the 
Commission's formal powers can be maintained legally at all242.
240 See also point 4 of the "general guidelines on co-operation" between 
Commission and CEN/CENELEC (note 232) and Art. 1 (2) of the 
proposal for amending the Information Directive (note 144).
241 EC Bulletin, supplement 2/86, 23; for more details see 4.3 infra.




























































































4. The change in the legal framework conditions for 
European product safety policy brought about by 
the S ingle European Act
The Single European Act (SEA)243 provides for some 
important changes to the framework conditions for a policy that 
will bring about the internal market and guarantee product safety. 
Art. 8 a244 contains the central objective of progressively estab­
lishing the internal market by 31 December 1992, and lists the 
additions to the Treaty that are to permit the accomplishment of 
the ambitious political programme contained in the White Paper 
on completing the internal market245. The supplementations of 
the Treaty relate essentially to harmonisation measures, leaving 
unaffected the existing rules on free movement of goods before 
approximation of laws. The internal market, on the realisation of 
which the new instruments are to be employed, is defined as an 
"area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty" (Art. 8 a, second sentence). It is the
243 Signed on 17 February 1986 in Luxembourg and on 28 February 1986 
in The Flague, published as supplement 2/86 to the EC Bulletin. An 
exhaustive survey on this can be found in EuR 21 (1986), 199 et seq. ; 
Ehlermann, 1987; Jacqué, 1986 and Lodge, 1986, and sharp criticism 
in Pescatore, 1986. See also Amull, 1986; Ehlermann, 1986; European 
Consumer Law Group, 1987; Gulmann, 1987; Hrbek/Laufer, 1986; 
Reich, 1987, Nos. 173-180; Sedemund/Montag, 1987, 546-47; Zuleeg, 
1987. Specifically on the connection between the SEÀ and free move­
ment of goods or achievement of the internal market, see 
Forwood/Clough, 1986; Hirsch, 1987; Meier, 1987; Rogge, 1986; 
Scharrer, 1986; Seidel, 1986. On the background to and the emergence 
of the SEA see de Zwaan, 1986; see also the comprehensive reports in 
EC Bull. 11-1985, 7-22 and EC Bull. 12-1985, 7-16.
244 The amendments or supplementations to the EEC Treaty proposed by 
the SEA are indicated as articles with no indication of law or treaty.




























































































core of the more comprehensively treated measures to set up and 
operate the Common Market (cf. Articles 2, 3, 100, 235 EEC).
4.1 Article 100 a — majority principle and reservations by
Member States
Departing from the unanimity principle of Art. 100 EEC for 
adopting directives, Art. 100 a (1) provides that the Council 
should adopt measures for the approximation of the legal and 
administrative provisions of Member States, having as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market, 
by qualified majority246. Apart from this facilitated decision­
making, there are also provisions on taxes, freedom of movement 
and the rights and interests of employed persons (Art. 100 a (2)), 
areas where to date, fundamental political agreement has been 
lacking.
It is questionable whether legal harmonisation measures to 
bring about the internal market will continue in the future to be 
possible in accordance with Art. 100 EEC. The majority principle 
is aimed at facilitating arrival at a political consensus; a single 
Member State is no longer to have the possibility of vanifying or 
delaying the further building of the internal market by a veto. It is 
therefore to be presumed that measures of legal approximation 
for the creation and operation of the internal market should in the 
future no longer be possible under Art. 100 EEC, which requires 
unanimous decision247. In the interest of accelerated realisation of 
the internal market, it is specifically the veto position allowed 
individual Member States by the unanimity principle, that is to be
246 This means the overcoming of the extra-legal 1966 Luxembourg 
Compromise, which allowed a Member State to prevent a Council 




























































































overcome. The derogation and safeguard clauses of Art. 100 a (4) 
and (5) constitute only a very restricted form of compensation for 
the veto right of Member States resulting from the unanimity 
principle. The individual Member State cannot prevent a 
Community regulation which in any case will have the effect of 
abolishing some of its powers. The derogation clause in Art. 100 
a (4) provides no protection against failure of a measure adopted 
by the Community legislator to meet regulatory policy concepts 
of an outvoted Member State, or against a measure in which one 
Member State's view brings in excessive protection of the objects 
legally protected by Art. 36 EEC, thus disproportionately 
restricting the freedom of economic activity248.
By the procedure of Art. 100 a, regulations may also be 
adopted. Since regulations limit Member States' room for 
manoeuvre even more than directives, the Commission has made 
a declaration in the Final Act that it will give precedence to the 
instrument of the directive in its proposals pursuant to Art. 100 a, 
where the harmonisation will in one or more Member States, 
involve the amendment of legal provisions.
Restrictions on use, such as restrictions on distribution, 
speed limits or conditions for utilisation, indirectly interfere with 
intra-Community trade if they differ from one Member State to 
another. A ticklish question of demarcation arises, namely 
whether a Community regulation of restriction on use is to be 
counted as part of a realisation of freedom of movement of 
goods, and can therefore in accordance with Art. 100 a be made. 
Seidel denies this, on convincing grounds249. In attempts at legal 
harmonisation so as to remove technical barriers to trade, such
247 Cf. Ehlermann, 1987, 382. Many proposals for directives mentioning 
Art. 100 EEC as a legal basis are being converted to Art. 100 a.




























































































arrangements have to date been included only where at least one 
Member State has met the regulatory object by design require­
ments, thus raising a technical barrier to trade. He further points 
out that restrictions on use have not been classified by the ECJ as 
measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
within the meaning of Art. 30 EEC250. Accordingly, harmonisa­
tion of restriction on use could be brought about only from the 
viewpoint of harmonising competition conditions, and therefore 
not according to the procedure of Art. 100 a. The danger that 
restrictions on use may be used as an indirect instrument for 
market restriction, though not the walling off of markets, cannot 
be entirely ruled out.
Since completion of the internal market cannot be brought 
about through directives that merely lay down minimal standards 
and allow Member States to make further-reaching require­
ments251, but undercutting of higher protected levels reached in 
individual Member States is politically undesirable, Art. 100 a (3) 
provides that the Commission shall, in its proposals for legal 
harmonisation in the areas of health, safety, environmental pro­
tection and consumer protection, take as a basis a high level of 
protection. The Commission's proposals and the resulting Coun­
cil decisions need not necessarily meet the highest existing level 
of protection in one of the Member States. The compromise lies 
in "setting the level of protection in such a way that the burden on 
Member States that so far had a low level of protection remains 
acceptable and on the other hand, the reduction of a high level of
249 Seidel, 1986, 61. See also Reich, 1987, No. 176 on the economic inter­
ests of consumers.
250 Cf. ECJ, Judgment of 31 March 1982, ECR [1982] 1211 (1229) - Bles- 
gen; Judgment of 14 July 1981, ECR [1981, 1993] 2009 — ban on 
night baking. See also Skordas, 1986, 23-28.
251 By contrast, Member States are explicitly allowed in the area of envi­
ronmental protection and in order to promote the safety and health of 
workers, to retain or adopt stronger protective measures (Art. 130 t and 




























































































protection in one Member State does not lead to political prob­
lems"252. An additional procedural guarantee against removal of a 
high level of protection is that the Council can by Art. 149 (1) 
EEC decide on amendments to the Commission proposal only 
unanimously, so that each Member State has a veto on going 
below a high standard proposed by the Commission. What is 
wanted, then, is the levelling of protective standards at a high but 
not necessarily the highest level253.
It should be borne in mind in this connection that the Com­
mission, in its proposals for realising the internal market, has by 
Art. 8 c to take account of the difficulties that less developed 
economies showing differences in development will have to sus­
tain. The objective of attaining as high a level of protection as 
possible is thus limited by the political objective of promoting 
harmonious development of the Community as a whole, to 
strengthen its economic and social cohesion (cf. also Art. 130 a 
and 130 b).
Doubts admittedly remain as to whether differing concep­
tions of safety, in areas where safety levels cannot be expressed 
by numerical threshold values, can be brought under a simple lin­
ear ranking. Here harmonisation of basic technical safety stan­
dards at the European level could be of assistance. In June 1985, 
a month after the Council decision on a new approach to techni­
cal harmonisation and standards, CEN set up a new technical 
committee (CEN/TC 114) with the task of creating, as with the 
German standard DIN 31000/VDE 1000, a common safety con-
252 Glaesner, EuR 21 (1986), 131. See also Rogge, 1986, 461.
253 One may well doubt whether a more or less laboriously reached 
common protective level may still make it possible to adapt to techni­





























































































cept and uniform technical safety provisions for all appliances, 
machines and installations254.
Art. 8 c allows exceptional arrangements in favour of less 
developed economies. They must be of a temporary nature and 
must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the 
common market. This introduces the ground rules for a "multi­
speed Europe" or for "graded integration"255 into the Treaty sys­
tem.
According to Art. 100 a (5), harmonisation measures 
adopted may be combined with a safeguard clause authorising 
Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic rea­
sons referred to in Art. 36 EEC, provisional measures subject to a 
Community control procedure. Safeguard clauses of this nature 
were already common256.
By contrast, Art. 100 a (4) means a considerable innovation. 
If a directive has been adopted by qualified majority257, a Mem­
ber State can by appealing to compelling concerns within the 
meaning of Art. 36 EEC or relating to protection of the environ­
ment or of the working environment, unilaterally apply different 
national provisions. This right of "opting out" is open to all 
Member States, not only outvoted ones258. The view that consent 
by a Member State necessarily means abstaining from national 
special regulations pursuant to Art. 100 a (4)259 is not supported
254 Cf. Jahresbericht 1985 der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeitsschutz 1985, 22. 
See also Budde, Vorschlag, 1987; Dey, EG-Richtlinie, 1987.
255 Cf. on this concept Scharrer, 1981; idem, 1984; Langeheine, 1984; 
Ehlermann, 1984; Eiden, Abgestufte Integration, 1984.
256 Cf. Chapter III, 2.5 supra.
257 Only Gulmann, 1987, 37-38 regards appeal to Art. 100 a (4) as possi­
ble even in the case of unanimous decisions; Ehlermann, 1987, 391 is 




























































































by the tenor of that provision, and creates a risk that Member 
States may endanger a decision by qualified majority because 
they abstain as a precautionary measure, in order to retain their 
possibilities of action pursuant to Art. 100 a (4). Art. 100 a (4) 
and (5) should be considered in the light of German desires for 
vehicles with clean exhausts and "are to guarantee that insistence 
on legal approximation once attained does not prevent the further 
development of environmental or health protection"260.
The derogation clause of Art. 100 a (4) also applies in cases 
where a directive adopted by qualified majority contains a safe­
guard clause within the meaning of Art. 100 a (5)261. These safe­
guard clauses usually allow only temporary departure from the 
harmonised law in order to respond to a newly apparent haz­
ardous situation, and are aimed at allowing appropriate adapta­
tion, in order to restore the harmonisation already reached. Art. 
100 a (4) is not confined only to temporary measures and nar­
rowly limited hazardous situations and should, unlike the safe­
guard clause in Art. 100 a (5), on certain conditions allow a 
Member State to make a lastingly deviant regulation. However, a 
Member State's recourse to autonomous national exceptional reg­
ulations might prove improper within the meaning of Art. 100 a 
(4), third sentence, if a safety interest could also be adequately 
taken into account through the safeguard clause procedure of Art. 
100 a (5)262.
It can be expected that Member States' powers deriving 
from Art. 100 (4) will be restricted by the principle of propor-
258 So also Ehlermann 1986, 104. But cf. by contrast Ehlermann, 1987, 
394-95.
259 Meier, 1987, 540; see also Seidel, 62-63.
260 Steindorff, 1986, 702.
261 Another opinion is held by Glaesner, EuR 21 (1986), 134.




























































































tionality developed in the case law. This is that a measure taken 
must be suitable for securing the object of protection adduced, 
and be necessary without being disproportionate; that is, it must 
be the measure that least hampers free movement of goods263. To 
limit the danger of the Common Market being split by measures 
of individual Member States under Art. 100 a (4), the Commis­
sion has to ensure that national measures that continue to apply 
one-sidedly do not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on trade among Member States. These 
two criteria are derived from Art. 36 EEC, second sentence. The 
ECJ has, in delimiting Member States' rights of reservation vis-à- 
vis free movement of goods, undertaken comprehensive verifica­
tion of proportionality, referring not only to the ban on arbitrary 
discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade. If it takes the 
same line in the case of the safeguard clause of Art. 100 a (4), the 
Commission should acquire further-reaching powers of verifica­
tion and prohibition than would appear from the wording of Art. 
100 a (4), second sentence264. In order to permit rapid judicial 
control where necessary, the Commission and the other Member 
States are exempted from the procedures laid down in Articles 
169 and 170 EEC when they wish to impugn unilateral action by 
a Member State under Art. 100 a (4). This indicates that a deter­
mination by the Commission, that a Member State's provision is 
in conformity with Community law or not, does not constitute 
law-making265. If refusal of confirmation constituted law-mak­
ing, the deviant Member State could bring an action for avoid­
ance pursuant to Art. 173 EEC266, and no provision on simplified
263 In detail see the account in Chapter IV, 1.2.2 supra. See also Glaesner, 
EuR 21 (1986), 135; Seidel, 1986, 66-67; Rogge, 1986, 461.
264 Cf. Seidel, 1986, 67.
265 For details on this see Seidel, 1986, 64-66. By contrast Meier, 1987, 
540, with his unconvincing reference to the confirmation provisions of 
Art. 93 (3) EEC, which are not taken over into An. 100 a (4). This 
reference is also found in Forwood/Clough, 1986, 403.




























































































appeal to the Court, by the Commission or another Member State, 
would have been required.
Over and above the objects of protection of Art. 36 EEC, a 
Member State may appeal to protection of the working environ­
ment or of the environment, but not to other binding requirements 
developed in the Cassis de Dijon case law as implicit reservation 
of Art. 30 EEC. It has no legal significance that the case law on 
the implicit reservation of Art. 30 EEC speaks of "mandatory" 
requirements whereas Art. 100 a (4) only mentions "major" ones. 
Both measures under the implicit reservation of Art. 30 EEC and 
steps justified by Art. 36 EEC must, like departures justified by 
Art. 100 a (4), meet the criteria of the proportionality principle, 
which has been handled strictly by the ECJ. The accompanying 
comparative table shows what departures Art. 100 a (4) brings in 
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It is hard to answer the question as to whether Art. 100 a (4) 
allows only appeal to already existing national provisions, ruling 
out the possibility of adopting new and further-reaching national 
requirements in an already harmonised area, contrary to the doc­
trine of preemption267. In favour one may adduce the fact that 
Art. 100 a (4), first sentence, allows only the application of 
national provisions, but for the field of industrial safety and envi­
ronmental protection, the comparable Articles 118 a (3) and 130 t 
explicitly allow further-reaching measures to be "maintained or 
introduced". There are, though, grounds for doubting this position 
too: the preemption doctrine derives its legitimacy largely from 
the fact that all Member States have agreed to a particular mea­
sure; it is just this full consensus that is lacking here. With a 
restriction to the application of already existing measures, a 
Member State with no relevant national provisions would be 
unilaterally disadvantaged.
For many types of cases, there could be a pragmatic com­
promise by focusing on the date when the time-limit for 
transposing a particular harmonisation directive expires, not the 
date when a harmonisation directive was decided by majority. As 
long as the transposition period has not expired, Member States 
would be allowed to regulate a matter freely268. This would give 
a Member State the possibility of deciding on a further-reaching 
national measure during the time-limit for transposition and con­
tinuing to apply it after expiring of that period, following the pro­
cedure provided for in Art. 100 a (4).
267 Explicitly stated by Reich, 1987, No. 176; see also Ehlermann, 1986, 
104. BEUC, Actualités No. 51 (2/1986), 9 criticises these restrictions. 
For the admissibility of introducing tighter national legislation once the 
Council has adopted the harmonisation measure see Miller, 1987, 503- 
04.





























































































This still leaves unanswered the general question, not spe­
cific to Art. 100 a (4), as to whether and under what conditions 
unilateral action by a Member State remains permissible when 
new risks come to light following harmonisation269. In just those 
areas where the Community has replaced Member States' powers 
by its activities, the Commission is obliged not only to set up and 
properly operate the Common Market, but also to protect such 
objects of legal protection as those listed in Art. 36 EEC. If it has 
not responded to newly emerging hazardous situations not yet 
covered by harmonisation measures, there is ipso facto no Com­
munity regulation, and Member States are, if the Community 
does not act, not prevented from taking protective measures 
themselves in response to the new risk. If the case is one of inten­
sification of a hazardous situation already covered by Community 
law, Member States must aim at raising the Community level of 
protection270.
A manageable distinction is required between harmonisation 
measures under Art. 100 a to complete the internal market on the 
one hand, and environmental protection and industrial safety 
arrangements on the other, since Articles 118 a and 130 t allow 
Member States to introduce or maintain higher protection even in 
a harmonised area without further substantive or procedural re­
strictions271; in contrast Art. 100 a (4) appeals to industrial safety 
or environmental protection dependent on the conditions 
described. The relevant point is the primary object of the mea­
sure272. If it is concerned primarily with creating the internal 
market, that is, with the free movement of goods, persons, ser-
269 On this see Skordas, 1986, 152-177.
270 On this issue, in connection with vehicle catalysers and lead-free 
petrol, see Steindorff, Umweltschutz, 1984 and Ress, 1985.
271 See the statements by Zuleeg, 1987, 283-286 on the principle of best 




























































































vices and capital in the various Member States with as little 
restriction as possible from different standards, then appeal to 
increased industrial safety or environmental protection is possible 
only under the restrictive conditions of Art. 100 a (4). If instead, 
a measure has to do primarily with the working environment 
within the meaning of Art. 118 a or with environmental protec­
tion within the meaning of Art. 130 r, that is, so to speak, with 
raising the "quality of life” in the Community, then Member 
States are not subject to any further restrictions if they wish to 
bring in higher levels of protection relative to industrial safety or 
the environment.
The simplified decision-making by qualified majority in the 
Council may ultimately have a disintegrative effect. This might 
occur because of the possibility of more than temporary deroga­
tion pursuant to Art. 100 a (4) not only by outvoted Member 
States, irrespective of an acute hazardous situation, The Com­
mission and Council will therefore have to consider whether they 
wish to push forward decisions by qualified majority and put up 
with the uncertainty, deriving particularly from Art. 100 a (4), for 
harmonisation already attained, or else strive as previously for 
unanimity, providing safeguard clauses specific to each direc- 
tive273.
4.2 Art. 100 b — mutual recognition
The internal market is to be set up by 31 December 1992. 
As regards the legal effect of this date, the conference made the 
following declaration in the Final Act:
272 See Reich, 1987, No. 176. On the practical significance of this alloca­
tion, see the instructive example in Reich, 1987, No. 180.




























































































"By means of the provisions in Article 8, the Confer­
ence wishes to express its firm political will to take the 
decisions necessary to complete the internal market as 
defined in those provisions before 1 January 1993, and 
more particularly, the decisions necessary to imple­
ment the Commission's programme described in the 
White Paper on the Internal Market. Setting the date of 
31 December 1992 does not create an automatic legal 
effect." (Our translation of the German version).
This declaration should be understood as a response by the 
conference to the Commission's original proposal whereby after 1 
January 1993 every Member State will automatically be obliged 
to recognise the equivalence of non-harmonised provisions of 
other Member States in respect of persons, goods, services and 
capital274. Now Art. 100 b empowers the Council to decide by 
qualified majority before the end of 1992 that non-harmonised 
provisions relating to the function of the internal market are to be 
recognised as equivalent in all Member States. But Art. 100 a (4) 
should also apply here as appropriate. At the moment, one cannot 
really say how successful the efforts at legal harmonisation by 
1992 will really be by comparison with the White Paper's ambi­
tious programme275.
It seems doubtful whether Member States that have not 
managed to arrive at harmonising their laws will be ready to 
decide on the step of bringing about the internal market by 
mutual recognition of legislation. After all, this would mean 
leaving aside all the substantive criteria, such as taking a high
274 But see the declaration on Art. 100 b in the Final Act, whereby Art. 8 c 
applies also to proposals submitted by the Commission pursuant to Art. 
100 b.
275 Skepticism would seem appropriate. On the delay already accumulated 
by comparison with the ambitious programme, see the Commission's 
first report to the Council and the European Parliament on implemen­
tation of the Commission White Paper on completing the internal 
market, COM (86) 300 final of 26 May 1986 and the answer to written 




























































































level of protection as a basis (Art. 100 a (3)), and taking differing 
levels of individual economic development into account (Art. 8 c 
)276, quite irrespective of the fact that here, too, unilateral rejec­
tion of mutual recognition is possible by Art. 100 a (4). Finally, it 
remains unclear as to whether only provisions adopted by the 
Commission in the course of 1992 can be the object of Council 
decision on mutual recognition; in that case the principle would 
be enumerative, requiring recognition of a precisely defined set 
of provisions. The alternative to this narrow interpretation would 
be to read Art. 8 c as establishing the principle of mutual recog­
nition generally and a priori, even for provisions in non-har- 
monised areas, that is, where there is no Community law to exert 
a preemptive effect.
In view of these ambiguities, one is inclined to favour the 
further application of Articles 30 et. seq. in non-harmonised areas. 
They, too, lead, where Member States cannot exceptionally 
appeal to the objects of protection of Art. 36 EEC or to manda­
tory requirements within the meaning of the Cassis de Dijon case 
law, to mutual recognition as the outcome in practice. Mutual 
recognition that would no longer presuppose a careful evaluation 
of Member States' interest in protection and proceed on a case- 
by-case basis, would overstrain the consensus achieved among 
Member States in their acceptance of the internal market objec­
tive.
which, of the 59 proposals in the Annex to the White Paper that the 
Council should have adopted in 1985, only 16 were adopted in time.
276 But see the declaration on Art. 100 b in the Final Act, according to 
which Art. 8 c also applies to proposals to be submitted by the 




























































































4.3 Conferment of implementing powers on the 
Commission
Finally, the Single European Act provides for a supplement 
to Art. 145 EEC277. According to this the Council has, apart from 
certain exceptional cases not mentioned in detail, to confer upon 
the Commission powers to implement regulations adopted. By its 
Decision of 13 July 1987, the Council laid down the procedures 
for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Com­
mission278, thereby limiting the number of different committee 
procedures to which the Council may resort in the future in con­
ferring these powers. According to Art. 4 of that decision, the 
existing structure of some 300 committees is to remain unaf­
fected. In its original 1986 proposal279, the Commission had, 
referring back to practice to date280, provided for only three 
different types of committees, namely "advisory committees” as 
purely consultative bodies, "management committees", brought 
in so far particularly in the area of agricultural regulations for 
products coming under a common organisation of the market, and 
"regulatory committees", previously used primarily in the area of 
adapting directives to technical progress. The European Parlia­
ment, in its endeavours to strengthen the Community's executive 
powers while concomitantly expanding its own control powers, 
recommended only the procedures of the Advisory Committee 
(preferred in the context of Art. 100 a) and the Management 
Committee)281. The Council Decision, now heavily attacked by
277 Art. 10 SEA. On this subject see Bruha/Miinch, 1987 and Glaesner, 
EuR 21 (1986), 145-46.
278 O JL 197, 18 July 1987,33.
279 OJ C 70, 25 March 1986, 6-7.
280 On the various committees see Commission, list of committees of 
Council and Commission, EC Bulletin, supplement 2/80; Schmitt von 
Sydow, 1980, 131-185; Die Beratenden Ausschüsse, 1979; idem, 1983, 
Art. ,155, Nos. 48-54. In the Community budget for financial 1987, 244 
committees of the Commission were listed, OJ L 86, 30 March 1987, 
372-380. The expenditure on their work has approximately quintupled 




























































































the European Parliament282, provides for no less than seven 
different Committee procedures. The details of the four basic 
procedures and their variants are contained in the following table.
281 OJ C 297, 24 November 1986, 54 et seq.
282 EP Resolution of 8 July 1987, OJ C 246, 14 September 1987, 42-43 
and EP complaint against the Council submitted on 2 October 1987, 















































































































































































































The main novelty is the "safeguard clause committee proce­
dure", which most strongly restricts the Commission's powers. It 
has to inform the Council and Member States of any decision on 
protective measures; prior consultation of Member States may be 
provided for. Irrespective of whether the Commission agrees with 
a committee, which in the overall context is not explicitly men­
tioned but is usually set up in the case of safeguard clause proce­
dures, each Member State can bring the Commission's decision 
before the Council within a set period. The Council may then, 
within a set period and by qualified majority, take a different 
decision (variant a) or (variant b) confirm, amend or abrogate the 
Commission's decision; where the Council does not take a deci­
sion within the set period, the Commission's decision is treated as 
abrogated. In the latter case, and with variant (b) in the regulatory 
committee procedure, a block on the application of Community 
law is possible where the Council cannot arrive at a majority for a 
decision.
The Conference had called on the Council in the Final Act 
of the SEA to give preference to the "advisory committee" proce­
dure as regards the Commission's powers of implementation, in 
order to bring about the internal market; emphasis was placed on 
the rapidity and effectiveness of the decision-making process; 
this would have considerably increased the weight of the Com­
mission vis-à-vis the Council and thus vis-à-vis the Member 
States. The Council Decision of 13 July 1987 makes no mention 
of preference for using advisory committees.
In the procedure of management and regulatory committees, 
the Council was hitherto able to take the delegated power on 
itself again in the event of unresolvable disagreement of the 
Commission with the Committee, i.e. with the majority of Mem­
ber States' government representatives. These powers of recourse 
for the Council have so far been of a theoretical nature. The real




























































































adapt, and of a more or less diffuse basic consensus of national 
experts and the relevant Commission officials among themselves. 
This explains why the committees, which have in some cases 
been operating for many years now, have only rarely rejected 
Commission proposals, fairly rarely abstained from an opinion 
and often even voted unanimously283. This "filter of expert con­
sensus" is not provided for in the case of the safeguard clause 
procedure, which is usually highly controversial politically or at 
any rate, a very sensitive issue for the protection policies of 
Member States concerned.
5. Com patibility o f  the new harmonisation policy  with  
the EEC Treaty
In legally evaluating the new approach, two groups of ques­
tions should be distinguished: those of its compatibility with the 
EEC Treaty, and the legal problems with implementing the indi­
vidual new directives patterned on the Model Directive284. Both 
sets of questions can, as long as important elements in the new 
harmonisation policy have not been definitively conceived, to 
some degree be dealt with only hypothetically. Nevertheless, it is 
sensible to discuss these questions in practical terms too, when 
and in so far as they illustrate the limits to political room for 
manoeuvre and thus give purely legal considerations additional 
weight.
283 Schmitt v. Sydow, Art. 155, No. 52; more fully, idem, 1980, 160-166.
284 On this see Chapter V.3.; on the significance of Art. 100 a (4) of the 




























































































5.1 Inclusion of standardisation organisations in the
Community's law-making process
In the course of preparing the Low Voltage Directive285, the 
advocates and opponents of the reference technique thoroughly 
discussed the pros and cons of including standards organisations 
in the Community's legislative process. The uncontested starting 
points for these debates were the principle of limited individual 
empowerment whereby the Community could exercise only the 
powers allocated to it in the EEC Treaty, and the related principle 
of institutional equilibrium which, in particular, requires obser­
vance of the relationship depicted in the Treaty between Com­
mission and Council286. Both principles have to do with the 
upholding of the rule of law and of democracy, from which it 
also follows that these principles prohibit the assignment else­
where of Community legislative tasks.
The proponents of the Low Voltage Directive referred above 
all to the legally non-binding nature of standards; the prohibition 
on delegation would not be infringed if and because the specifi­
cation of safety objectives laid down in the Directive would ulti­
mately be under the control of governmental bodies, and because 
the safeguard clause procedure of Art. 9 did not rule out emer­
gency measures287. Yet this argument has two weak points. First, 
the structure of the Low Voltage Directive gives harmonised, 
international and national standards (and conformity certificates 
issued by a national body) considerable legal importance, merely 
because conformity with the standards is a basis for presuming 
compliance with the safety objectives in the Directive and thus a 
right to access to Member State markets288. This legal effect can
285 OJ L 77, 26 March 1973, 29.
286 For a recent description see Hilf, 1982, 310 et seq.




























































































be removed only through the apposite safeguard procedure. A 
second, graver objection is directed against the merely formalistic 
interpretation of the prohibition on delegation. Especially in the 
case of the Low Voltage Directive, it is indisputable that its 
safety objectives open up very considerable leeway for standardi­
sation organisations289 and that the level of safety is, in practice, 
essentially determined by private standards290.
The Model Directive modified the reference technique of 
the Low Voltage Directive. The safety conformity of European 
and national standards is continually checked through the 
"management of the list of standards", though there is no such 
preliminary control in the case of national certificates of confor­
mity; to that extent, Member States are solely responsible for the 
reliability of their certification bodies. With all these provisions, 
the Model Directive presupposes that safety requirements be 
more precisely formulated than in the Low Voltage Directive291.
These changes take the force away from the objections 
raised against the Low Voltage Directive, but do not remove the 
problem of delegation. By contrast with what has often been 
asserted in the literature292, the controversy that broke out over 
the Low Voltage Directive has not been clarified even by the ECJ 
judgment in case 8 1 5/79293. While in its decision the ECJ urged
288 Cf. Lauwaars, The Model-Directive on Technical Harmonisation, EUT 
Colloquium Papers, DOC IUE 169/86 (COL 82), 12.
289 Cf. 3.2 supra at note 158.
290 Cf. esp. Róhling, 1972, 114 et seq. and more details in 2.4 supra; the 
European Parliament’s Committee for economic and mandatory affairs 
and industrial policy (note 163 supra) arrives at an answer to this 
objection that is as contradictory as it is legally untenable. The 
Committee categorically rejects involvement with ^'technical details" 
(loc. cit., point 2) and alleges that there is no "abandonment of legisla­
tive powers” because technical regulations secure general bindingness 
and legal force (sic!) only "where the Community legislator confers it 
upon them in the prescribed procedure" (loc. cit., 11).




























































































Member States to comply with the Low Voltage Directive294, it 
did not explicitly address itself to the issue of the prohibition on 
delegation. The sole relevant decision of the ECJ, as far as we 
can see, is from long ago. It concerned the delegation of decision­
making powers of the High Authority on private institutions set 
up pursuant to Art. 53 ECS. The ECJ drew a distinction: "clearly 
defined executive powers" are unobjectionable; "discretionary 
powers" instead "bring about an actual transfer of responsibility", 
"since it replaces the choices of the delegator by the choices of 
the delegate"295. But these statements do not offer much help in 
deciding either. By contrast with the situation in Art. 53 ECSC, 
co-operation between the Community and European standards 
organisations is based not on a particular provision of the EEC 
Treaty but only on the Council resolution of 16 July 19 84296. 
Above all, however, it is hard to draw a line between mere 
"executive powers" and inadmissible "transfers of discretionary 
powers"297; and in the case of the delegation issue with reference 
to standards, where what counts is the relationship between 
formal decision-making powers and actual possibilities of influ­
ence, it can only be applied in the form of a description of general 
trends. The more precisely safety objectives are set forth in
292 Cf. most recently Bruha, 1986, 25.
293 Judgment of 2 December 1980, ECR [19801 3583 - Cremonini v. 
Vrankovich.
294 See also Judgment of 14 July 1977, Case 123/76, ECR [1977] 1449 - 
Commission v. Italy. In this procedure the Republic of Italy, the defen­
dant, further asserted that the legal effects attributed to European stan­
dards in Art. 5 of the Low Voltage Directive could at any rate not arise 
where they have been adopted only by a qualified majority. This was 
opposed at the time by the Commission and Advocate-General Warner 
(loc. cit., 1470) with the thesis that all Member States had by their 
agreement to the Low Voltage Directive accepted CENELEC's deci­
sion-making procedure and were therefore now bound by its outcome. 
Understandably, the ECJ avoided adopting this position as its own (loc. 
cit., 1458, para. 8). Possibly the tighter version of the recognition pro­
cedure in the Model Directive was motivated in part by this problem.
295 ECJ, 4, 13 June 1958, Case 9/56, ECR [1958] 9, at 43-44.




























































































directives, and standardisation mandates to European standardis­
ation organisations are formulated, and the more intensivy the 
follow-up supervisions of standards in recognition and safeguard 
clause procedures and those regarding conformity certificates 
from national bodies are exercised, the easier it is to throw out 
the objection that the new approach means impermissible delega­
tion of legislative powers7-98.
5.2 The institutional balance between Council and 
Commission
The Model Directive strengthened the Commission's posi­
tion not only in managing the list of standards but also in admin­
istering the safeguard clause procedure299. This makes it easier to 
defend the reference technique against the objection on delega­
tion of powers, but at the same time raises the further question as 
to whether the Commission's strong legal position is compatible 
with the principle of institutional balance. The Treaty basis for 
delegating "implementing powers" of the Council to the Com­
mission is Art. 155 EEC, fourth indent. A widespread extensive 
interpretation of this provision in the literature states that the 
extent and procedures for conferring decision-making powers on 
the Commission is within the Council's discretion300. Delegation 
without any criteria or bounds would be incompatible with the
297 See Hilf, 1982, 317 et seq.
298 An additional objection to the reference technique is derived by 
Lauwaars (op. cit., note 285), from the fact that privately set standards 
are not subject to any judicial review (see also Avocate-General Roe- 
mer's opinion in Case 10/56, Judgment of 13 June 1958, ECR [1958] 
177 - Meroni. Member States can now secure judicial verification that 
standards are in conformity with respect to safety, and firms can 
defend themselves against refusal of conformity certificates by certifi­
cation bodies.




























































































principle of institutional balance, to which the term 
"implementing regulations" refers, and which is not even at the 
disposal of the Council, especially since delegation restricts the 
European Parliament's powers of involvement in the Community 
law-making process301. Following the European Parliament's 
censure, demarcation formulas were developed requiring that the 
Council itself should take the "essential basic decision" and the 
Commission's leeway in decision be limited in such a way that 
"the political, economic and legal effects of the Treaty are deter­
mined by the Council’s measure and are not affected by the 
Commission"302.
The ECJ has not directly taken a position on these problems 
of interpretation. Admittedly, there is a statement in the judgment 
of 17 December 1970 that application of Art. 155 EEC is "at the 
discretion of the Council"303. But the matter at dispute in this 
judgment was the admissibility of a management committee pro­
cedure that restricted the Commission's decision-making auton­
omy. Accordingly, the ECJ's pronouncement cited has to be read 
along with its recognition of the possibility for the Council, pro­
vided for in the management committee procedure, to "delegate 
to the Commission an implementing power of considerable 
scope, subject to its power (specifically where the management 
Committee rejects Commission measures) to take the decision 
itself where necessary"304. The same approach has been followed 
in Cases 23 and 37/75305, concerning a conferment of
300 Cf. Schindler, 1972, 152 et seq. ; Schmitt von Sydow, 1980, 64 et seq.
301 On the European Parliament's position see the references in Schindler, 
1972, 149 et seq.
302 According to Grabitz, 1982, 50; see also Ehlermann, Note on ECJ 
Judgment of 31 March 1971, Case 22/70, EuR 1971, 242-43., 250 et 
seq., 252 and Chapter III, 2.6 supra.





























































































"comprehensive implementing powers" with broad room for dis­
cretion" in cases where the transfer of powers by the Council was 
compensated by involvement of Member State representatives in 
the Commission's decision-making process and by corrective 
powers for the Council. This is in line with the political meaning 
of the management committee and regulatory committee proce­
dure, but is at the same time an objectively obvious consequence 
of the delegation of implementing powers that include discretion.
The wide-ranging debate on shifting decision-making 
powers to "non-Treaty" bodies, which always concerned the 
admissibility of restrictions on the Commission's autonomy of 
decision306, ignored the consequences of extensive delegation of 
"implementing powers" for the political legitimation of Commu­
nity law. But now that the practice of delegation has become 
established, and at the same time highly articulated machinery to 
protect Member States' influence has been developed, employ­
ment of these controls must also be in line with the nature of the 
delegation concerned. A nomiative interpretation of the principle 
of "balance", which sees this principle as one of maintaining 
Member States' possibilities of influence, can be combined with 
the analytical observation that the Community, wherever it 
creates supranational legal structures, has to allow Member States 
possibilities of involvement in its decision-making process307. 
But now the Final Act of the governmental conference on the 
Single European Act has explicitly asked the Council "to give the 
Advisory Committee procedure in particular a predominant 
place", specifically "for the exercise of the powers of implemen­
tation . . . within the field of Art. 100 a"308, and the European
305 Case 23/75, Judgment of 30 October 1975, ECR [1975] 1279, 1302 -
Rey Soda; Case 37/75, Judgment of 11 November 1975, ECR [1975]
1339, 1346 - Bagusat.





























































































Parliament has firmly supported this proposal309. Even these 
statements were already lagging behind the Commission's origi­
nal intentions on amendment of Art. 145 EEC310, and also 
presuppose the powers of action remaining to Member States 
pursuant to Art. 100 a (4). Now the Council decision of 13 July 
1987311 has politically (even if not legally) strengthened the 
position of Member States in the "advisory committee" proce­
dure, and above all abandoned the favouring of this type of 
committee in connection with activities oriented towards bringing 
about the internal market. This development quite meets the legal 
reservations regarding the Council's depriving itself of its powers 
by transferring decision-making powers in extremely sensitive 
questions of legislative policy to the Commission, under the title 
of mere "implementing powers".
5.3 F u tu re  perspectives
A precise formulation of safety objectives can not only fend 
off the delegation issue but also clearly limit the "implementing 
powers" of the Commission. But this reaction would once again 
bring into the question the practical advantages which the new 
harmonisation policy is all about. In order to make the new har­
monisation policy legally unassailable, R.M. Lauwaars has sug­
gested setting up a European standards institute on the basis of 
Art. 235 EEC, with the power to decide on adoption of standards 
through decisions within the meaning of Art. 189 EEC312. In
307 Chapter III, 1.2.2 supra.
308 Cf. 3.6, note 241 and 4.3 supra.
309 See the European Parliament's opinion, printed in OJ C 227, 8 Septem­
ber 1986, 54, concerning the Commission’s proposal on the exercise of 
implementing powers transferred to the Commission, OJ C 70, 25 
March 1986, 6.




























































































practice, this proposai has little chance of being realised, if only 
because the whole setup of the new approach offers alternative 
ways out, which have already in part been taken.
The legal systems of Member States that allocate functions 
in the law-making process directly or indirectly to standardisation 
organisations, restrict this function by powers of influencing the 
standardisation organisations, by requirements on the trans­
parency of standardisation work and on guarantees of "balanced” 
rights of participation, and through governmental checks on the 
outcome of standardisation313. The general guidelines on co­
operation between the Commission and European standardisation 
organisations314, though no doubt in need of further clarification, 
and the form of the recognition procedure in the Model Directive, 
point in the same direction. By using these guidelines, however, 
the Commission can secure transparency in the standardisation 
procedures and possibilities for participation by "interested cir­
cles" vis-à-vis only the European standardisation organisations. If 
the principles of the general guidelines are meant as an answer to 
the delegation issue, then compliance with them ought consis­
tently to be made binding on all national standardisation organi­
sations seeking recognition of their standards; likewise, recogni­
tion of national standards would have to depend on correspond­
ing requirements. Community law requirements on standardisa­
tion procedure would, however, not take account of the objec­
tions to the Commission’s formal position in the recognition and 
safeguard clause procedure arising out of the principle of institu­
tional balance. It would therefore seem appropriate to adapt the 
rules of procedure of the Standing Committee mentioned in Sec-
311 OJ C 197, 18 July 1987, on this see 4.3 supra.
312 Loc. cit. (note 281); on the conditions for this sort of foundation see 
Lauwaars, 1979, and Hilf, 1982, 322 et seq.
313 See Chapter V, 6 infra.




























































































tion IX (9) of the Model Directive to the patterns of the Manage­
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